SYRIANS UNDER TEMPORARY PROTECTION IN TURKEY:
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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Due to globalisation and political, economic and social crises in the international arena, migration has become a central issue in the world, and studies in this field have picked up speed. Globalisation abolishes boundaries between countries but at the same time gives rise to new ones. Today, the phenomenon of migration has become even more critical in the globalising world order. People come from different geographies and as a result give rise to intercultural interaction. Therefore, it is seen that today international migration has become a very important phenomenon for many countries. Migration, being a result of various reasons, causes different cultures to meet and know each other, as well as creating intercultural conflicts.

Although immigrating to far lands and crossing boundaries is as old as human history, the concept of international migration, in the sense it is considered as today, was only developed since the 19th century. For during this century, the sovereignty of nation-states, which was being established on the basis of ethnic and cultural unity, was wielded on the land they identified as theirs, as well as on their citizens living in these areas through their political power, emerged in its most distinct form, and achieved international recognition. This gave rise to a process involving the identification of national boundaries, and the registration of those passing through these boundaries under the identities of “citizen” and “alien.” In this sense, the phenomenon referred to as “refuge” came into existence.

Refuge affects both the individual who is forced to leave their country, and the target country and its citizens. Therefore, the solution to the problem requires policies involving global partnerships. If the causes for this global mobility were to be eliminated, the negative results of refuge would be minimized. Unfortunately, sources are sparse regarding migration, even though it has currently become an important issue. As an institution maintaining that a more livable world can be achieved by protecting rights and equality, we too carry out various studies in the hopes of shedding light over the topic of migration, and the problems it causes.
I am happy to introduce you our publication on International Migration, in which we, as World Academy for Local Government and Democracy (WALD), tackle migration, which is among the most important subjects of the 21st century. I am convinced that our book “Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey: Findings and Recommendations,” in which we examine migration in its various aspects, will prove a very useful source not only for local governments, but also for everyone carrying out research on the topic of migration. This edition was enhanced further with the addition of new articles written by esteemed scholars. I extend my heartfelt gratitude to all academics allowing us to benefit from their valuable ideas, and to all those who had a share in bringing you this book.

Best Regards,

Mehmet DUMAN

WALD Chairman of the Board
Internal and external migration, especially irregular migration, is among today’s most widely discussed subjects in the world and in Turkey. The tragedy of refugees who are forced to leave their countries under dire conditions - especially of Syrians in the recent years - maintains its place in the world’s agenda, sometimes in the form of a child swept ashore in the Aegean Sea, sometimes as a kick delivered at the border of a European country, and sometimes as other similar images that trample on human dignity.

As a result of the recent civil war in Syria, millions of Syrians immigrated to neighbouring countries, especially Turkey. Turkey, pursuing an open door policy, granted these Syrian immigrants temporary asylum rights. As a result, a policy specific to Syrians was developed. Within this framework, new arrangements were made in legislation, and Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection was passed (OJ 28615 of 11 April 2013). Finally, Law No. 6735 on International Labour was passed (OJ 29800 of 13 August 2016) in order to identify, implement and monitor policies regarding international labour and to regulate the procedures and principles, powers and responsibilities regarding works and transactions related to work permits and work permit exemptions to be granted to foreigners, as well as to regulate the rights and obligations in the field of international labour. Regulations under these laws are also being published. Within this framework, the Directorate-General of Migration Management was established under the Ministry of Interior. This directorate-general was organised in 81 provinces and 148 districts as well as abroad. This way, international migration found a place in the country’s agenda in terms of both legislation and public administration.

In the field of international migration, reports, workshops and publications are carried out by local governments, academic institutions and non-governmental organisations as well as central administration studies. These efforts are not limited to the national field, but also have an important place in the international arena.

Through this extraordinary agenda, the irregular migration to Turkey is discussed on both national and international platforms. Headed by our President, the government of the Republic of Turkey provides this new population in our country with the necessary support. In fact, speaking on 21.09.2016 at the
leaders’ summit on “Refugees” held in the USA, our President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed that Turkey, as one of the countries that host the largest number of asylum seekers, with a human-centred understanding, has opened its borders to anyone fleeing persecution from the very start, and shall continue approaching everyone with the same sensibility, regardless of ethnic origin, faith, denomination and disposition. Explaining that the invoiced amount spent by Turkey for asylum seekers up to today has exceeded 12 billion Dollars, which amount is also matched by that spent by non-governmental organisations, he described the general framework with the following words: “Against these figures, the total support we have received from around the world is only 512 million Dollars. We do not want to condemn asylum seekers to the camp life; we do not want to continue this process with tent cities or container cities. While 300 thousand out of 3 million are still hosted at tent and container cities, others live in houses in various cities. In order that the asylum seekers may stand on their own feet, we allow them to live in our cities and work, and we have already initiated the process of granting them citizenship. Of course, this also brings with it a social risk problem. We have taken this risk, and we do not regret it.” The warm attitude and statements of our President, Prime Minister and other authorities reinforced trust among the nation in a sense, facilitating commingling.

Various meetings on the subject, at both state level and academic level are attended by municipalities, expressing the roles of municipalities in the matter and their contributions to possible solutions. An example that took place recently was the meeting entitled “Cities’ Response to Migration” held during the Mayors’ Session of the World Humanitarian Summit held in Istanbul between 22 - 24 May 2016. At the meeting, attended by UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon, UCLG and Istanbul Mayor Kadir Topbaş as well as other mayors, the fact that refugees and immigrants should be included in national and urban development plans was addressed. The meeting also dwelt upon refugees’ contributions to cities’ welfare.

In addition to meetings on the Syrians under temporary protection in our country, reports prepared by various corporations and institutions were also published. Examples to these institutions are AFAD, SETA, the Istanbul Bilgi University Children Studies Unit, USAK & Brooking Institute, Human Rights Watch, and UNICEF. While reports make an important contribution to understanding the recent developments, academic papers on the subject are still too few.
Studies such as this study entitled “Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey: Findings and Recommendations” was planned as a publication targeting a wide readership on the Syrians under temporary protection, which holds an important place in our country’s agenda. This compilation hosted by the World Academy of Local Government and Democracy (WALD), which reflects the opinions of academics from various universities, has a quality that allows use by individuals and corporations from both the academy and various fields. Efforts were made to limit the authors’ fields of study in order to avoid repetition in the articles, and theoretical and practical subjects were included by also taking international practices into consideration. It is also important that among the authors are administrators of the migration studies centres of the Hacettepe and Yıldırım Beyazıt Universities. At the end of the book is a section where the nine chapters of the book are summarised and evaluated.

While creating the general framework of the book, care was taken to address the findings related to the following headings, as observed in the field. The first of these, policies regarding international migration, is formed by central government. Policies and decisions on migration are made by the central government, and the registration, checking and similar applications for these are conducted by provincial migration directorates under the governor’s offices, which are central government units. Aids and applications at the tent cities are conducted under AFAD. Aids and other applications in the cities are mostly carried out by municipalities. The coordination of central administration and local governments is obligatory for successful outcomes.

The second points is that, as a result of irregular migration, a large number of people (sometimes thousands and even millions) take advantage of the cities’ existing infrastructure, becoming partners to the inhabitants of those cities. In other words, immigrants use cities’ common networks and areas such as water, wastewater, power, natural gas, road network, transportation and parks. Therefore, a sudden increase in population uses up the redundant capacity in the existing networks and/or requires a renovation of the existing network or its rebuilding.

The third point is an important observation that the irregularity of the migrations requires the rearrangement of the population projections.

The fourth point is that almost all foreigners arriving through irregular migration are in need. Aid is provided from the central administration’s budget or
from different resources (from foreign sources to a very small extent) in order to meet the needs of those living in tent cities. While these needs vary according to the qualities of the immigrants, the focus is on basic human needs such as food, shelter and clothing.

Fifth, aid to immigrants by non-governmental organisations and individuals (by real and legal persons) have an important place. For instance, the provision of furniture or food for a foreign family arriving at the neighbourhood, by an association, foundation or the locals, and aid due to religious holidays such as Ramadan or Eid al-Adha are quite frequent.

Sixth, a field that must be taken into consideration for the solution of the problem of employment opportunities and incomes of immigrants, is employment. Granting foreigners work permits is arranged by law. A law has been enacted on this matter in our country. However, it is possible that income, in particular wages and salaries earned by immigrants remain below average.

The seventh point is that, efforts directed at “social adaptation” in the case that immigrants decide to settle for a long period or permanently, must be considered. This, in turn, gives rise to many fields of activity such as providing immigrants with places and facilities to define, introduce and represent themselves, found their own associations, form religious or other charity institutions and practice their religious beliefs. Adaptation efforts concentrate on future planning, especially teaching children Turkish and provide schooling for them, regulating employment rights and monitoring implementation, settlement policies, efficient registration and planning, and granting local governments greater initiative to strengthen adaptation processes. Within this framework, efforts made by local governments in European countries are mostly directed at concrete applications. Under this heading, important discussions take place with regard to subjects such as cemeteries, cultural and religious activities, the construction, financing and taxation of buildings, sacrifice slaughtering centres, women-only places (such as swimming pools) etc. (Council of Europe, 2008; 46-73). For instance, the national authority in Lebanon is wary about the possibility that the Syrians may stay permanently. Also, the multi-religion and multi-sect structure of that country renders a solution more difficult.

The eighth point is that one of the main problems experienced by immigrants is the communication problem stemming from the fact that they cannot speak the
language of that country. Also, the education of children and youths arriving along with immigrant families can also pose important problems in providing equal opportunities for the future.

Ninth, since the need for accommodation stemming from irregular migration cannot be addressed in a short period of time, problems such as squatting or the resettlement in slum areas emerge.

Tenth, new ghettos are formed by immigrants. Security problems may be seen in such locations.

Also, along with the negative aspects of migration, the contribution of the dynamism brought about by immigration to the economy and to cultural intermingling must also be taken into consideration.

It appears that policies on international irregular migration and their reflection on practice will be occupying our agenda for a long time. For these require staged efforts in the fields of politics, culture, economy and foreign relations. In this sense, this study constitutes a first stage in this subject. The following stage will be to add the experiences and bring the subject to the international arena by publication in a foreign language. I hope that correct and lasting policies will be made together with practitioners in order to give rise to good practices.

I wish to congratulate and thank all authors who have made efforts in preparing this work. Also, I sincerely thank WALD Chairman of the Board and UCLG-MEWA Secretary-General Mehmet Duman and his team, who have supported the study.

Editor

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IRREGULAR INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Introduction

Migration is generally grouped as voluntary migration or involuntary, in other words irregular, migration. Voluntary migration involves people changing the place they live in order to achieve a better life, while compulsory migration involves people involuntarily abandoning the place they live, even their countries, for various reasons, most of which are political.

The number of Syrian nationals who were registered and given “temporary protection” in Turkey has reached 2,749,410 as of April 2016. Considering those who have not been registered, the number of Syrian nationals in Turkey can be said to have reached around 2.9 - 3 million. As a result, the ratio of Syrian nationals in Turkey has reached 3.5% of the population of Turkey. Considering also that around an additional 300 thousand refugees arrived to Turkey from around 165 countries, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, within the last five years, it can be said that there are currently 3.2 - 3.3 million refugees in Turkey. With these numbers, Turkey has become the country with the largest number of refugees in the world. This extraordinarily rapid process and the increasing numbers indicate the largest foreign immigration mobility encountered in Turkish history.

The demographic properties of the immigrants are as important as their number. The most interesting demographic property of the Syrians in Turkey is the fact that they are a young population. The ratio of Syrians under 18 is about 55%, which corresponds to 1.5 million youths and children. According to UN data, the ratio of 0-4 years of age in this vast amount of population is 20%. In other words, 550 thousand of the

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Syrians in Turkey consist of those under 4 years of age. Considering that, within the last five years the average time spent in Turkey by Syrians was 3 years, it can be said that at least 200 thousand children out of this 549 thousand were born in Turkey. The ratio of those arriving with their families is high. Child, woman and elderly immigrants as well as those with disabilities constitute the populations that require social protection. It is also important to identify the qualities of this population with regard to municipal services. Many municipalities have identified the qualities of the immigrating population through household interviews or birth records. However, we have found that even municipalities with large populations consider services for foreigners as the central administration’s duty and therefore carry out no such efforts.

With respect to international migration, the driving and attracting factors effective in terms of economy express people’s tendency to migrate from locations providing a low income to those providing a high income. Migrations from lower living standards to those that are more attractive, and from lower income levels to higher income levels are on the increase. In fact, a serious choice in favour of large cities, particularly Istanbul, that have a higher share within the gross domestic product, can be seen.

The crisis in Syria is already in its 5th year, and the expectation of peace in Syria in the short and medium term has weakened. Research indicates that the Syrians, over 91% of whom have been living in urban areas for more than three years, do not wish to return to their country. Therefore, it is useful to reiterate the findings made by C. Reinauer, Mayor of the State of Berlin, Kreuzberg in Germany (Zeytinburnu Municipality, 2006): “Worker immigrants in Germany were accepted as guests for many years. Therefore, the necessity for them to learn the German language was not dwelt upon. Since it was not thought that they would stay permanently, an infrastructure for living together was not prepared. What was meant by cultural integration was “assimilation”. Therefore, a pluralist administration understanding is important in the solution of migration-related issues in a multi-ethnic society”.

The most important factor determining international migration is the decisions made by the central administration. “Temporary protection”
was provided to “guests” escaping the civil war in Syria and seeking asylum in Turkey, and an “open door policy” was implemented. Efforts were made to place immigrants mainly in camps, but large-scale irregular migration influx occurred to large cities, which is seen to continue despite being in a lesser intensity. Instead of compulsory settlement, the immigrants were granted the right to choose where to settle.

In addition to determining the immigration policy, central administration also provides immigrants living in camps and cities with financial support. The cost suffered by Turkey due to the Syrians in Turkey has reached incredible dimensions during the last five years. The daily expense made for the 25 camps in 10 cities, where only 9% of the Syrians live, is over 5 million Dollars. In other words, the cost in the camps alone has exceeded 9 billion Dollars. These people are also provided with free medical services and medication. These expenses are at an extraordinary level. The average daily number of Syrian babies born in Turkey is 125. This figure means 45 thousand babies a year. The number of polyclinic services provided in five years is over 13 million, while the number of operations has exceeded 340 thousand. The daily number of prescriptions is around 15-20 thousand. Only 5% of these costs have been met from foreign sources. These figures do not include the expenditure made by municipalities and other corporations. During his speech at the UN Refugees Summit, our President indicated that Turkey spent around 12 billion $ for the asylum seekers and a similar amount was spent by non-governmental organisations, while the support from abroad amounted to only 512 million $ (speech of 29.9.2016). Again, during the same speech Mr. President specified Turkey’s policy regarding Syrians under temporary protection, saying: We do not want to condemn asylum seekers to the camp life; we do not want to continue this process with tent cities or container cities. While 300 thousand out of 3 million are still hosted at tent and container cities, others live in houses in various cities. In order that the asylum seekers may stand on their own feet, we allow them to live in our cities and work, and we have already initiated the process of granting them citizenship. Of course, this also brings with it a social risk problem. We have taken this risk, and we do not regret it. Up to today, we provided the necessary professional training to around 15 thousand Syrians, incorporating them into professional life”.

The municipalities at border regions also send to cities of Syria and Iraq basic necessities. For instance, the Şanlıurfa Municipality has sent Kobani humanitarian aid amounting to 9 million $ within the last one and a half years. Around 3,000 Kobani inhabitants who were injured during the clashes were treated at the hospitals of Şanlıurfa.\(^2\) Other municipalities and non-governmental organisations also carry out cross-border aid.

Outside camps, no migration influx to villages or hamlets occur. The Syrians, spread among all cities in Turkey, mostly settle in cities. The burden brought by migration to cities is mostly shouldered by the municipalities of those cities. In this process, the short-, medium- and long-term effects of migration are converged upon municipalities. How municipalities work in this process, the problems they encounter and the policies they form constitute the subject of this article. Although it is possible to solve the accommodation problems of camp inhabitants or to better examine and take care of their needs, it becomes difficult to reach unregistered Syrians living in the cities and to determine their living conditions as the refugee crisis becomes urbanised (TÜSEV, 2015). For this reason, systematically handling and analysing the problems the municipalities experience during this process is important in terms of the public policies to be created.

At this point it is useful to underline certain points in order to create a framework for the subject. Policies regarding international migration are formed by central government. Within this framework, policies and decisions on migration are made by the central government, and the registration, checking and similar applications for these are conducted by provincial migration directorates under the governor’s offices, which are central administration units. Aids and applications at the tent cities are conducted under AFAD. However, the main role lies with the municipalities with regard to aid and other practices in the cities. The coordination of central administration and local governments is obligatory for successful outcomes.

As a result of irregular migration, a large number of people (sometimes thousands and even millions) take advantage of the cities’ existing

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\(^2\) Declaration by the Mayor of Şanlıurfa Metropolitan: TBB İller ve Belediyeler Dergisi, Issue: 813.
infrastructure, becoming partners to the inhabitants of those cities. In other words, immigrants use cities’ common networks and areas such as water, wastewater, power, natural gas, road network, transportation and parks. Therefore, a sudden increase in population uses up the redundant capacity in the existing networks and/or requires a renovation of the existing network or its rebuilding. The speed and quality of the migration gives rise to the need to rearrange population projections. This, in turn, makes it difficult for local governments to make decisions and investments.

Social aid is one of municipalities’ main and visible roles in this matter. Almost all foreigners arriving through irregular migration are in need. The budget of the central administration is used to meet the existing needs of those in tent cities, while the needs of those migrating to cities are generally met by local governments. While varying according to the qualities of the immigrants, these needs are mostly in the areas of basic human needs, which are food, accommodation and clothing.

Immigration brings with it social and financial capital. Therefore, in addition to its negative effects, immigration may also bring an advantage. For this, the economic aspects of migration, such as employment and the establishment of businesses must also be taken into consideration.

Immigration records are kept by provincial immigration administrations. The address registration of those holding a residence permit or an identification card obtained from the migration administration at the district birth registries are made in accordance with the regulations.3 It is not possible to view the Syrians collectively through these records, but only individually through identification numbers. Also, authorised official bodies can also be viewed. Here, the basic finding related to our subject is that

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3 Principles and procedures relating to keeping settlement and address information on Turkish citizens as well as foreigners obtaining a residence permit for foreigners in Turkey with a minimum term of six months for any purpose, are regulated in accordance with the Address Registration System Regulations (O.J. 15/12/2006 No: 26377). According to the guidelines under this regulations, “The current location of those, whose previous place of settlement is not known or who have not obtained a place of settlement in Turkey in spite of having left their place of settlement in the foreign country, shall be considered to be their place of settlement” (Address Registration System Application Guidelines, article 3/7).
certain municipalities keep their own records as they do not have these records.⁴

It is noted that it is necessary for municipalities to assess the services addressing newcomers, which is also important in the process of creating public policies. In this article, the process in question shall be examined under the heading of exposing and evaluating applicable legislation, and then the services provided shall be examined under the headings of housing, education, social benefits, water and wastewater services, public transport and funeral services.

**Citizenship Criterion in Municipal Services**

In the European Council Local and Regional Administrations Congress documents, the subsidiarity and local government social and territorial cohesion are based upon “citizenship”. In fact, the word “citizen” is used in eight places in the European Charter of Local Self-Government, while no mention is made of those who are not citizens.⁵

The municipality is a public legal entity with administrative and financial autonomy established in order to meet the common local needs of the residents of the town, the decision-making body of which is elected

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⁴ The interviews we conducted with certain birth registries and municipalities brought us to the conclusion that there is a lack of coordination between corporations with regard to the records of foreigners. It was also seen that certain municipalities (such as the Istanbul Sultanbeyli Municipality) developed their own registration system. It is understood that migration records are not fully kept at certain provinces. All of the approximately 80,000 Syrians in Konya were registered (Interview with the Deputy Governor and Metropolitan Mayor).

⁵ In 1992 the European Council launched an initiative on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level with respect to foreigners’ participation in local social life. Accordingly, it was foreseen that foreigners having resided in the country for at least five years should be granted the rights granted to citizens. Providing foreigners with representatives at local level in order to facilitate relations with local governments and drawing up an integration pact between foreigners and host administrations were dwelt upon. In order to ensure the integration of the population of foreign origin and to work on the best practices on this subject, in 2006 the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Dublin) and the city of Stuttgart came together to found the European Network of Cities for Local Integration Policies for Migrants - CLIP (Council of Europe, 2007)
by voters. The Municipal Law has also regulated the concept of neighbourhood. A neighbourhood is an administrative unit located within the boundaries of the municipality, whose needs and priorities are similar and whose residents are in a relationship of neighbourhood. (Municipal Law No. 5393, Article 3). As understood from the definition, the Municipal Law is based on the ‘common needs of the town’.

The paragraphs of Article 14 of the Law which reads “Municipal services are provided at the locations closest to the citizens and through the most suitable methods. Methods suitable to the condition of those with disabilities, the elderly, the needy and those of low income shall be applied in providing services. The municipality’s duty, responsibility and sphere of authority, cover the area within municipal boundaries”, emphasises the concept of citizen with regard to benefiting from municipal services, underlining the municipality’s area of responsibility and authority. The conditions for voting and standing for election for municipal and local government have also been specified in the law. Accordingly, immigrants or asylum seekers may not take office in these administrations and may not participate in elections.

Article 71 of Law No. 5018 on Public Fiscal Management and Control defines “public loss”. According to this, is it possible for municipalities’ expenditure on foreigners to be assessed under public loss? Interviews held with many municipal officials revealed that the municipalities provided social aid to the Syrians under temporary protection through a foundation or association and/or a non-governmental organisation having social purposes founded by themselves. Certain municipalities, on the other hand, provided aid to citizens indicated in existing poor citizens lists, allowing the Syrians to benefit from these lists too. Again, our interviews with a number of experts from the Court of Accounts did not reveal any opinions by the Court of Accounts on municipalities with respect to aids that have been provided to Syrians up to today. Although not given much consideration perhaps because of the humanitarian aspect of the subject, aid by local governments to the Syrians under temporary protection or other foreigners must be placed under objective rules.

Article 14 of the Municipal Law lists the duties of municipalities. The Metropolitan municipal law also provides for task sharing between mu-
nicipalities. This way, under a system providing for a dual local administration structure in metropolises, task sharing between the metropolitan and district municipalities has been ensured. However, basic duties remain in the field of the metropolitan municipality.

Many local joint services remaining within the field of duties of municipalities concern immigrants and asylum seekers along with residents of the town. These are mainly water and sewer systems, transport, burial and cemetery services, social services and aid, marriage, vocation and skills acquisition, aids and services aimed at women, children and people with disabilities, the construction of public school buildings, the provision of tools and equipment, health services, aid in cash and in kind to support sports, emergency assistance, rescue and ambulance services. In fact, the failure to provide these services would seriously threaten not only the life and property safety of immigrants and asylum seekers, but also the wellbeing and security of residents.

The same article of the law also provides that priorities in providing services should be determined by taking into consideration the municipality’s financial status and the urgency of the service. This way, the municipality’s financial status and the urgency of the service shall be taken into consideration also with regard to local services to be provided to asylum seekers and immigrants.

Among the tasks assigned by the Municipal Law to the mayor is “taking the necessary precautions to ensure the peace, wellbeing, health and happiness of the townspeople” (Article 37). Therefore, taking the necessary measures to ensure the peace, wellbeing, health and happiness of both the residents and the immigrants and asylum seekers is considered by the mayor. According to paragraph (n) of the same article, “using the allowance set aside in the budget for the poor and needy, conducting the services aimed at those with disabilities, and forming the centre for those with disabilities” are the mayor’s duties.

Article 60-j of the Law lists “social services and aids to be provided to the poor, the needy and orphans as well as those with disabilities” among municipal expenses. We are of the opinion that those among immigrants
and asylum seekers having these qualities are also entitled to benefit from these aids. In fact, this is the current practice.

According to the article regulating municipalities’ foreign relations, municipalities may become founding members or members to international organisations carrying out activities within their field of duties subject to a resolution by the municipal council. The municipality may carry out joint activities and service projects with these organisations and foreign local governments, or may establish a sister city relationship (Article 74). This way, municipalities are enabled to carry out joint activities with international organisations within the context of humanitarian aid to immigrants and asylum seekers.

With respect to immigrants and asylum seekers, municipalities may take on duties in fields remaining within the field of duties of the central government. Indeed, “In line with an agreement it may sign upon a resolution by its council, the municipality may, with respect to matters within its field of duties and responsibilities, meet needs in kind or provide vehicles and personnel on temporary basis for carrying out the fundamental duties and services of local governments and the central government” (Article 75 of Law No. 5393).

**Citizenship Law**

Here, another legal arrangement regarding municipalities, which would assist in the solving of problems and in regulating public services addressing non-citizens is the concept of citizenship law.

According to article 13 of the law, which regulates citizenship law, “each person is the citizen of the town in which they reside. Citizens are entitled to participate in municipal decisions and services, being informed about municipal activities, and to benefit from aids provided by the municipal administration. It is compulsory that aids are provided in a manner that does not harm human dignity.” While immigrants or asylum seekers are not considered citizens, the aid and other services provided to them must also be provided under conditions not harmful to human dignity.
The last paragraph of the above article reads, “each individual residing or located within municipal boundaries, or is related with such area, shall be obliged to comply with the municipal’s lawful decisions, orders and announcements as well as to pay the municipal taxes, duties, fees and contributions.” Accordingly, the expression “each individual” residing or located within municipal boundaries, or is related to such area also includes immigrants and asylum seekers.

Article 59, which regulates municipal revenues, lists municipal taxes, duties, fees and contributions, revenues obtained from the lease, sale or otherwise use of moveable and immoveable property, fees collected in exchange for services in accordance with tariffs to be set by the municipal council, etc. Immigrants and asylum seekers are under the duty of making payments to the municipality according to the transactions they carry out or services they receive. However, they are also entitled to benefit from such services in a manner that is equal with the citizens. For instance, they are entitled to benefit from the transport prices or tariffs in a manner that is equal with town residents.

As it is seen, while the Municipal Law No. 5393 is not clear on what kind of local common services are to be provided to asylum seekers or immigrants arriving in the town, it is possible to relate the matter to the concept of “guest” within the context of basic human rights and local and national culture. In fact, it is possible to see this understanding in the aid and support provided by the community to the Syrian asylum seekers.

In many towns the number of asylum seekers living outside camps exceed the local population (as in Kilis), while in a metropolis such as Istanbul with a population exceeding 15 million, the number of asylum seekers is much greater than that indicated by official figures. The metropolitan area virtually becomes the region’s centre of attraction.

Against this, however, the responsibility of the municipalities increases without a matching increase in resources, capacity and authority. As is the case with the rest of the world, in Turkey too local governments carry the heaviest burden in this matter.

The Municipal Law is primarily founded upon the concept of “citizen-
ship”. The Law on Foreigners and International Protection enacted in 2013 has not provided local government with any special facilities with respect to refugees, providing instead for an arrangement where directly authorised institutions consult with local governments. Foreigners, under categories such as temporary protection, refugees or asylum seekers are primarily the concern of local governments. Within this framework, active duties rest with local governments in all processes except for the initial registration and finally granting of citizenship or the transfer to another country. At the same time, local governments constitute the most important area of responsibility of the harmonisation process, and are responsible for implementing it. Local harmonisation / integration processes are only possible through increasing municipalities’ powers and capacities. We are of the opinion that this may lead to rearrangement in municipal law.

Considering differences and various priorities across Turkey, it is useful for especially regional municipal units to take on an active role in these arrangements and implementations, and their being encouraged with regard to regional planning and working in harmony. While decisions made by the central administration create the general policy, the actual implementation takes place at local level. During the process, as the primary actors, the municipalities must consider the needs, priorities and capacity of the locality in actualising local harmony. However, due to factors such as the gradually increasing number of immigrants or asylum seekers and their irregularity, the management of the process puts a strain on not only the central administration, but also the local governments. For this reason, it is necessary to increase the powers, capacities and resources of municipalities and other local governments. This subject must be given further importance especially in Istanbul, which is a metropolis. A need has emerged for legal arrangements to empower municipalities, which undertake the real burden from the short- and long-term education of the immigrants to all other services and to reinforce them through the support they would receive per refugee. Law No. 6735 on International Labour was enacted in order to determine, implement and monitor policies regarding international labour, as well as to regulate the procedures and principles to be followed in efforts, transactions, powers and responsibilities regarding work permit and work permit exemptions, and rights and obligations in the field of international labour (OJ 13/8/2016 Issue: 29800).
Arrangements for Metropolises pursuant to Law No. 6360

Law No. 6360 enacted in Turkey in 2014 granted all provinces with a population larger than 750,000 people the status of “metropolis”, and “special provincial administrations”, which is another local administration body operating in these provinces, were terminated, with part of their duties having been transferred to metropolitan and/or district municipalities and part to the newly formed “Governor’s Office, Investment Monitoring and Coordination Department” under the provincial Governor’s Office (Esen, Güneş, Ünal, 2014). Since this regulation covered all provincial boundaries, town municipalities and villages, each of which were legal entities, were terminated and transformed into “neighbourhoods”, which are not legal entities. Through this regulation, the revenues of the municipalities were rearranged. This regulation was realized previously for the provinces of Istanbul and Kocaeli. The duties of municipalities were listed in Municipal Law No. 5393 and Law No. 5216 on Metropolitan Municipalities, with duties not listed among these articles being ceded to central administration. Therefore, in provincial administration, certain units operating under the governor’s office (and under district governors’ offices in districts) may have duties of local character. This condition may be examined separately with respect to the administration system. While there are 30 metropolises in Turkey, Istanbul should be assessed separately due to the size of its population as well as other characteristics. Indeed, being Turkey’s biggest city, Istanbul has become a centre of attraction also for international immigration.

Law No. 6360 has determined the area within the boundaries of 30 provinces in Turkey as metropolitan municipalities. Istanbul, Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Hatay and Mersin, which bear the brunt of irregular immigration, are in the status of metropolises. In Turkey, metropolitan municipalities carry out the duties specified in Law No. 5216 on Metropolitan Municipalities within the area remaining between the province boundaries. These are generally duties such as town planning at provincial level, transport, water and wastewater services, stream remediation, fire-fighting, emergency planning, development services and social aid.

6 In the world, metropolises are structured according to four different approaches: divided, single-stage, dual-stage and voluntary organisations (UCLG-MEW A. 2016: 88). Turkey adopted the dual-stage model, which involves metropolitan and district municipality.
According to Law No. 2560, water and wastewater services are carried out by water and sewer administrations with a dedicated budget, operating under the metropolitan municipality. Power and natural gas distribution services, however, are supplied by the private sector except for a few metropolises where such services are provided by municipality-owned companies.

In metropolises, the Syrians have taken precedence in terms of service priority, compared to the population living in rural areas.

Legally, local governments are responsible for supplying services to the population within a certain area. Therefore, a gap may appear between the services provided by municipalities and areas of their legal liability. The Kilis provincial municipality supplies services to the Kilis province centre, while the Kilis special provincial administration supplies services to the rural area. This province also has district and town municipalities.

In addition to the technical and financial inadequacy suffered by local governments, three basic difficulties concerning local governance can be seen: inadequacy in corporate autonomy, inadequacy in transparency, and easily affected relations between local governments and humanitarian aid actors. For instance, in Lebanon, which is one of the countries that have received the largest number of international immigrants in recent years, the municipalities experience these typical problems (UCLG-MEWA, January, 2016).

**Municipalities’ Basic Services Addressing Foreigners under Temporary Protection**

The irregular immigration crisis increases the costs of urban services such as supplying potable water and purifying wastewater, transport and solid waste disposal, and causes existing services areas to reach their full capacities in periods shorter than envisaged in the projects. For instance, the Kilis Municipality, which provides services as a provincial municipality, encounters difficulties in supplying services in the face of the influx of Syrians arriving at the city due to the crisis. The municipality’s corporate capacity remains inadequate in this process, and the need for financial support grows daily (UNDP, 2016).
In countries dealing with irregular immigration, efforts are being made to develop new approaches and projects in order to develop national corporations’ capacities. However, this gives rise to the problem of financing.

For instance, financial transfers from the Lebanese central government to local governments have remained at 1.42%. In this country, 94% of the entire government budget is used by the central administration, while 6% is allocated to local governments. A “waste crisis” was experienced in the summer of 2015. The municipalities requested the increase of their financial and technical capacity, but Lebanese politicians once more turned to centralisation for the solution. The role of local governments in a new development-oriented strategy in Lebanon is being discussed. In developing the capacities of municipalities, the focus is primarily on a mode of administration involving the municipal police, education and operations. This situation also involves social stability mechanisms. While cooperation initiatives between municipalities of Western countries and Lebanese municipalities have decreased in the recent years, sharing of experience, training and business visits continue. Although to a small degree, financial support has been provided to infrastructure projects. In Lebanon, the scope of “heavily impacted regions” covers 251 municipalities. The greatest complaint of the mayors concerns the timing of projects.

In Turkey, the financial transfers made from the government’s budget and those provided from the people through non-governmental organisations, with respect to irregular immigration, has reached an important level. Again, the direct and indirect expenditure made by municipalities for temporary asylum seekers has reached serious levels. Municipalities’ expenditure stemming from irregular immigrants is supplied from three main sources: own funds (taxes and other own revenues), transfer payments by the government, and international aid. No additional allowances were made to the municipalities during the latest irregular migrations. Municipalities mostly complain of this matter. Except for a few examples, the aid promised by international institutions has also failed to arrive. Therefore, the aid provided to temporary asylum seekers creates an additional burden on the municipalities. Certain municipalities have obtained international loans. For instance, Hatay Su ve Kanalizasyon
İdaresi (Hatay Water and Sewer Administration, HATSU) utilises Bank of Provinces loans and loans from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in the construction of infrastructure and wastewater purification plants. With the support of UNDP, vehicles were purchased in order to increase the corporate capacity. 38 vehicles were purchased (3,050,000 USD), and 4 vehicles (2 fire-engines, 1 waste transporter, 1 funeral coach) were delivered to the Şanlıurfa Metropolitan Municipality. The Turkish Union of Municipalities supported this municipality by providing 83 vehicles with a total value of 5 million $, consisting of mobile kitchens, fire-engines, vacuum trucks, and mobile health and cleaning vehicles (Mayor’s statement; TBB İliler ve Belediyeler Dergisi, Issue: 813).

**Housing**

Within the context of irregular immigration, the ratio of those living in tent cities is low. However, the stock of housing to respond to irregular immigration in cities remains inadequate. This situation increases the need for council houses addressing low- and middle-income groups. Housing areas vary according to socio-economic level. In connection with housing, the need for social areas such as schools, community clinics, religious facilities, playgrounds and parking lots arises. Also, construction and operation of the water, wastewater, natural gas and power networks of these areas are required.

In the management of urban development and the opening up of new settlement areas, the threat that housing areas might put pressure on agricultural areas emerges. Also, there may also emerge a pressure on urban protection areas in the old settlements of the city.

In terms of economy, the increase in the city’s population causes an increase in rent revenues in urban areas. Another matter to be taken into consideration is the housing architecture in the new settlement area.

Rapid and irregular immigration causes squatting and illegal housing. For this reason, such negative occurrences must absolutely not be tolerated during the first phase of immigration. The low-rent parts of the
cities are chosen in irregular mass immigrations. These settlement areas must be rendered healthy. Conducting urban transformation activities in cities has gained priority.

According to the UNDP Project for Mitigating the Effects of the Syrian Crisis on the Southeastern Anatolia Region (2016), the Syrian population in Gaziantep requires 75,000 council houses. The number of houses that must be urgently built is 5,000. (Estimated Cost: 450,000,000 TL). It is observed that Syrian guests living outside camps in Şanlıurfa, rent houses as 2-3 families living together, and the current number of houses in which Syrians live is around 18 thousand.

In the regions of Kilis where poor neighbourhoods are more common, the housing conditions, infrastructure problems, social facilities and basic needs that were already inadequate became even harder to be dealt with, with the settlement of the Syrian population. In fact, since there are no longer houses to rent in Kilis, many immigrant families use abandoned houses by making simple reparations thereon. The biggest expectation (31%) of the immigrants from local governments in Mersin is the provision of housing. Syrian immigrants living in Mersin largely live in rented houses. An outcome of the immigrant influx, which caused an abnormal increase in house rents, is the sharing of the same house by multiple families. This, in turn, causes many medical and cultural difficulties.

The accommodation of the Syrian population within the city affects the housing stock, causing an extreme increase in house/rent prices. On the other hand, the provision of heating in the houses through the illegal use of electricity in urban areas causes problems in the provision of power services as well as putting a strain on the power infrastructure. The fact that the Syrian population is larger than what was anticipated has also increased the consumption of potable water. The construction of council housing to be offered to the Syrians may be considered in order to improve the living conditions of the Syrians and lowering the high rent and house prices in the city.

Gaziantep’s accelerated growth in industry, its rapid development profile and the socio-economic advantages it offers makes the city habitable
and attractive for the Syrians. The irregular influx of a large number of Syrians in a short period of time in Gaziantep has brought with it the problem of housing. Many Syrians are trying to live under health-threatening conditions (for instances, houses without toilets), and Syrians without financial means are trying to live in abandoned buildings or on the streets. Being also a ‘students’ city’, Gaziantep started to suffer from a housing problem after the Syrian war, the rents rising almost threefold. This rapid increase has brought many problems in its wake. New council housing projects will provide the Syrians, who currently live under very harsh conditions, with a healthy living environment, which will reduce the demand for housing and thus lower rents and house prices. Around 15,000 of the 375,000 Syrians registered in Hatay stay in accommodation centres. The rest of the Syrians have caused an increase in the need for housing, and the fact that the city’s housing stock is inadequate has caused an increase in house prices as well as irregular construction. Irregular immigration plays an important role in the increase of property sales in Istanbul, which is a centre of attraction. However, since a large part of the foreign asylum seekers are of the low-income group, it is observed that they mostly reside as tenants in the city’s slum areas or poor districts.

**Water and Wastewater Services**

The provision of water and the disposal of wastewater is the duty of province, district or town municipalities, or of water and sewer administrations in metropolises. Also, rainwater drainage and stream improvement within the boundaries of the municipality are also duties of the municipalities. Water supply projects are carried out by the State Water Works, and the facilities are operated by municipalities. The construction and operation of wastewater plants are the duty of municipalities.

The basic investments of the municipalities of the cities where the Syrians immigrated concern the construction of water supply and wastewater disposal plants. In fact, the municipality projects indicated in the UNDP report mainly concern water and wastewater. During the last five years, when the population increased two-fold and water consumption three-fold in Kilis, the daily amount of water distributed rose from 9 thousand
m³ to 27 thousand m³. The Directorate of Water Works indicated that the amount of water consumption per capita in the neighbourhoods in which especially Syrians live, is very high and above average in Turkey. The water consumption that has risen three times within five years has also affected wastewater purification plants and the sewer infrastructure. Here, a purification plant with a daily purification capacity of 15,109 m³ was opened for operation considering that this capacity would be adequate until 2023. By the end of 2015, the purification plant has been purifying 15,000 m³ of wastewater daily.

As can be seen, the primary investments of the Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep and Hatay metropolitan municipalities have also turned towards water and wastewater together with irregular immigration.

**Public Transport**

The large numbers of the irregular immigration in the city centres increase transport costs, causing the existing service areas to reach full capacity in a shorter time than envisaged in their projects.

According to the UNDP research, the Şanlıurfa Municipality considers to solve urban infrastructure and superstructure within the same plan, organising a “Transport Master Plan” in order to carry out applications jointly. The same municipality has also commissioned mobile health vehicles and ambulances in order to facilitate the Syrians’ access to hospitals and to prevent crowding at hospitals.

As a result of irregular immigration, within the last five years 60 new lines were created, while 140 busses and 380 drivers were brought into service in order to increase the capacity of transport services in Gaziantep. This, in turn, caused an important increase in personnel costs. Of the municipal budget for 2015, around 30% was allocated to the transport infrastructure, 23% to the development of information technologies and corporate capacity, 20% to infrastructure investments for a clean environment, 11% to social and cultural fields and activities, 6% to preparations against natural disasters, 4% to urbanisation projects and improving the
living standards of disadvantaged groups, and around 1% to social projects for a barrier-free city, social projects addressing youth, and facilities for the agriculture, trade and industry sectors.

The Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality has provided 9 service vehicles to ensure the free transport of Syrian students to their schools. However, it is indicated that these busses are inadequate. Picking up children from their homes and taking them to their schools on service busses also increases the number of students to benefit from educational services. However, an increase in busses in intra-city travel has negative effects on the traffic.

The rearrangement of intra-city transport, which is one of the primary problematic areas when planning spatial development, has become the priority problem of Kilis’ urban development. The reason for this is that there is no public transport from the north to the south of the city, and that transport between west and east is inadequate and inconvenient.

The Hatay Office of Transport is conducting work to solve the traffic problems that have increased together with the arrival of the Syrians in the city in the recent years. Within this scope, the primary areas of work have been the construction of new junctions, the organisation of the traffic circulation, and the preparation of the Hatay Transport Master Plan.

The population arriving from Syria has increased the vehicle and pedestrian traffic in the city. The increase in both the number of vehicles and the number of pedestrians has made urgent arrangements necessary. In intra-city transport, the increasing populations of neighbourhoods also caused an increase in the demand for transport, as a result of which the development of public transport services gained importance. Also, the new traffic axes created in order to ensure the access of Syrians living in temporary accommodation centres to Hatay also require public transport means as well as traffic arrangements. The fact that the Metropolitan Municipality’s budget has failed to increase at the rate of the increasing population and areas of duty/responsibilities has made the provision of services difficult. This has especially caused difficulties to the capacity of the corporate super- and infrastructure, and inadequacy in terms of vehicles, machinery and equipment as well as the spaces in which the corporation provides services.
The Municipality’s busses, minibuses and public transport vehicles prove to be inadequate in meeting the transportation needs of the Syrians in Hatay from the temporary accommodation centres to the city or district centres. The allowances provided by the Municipality also remain inadequate. A feasibility study conducted with regard to public transport services in the province of Hatay on the suitability of 8,15 - 9,5 meter-long busses to the existing road network revealed that the use of 8,15 meter-long busses would be more convenient. Acquiring 50 of these busses, each having a passenger capacity of 60, in order to serve in the province of Hatay, would meet the need of the province where the influx of Syrian refugees has put a strain on transport services.

In Istanbul too, the population increase in the city and an increase in various activities have caused an increase in transport investments. While the foreign population has a part in this increase, measuring its extent would require a separate study. The investment budget allocated to transport in Istanbul approaches to 60% of the municipal budget (http://www.ibb.istanbul/tr-).

**Social Benefits**

The objective of Law No. 3294 on the Encouragement of Social Aid and Solidarity is “aiding those who are poor and needy as well as those accepted to, or arriving in, Turkey in whatever manner when necessary, taking measures to strengthen social justice and ensuring the just distribution of income, encouraging social aid and solidarity” (Article 1). Therefore, as is the case with citizens who are in need, any foreigners in need who have arrived in Turkey for whatever reason shall benefit from such aid. Aiding those who are poor and needy as well as those accepted to, or arriving in, Turkey in whatever manner when necessary, taking measures to strengthen social justice and ensuring the just distribution of income, encouraging social aid and solidarity.

Social aid covers basic human needs, mainly food and clothing. Hygiene materials for children as well as healthcare materials specific to women and girls are also within this scope. Providing families or persons who
have access to kitchens and cooking facilities with food aid would both reduce costs and provide psychological comfort. Also, the needs of the elderly, youth, homeless children or those working on the street as well as those addicted to addictive substances must be considered. Healthcare and education aids can also be included in this category.

The first step in social aid is to identify the demographic, social and economic properties of individuals and family members. To this end, certain municipalities have established social research centres. A study aiming at creating a social risk map for the city is underway. This way, resources would be used more efficiently while satisfying the needs of aid-seekers. Also, these fields would allow the creation of important projects.

Municipalities provide social aid to those in need directly or through associations and other non-governmental organisations. Providing the social aid allocated from the municipal budget to the poor of the town also to irregular immigrants would without doubt reduce the share received by the citizens in need. Indeed, certain municipalities indicate this fact in private interviews. Access to social aid differs among municipalities. For instance, certain municipalities, such as the Sultanbeyli municipality, access immigrants through the SMS system. It is very important that NGOs cooperate with municipalities in the fields of social and legal counselling, humanitarian aid, health, education, vocational education and research.

According to Municipal Law, municipalities may conduct joint projects with non-governmental organisations. These include social aids. In fact, according to Law No. 5253 on Associations (article 10) and the Regulations on Associations (article 91), associations may conduct joint projects with public bodies and institutions.

Social aid must be identified and distributed with an eye to human dignity. To this end, emphasis may be placed on forming a properly working registration system, monitoring needs and not delaying their supply. However, such aid must be discontinued when the need ceases to exist.

The fact that social aid is carried out by province and district social aid and solidarity foundations operating under the central government,
province and district municipalities and non-governmental organisations (associations, foundations, unions etc.) involves a moral risk where some people may receive aid from more than one sources while not being in need. Ensuring that social aid institutions share certain information with each other would reduce such repetition and waste as well as increasing the offer of services to those who are shy to receive aid.

Bureaucratic procedures to receive aid must remain at the minimum required. Otherwise, the multitude of bureaucratic procedures and even an increase in their difficulty would prove to be contrary to the purpose stated in the law. Also, the examination of aid applications must be made in time, without leading to abuse, and without harming human dignity.

According to information obtained, the SOYBİS system is applied and used at province and district levels, and integrated aid services are being implemented by social aid and solidarity foundations in all provinces and districts of Turkey.7

It is observed that municipalities and non-governmental organisations carry out social aid of very different natures. Some of these are: various aids and services in kind such as wheelchairs, blankets, baby formulae, children’s toys, food packages, baby sets, children’s sneakers, stoves, wood-coal, radiators, household appliances, medication, school education sets, bath services, soup from mobile kitchens, distribution of aşure, as well as cash aid for birth, education, accommodation, health, family, those with disabilities, orphans and widows. In fact, certain municipalities provide shopping cards through certain shopping centres.

The questionnaires addressing immigrants in Mersin reveal the fact that the most important fields are accommodation (around 35%) and then food (close to 30%). While these percentages vary according to the immigrants’ period of stay, there is a greater requirement for aid in kind in the first stages of immigration, which in time turns to aid in cash. For instance, while an individual or a family who is hungry requires food aid, a family cooking its own food would need cash in order to pay its natural gas or electricity bills.

7 Information obtained from the Bahçelievler District Governor’s Office.
Social and personal culture and habits should also be considered in identifying needs.

In irregular immigrant influxes, the attitude of the members and non-governmental organisations of communities receiving immigrants is important. In fact, the community has provided an important degree of support to the Syrians seeking temporary asylum in Turkey. Associations and foundations, which are non-governmental organisations, offered their assistance through many support campaigns. Generally the aid activities of municipalities and non-governmental organisations are in harmony. While non-governmental organisations play an important role in the provision of services in Lebanon, the municipalities’ bureaucratic procedures created obstacles in the way of work carried out by both national and international humanitarian aid organisations. A lack of trust was also observed. In certain cases international organisations decide on in which sector the aid shall be provided, such as water and wastewater, housing, education, vocational education etc., as well as how the aid shall be provided, such as the project budget and location. Funds are under no circumstances transferred directly to municipal budgets. In certain cases the municipalities are asked for one-time support in the projects. At this point, the vision and attitude of the mayor is also important (UC LG-MEWA, January, 2016).

Certain types of non-organised and non-permanent aid motivated by being neighbours, relatives or friends are also very important, while varying according to the community’s characteristics. For instance, during the month of Ramadan, aid, zakat, alms and sacrifice donations made by certain wealthy persons can reach important figures. Again, individuals or families in need may be provided with used household items or personal belongings (such as clothing, shoes). In fact, certain municipalities make their personnel categorise such goods to render them usable, after which they are supplied to those in need.

As our President indicated in his speech delivered at the Summit on Refugees, Turkey has spent 12 billion $ from the central budget on Syrians under temporary protection, while social aid has equaled this amount. The aid and support continues.
Neighbourhood relations play an important role in creating a common life culture at local level and ensuring proper social relations. While regulating the structure of neighbourhoods, the Municipal Law refers to neighbour relations. According to the law, a neighbourhood is an administrative unit located within the boundaries of the municipality, whose needs and priorities are similar and whose residents are in a relationship of neighbourhood (Municipal Law No. 5393, Article 3). Neighbours fulfilling their basic human duties towards each other regardless of differences in culture, economic class, race or religion, for instance visiting the sick, attending funerals, joining in on the joy on happy days, holidays, festivals and weddings, shapes the relationship between neighbours according to the social culture. Individuals and societies adopting the maxim “Those who are full when their neighbours are hungry are not our people” also share their needs. The source of neighbourhood culture or rights is religion and ethics. In the culture of aid between neighbours which is actually established on a voluntary basis, it is considered rude to not help a neighbour in need. Neighbour rights extend to foreigners as well as citizens. Although this subject is not given much consideration in the literature, aid and support arising from neighbour relations in neighbourhoods directed especially towards the Syrians seeking temporary asylum settling in cities, is quite common. This aid also ensures mutual trust and communication.

**Education**

As of August 2016, there are 960 thousand Syrian children at school age in our country. 1/3 of these are provided with education. In other words, 600 thousand children are not able to receive education (AFAD: https://www.afad.gov.tr/tr/9743/BM-Mukim-Koordinatorunden-AFAD-a-Ziyaret). In Turkey, educational services are primarily supplied by the central government. However, municipalities may also provide education facilities. Within this framework, municipalities support the education of Syrian children and youth. The central government has adopted the policy of providing Syrians with access to free education and health.

An example on this subject: The Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality has prepared an inventory regarding the education of the asylum seekers’ chil-
dren and the condition of the general education centres. Two Syrian Information and Education Centres were established within the body of that municipality. Thereat, 2,990 children were admitted to formal mainstream education, while free transport services to schools was provided. A protocol signed with the Gaziantep Governor’s Office led to the establishment of the Ensar Toplum Merkezi, providing counselling services on education, health and law to women and children. At this centre, specialists from the Province Directorate of National Education, the Province Directorate of Health, the Province Directorate of Security, the Province Directorate of Family and Social Policies, the Province Directorate of İSKUR, the Province Directorate of Religious Affairs and the Province Directorate of Youth and Sports, offer services under the Municipality’s coordination. A total of 1,072 asylum seekers were provided with services. Within the scope of vocational courses, 2,146 Syrian immigrants benefitted from Turkish Language Education while 3,000 of them took courses on marbling, mosaics etc.; the immigrants also participated in activities such as theatre, expeditions etc. 3,233 Syrian benefitted from various trainings of vocational and artistic content.

Similar efforts are also supported by other metropolitan and district municipalities. Education, vocational training and psychological support services by municipalities are provided through a protocol signed with units reporting to the central government (directorates of national education, health etc.).

Marriage services provided by local governments are also worth mentioning. Legislation provides that marriage with Turkish citizens or foreigners is conducted by municipalities. The marriage contract is realized after the Syrians submit to the municipality a document certifying that there are no prohibitions against the marriage, obtained from the migration administrations.

**Funeral Services**

Funeral services are important for temporary asylum seekers. The reason for this is that sending or taking a deceased foreigner to their country poses an important health and cost problem. Therefore funeral services are provided by municipalities. Certain municipalities require a larger number of hearses due to the increasing number of Syrians.
Non-governmental Organisations Serving Syrians and/or Established by Syrians

There are a large number of national and international non-governmental organisations providing various aids to the Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey. Certain associations and foundations cooperate with certain municipalities to provide aid to a certain region, while others carry on their activities across the country. International aid organisations also carry out activities in this field, but their efforts are limited and mostly focused on certain problems. Therefore, it is possible to see that the larger part of this burden is shouldered by Turkey, with the promised foreign help not having been fulfilled. Also, some researchers conducting research for this book had negative experiences indicating that international aid organisations were not adequately transparent and willing to cooperate with Turkish researchers.

Non-governmental organisations play an important role in ensuring the Syrians’ involvement in social life, learning about their rights and defending these rights when necessary. According to the Turkish legislation on associations, foreigners obtaining residence permits may also found associations. For instance, the number of associations founded by Syrians in Istanbul for various reasons within the last five years has reached 132. The associations founded by foreigners make an important contribution to the Syrians’ social integration, while increasing the feeling of trust towards them in the community. This is especially important in terms of security against terrorist acts. These associations are allowed to become members to unions and establish platforms, participating in national and international activities.

Our research on the associations in question revealed the fact that the corporate capacities of most of these associations failed to develop, which caused them to remain as a name on paper. The fact that the administrators and employees of most of them do not speak the Turkish language reduces their effectiveness. It would be proper if a special unit was established at the directorate of associations for the associations established by foreigners.
Also, specialist auditors should be equipped to audit these associations, in other words, they should be trained on international relations to ensure their communication with them. The administrations of these associations may be subjected to information, direction and accounting processes. Turkish language courses may be provided through these associations. In the same way, seminars may be provided to those to receive aid from international organisations, and vocational training courses may be opened (Esen, 2016b).

**Social Adaptation Work**

Local governments and non-governmental organisations have important duties in ensuring foreigners’ adaptation to local culture. Ensuring that local governments establish relations with different groups in their own geographical areas is an especially good idea. For these groups constitute part of the local community, and cannot be ignored. These groups may help strengthen social bonds and social adaptation throughout society, and otherwise may tend to drift away from the border. In order to establish successful bonds with people who are difficult to approach and communicate with, speaking to an intermediary from within the group is mostly a good idea; identifying the needs of these groups and assessing to what extent these needs may be taken into consideration are mandatory for these bonds. Local governments, as impartial units seeking to take the interests of all residents equally into consideration, must be in full communication with all groups in the community. It is important for local governments to support such dialogues and to accept the legitimacy and existence of the religious and cultural diversity within society as part of its general policy (Council of Europe, 2008).

The fact that irregular mass migration has become permanent in the cities brings us to the stage of mutual acceptance and the adoption of a multi-cultural life. At this stage, establishing communication between social strata, forming common values, ensuring an environment of trust, and forming principles of individual and social freedom, mutual transparency and information exchange in order to reflect these to practice are required. Today, on this subject it is possible to benefit from contemporary multi-national and multi-cultural examples as well as the Ottoman experience.
Conclusion

More than 90% of the Syrians arriving in Turkey as temporary asylum seekers have settled in cities. Therefore, problems stemming from their temporary and permanent residence mostly concern local governments, and in this respect the municipalities (metropolitan and district municipalities) and special provincial administrations.

A new need for planning arises in the cities together with irregular mass immigration. For these immigrations give rise to a large mobile population. Therefore, the investments made by municipalities in accordance with their population projections require additions in a very short space of time. Problems are experienced in housing in particular, as well as water and wastewater, natural gas and power lines, solid waste collection and disposal, and transport. Infrastructure services gain importance together with irregular mass migration. For this reason, new investments become necessary. However, the financing of these give rise to the problem of securing adequate financial resources.

While social aid and health payments were the primary needs during the first days of the immigrations, gradually education and housing requirements arose. The need to increase their corporate capacities and obtain financing emerges in order that municipalities may provide these services. The community housing problem may also pose a serious threat against agricultural and protection areas. Since immigrations have caused a steep rise in rents in cities, negative economic consequences have emerged not only for the asylum seekers, but also for all members of the community of lower-income. Also, providing services to asylum seekers may also give rise to the problem of citizens’ being deprived of certain services.

Legislation has been developed with respect to irregular immigration, and migration administrations have been established under the central government rather than police measures. Parallel to these developments in central government, certain municipalities have established a new administrative unit to deal with irregular immigration. For instance, the Immigrant Affairs Branch Directorate was established under the Department of Health and Social Services of the Gaziantep Metropolitan
Municipality. The task of this directorate is to closely monitor current information and developments and pay regard to the dynamic structure of the processes. Directorates or chief’s offices are established under names such as social services and the like in order to provide immigrant services.

It is understood that many municipalities in Istanbul need to form a similar separate unit.

As understood from municipalities’ workshops, reports and declarations on irregular immigration, there is an important gap of coordination between the central government and local governments. In fact, municipalities complain that they are not able to obtain records from provincial immigration administrations. Therefore, many municipalities carry out their own identification in order to provide social aid to foreigners. Municipalities provide social aid by supplying such aid directly from their own budgets or establishing or supporting a non-governmental organisation for this purpose. Almost all municipalities consider the central administration’s relation with local governments with respect to its policy on foreigners inadequate. The main reason for this is that provincial immigration administrations, which are a new administrative unit, are overburdened, and that bureaucracy has increased since asylum seekers are provided with identification cards according to province. According to the municipalities, the foreigners encounter the greatest difficulties in housing, the education of their children, and poverty arising from cheap labour. Establishing a unit for foreigners under municipalities, employing translators and teaching foreigners Turkish must be considered as priorities.

Cooperation between NGOs and municipalities in the fields of social and legal counsel, humanitarian aid, health, education, vocational training and research addressing the Syrians under temporary protection is important for effectiveness and the solution of problems.

Answers to many questions such as cooperation between central government and local governments, the healthiness of the records on immigrants kept at the municipalities, cooperation between local governments, forming a policy on living together have started to be considered with regard to the effectiveness of the social aid and other services provided to temporary asylum seekers.
Social aid is provided by social aid and mutual aid foundations in provinces and districts. Efforts by municipalities and the civil society also become important as a result of the urbanisation of immigration problems. Among the Syrians under temporary protection, children, women and those with disabilities are groups that must be considered separately.

More than the efforts made by administrations and communities subjected to irregular mass migration, perhaps the reasons and solutions of this migration should be evaluated.

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CENTRAL MIGRATION MANAGEMENT IN TURKEY

Introduction

Definitions of Turkey generally start with the metaphor of “bridge”. Its geopolitical position between the East and the West has put Turkey into a position of a “transit” country between the two worlds. However, added to its quality as a transit country in the “West” and “North” directions, recently it has also become a “target” country. In fact, according to data by the World Bank, Turkey appears to have become a “net migration country” since 2010.

While the number of foreign citizens entering Turkey in 2005 was around 21 million, this figure appears to have exceeded 36 million in 2014. While the number of residence permit applications were 182,301 in 2010, this number has exceeded 400,000 in 2015. Similarly, while the number of work permit applications in Turkey was 14,201 in 2010, this figure reached 52,304 in 2014. The number of international students arriving in Turkey for education was 19,257 in 2007; in 2015, however, this figure appears to have reached 72,178 ( Sağiroğlu, 2015).

A similar picture may be seen in irregular migration movements too. The number of irregular migrants that remained at a yearly average of 50,000 until 2014 reached 146,000 in 2015. Also, while International Protection applications numbered 2,935 in 2005, this number became 41,752 in 2014. In 2014 there is a stock exceeding 150,000, awaiting results for their international protection applications ( Sağiroğlu, 2015). The total number of international protection applications increased approximately by a third in 2015, reaching 216,351 (GİGM, 2016).

However, it was refugees from Syria and Iraq, Turkey’s southern neighbours, which converted Turkey into the world’s largest refugee stock country as from 2015.

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As of September 2016, 2,728,726 Syrians, - only a tenth of which are accommodated in camps - have been residing in various regions of Turkey “under temporary protection” (Sağıroğlu, 2015).

In summary, Turkey has been receiving migrants and refugees at an increasing rate for the last ten years. An optimistic estimation would indicate that today Turkey accommodates over 4 million foreign regular / irregular migrants and refugees.

Turkey is not the only country that has been subject to large migrant influxes. It is known that over 1.3 million refugees have entered various countries of Europe in 2015. European Union countries experiencing one of the largest migrant influxes of history experience important upheavals both among each other and within their own internal politics. Recently, as a result of the BREXIT process that led to the United Kingdom’s leaving the Union, it appears that discussions on the European Union’s political future will continue. The dramatic rise of right-wing parties within the political picture of many European countries, mainly France and Germany, is constructed as another reflection of the migration influxes.

The extraordinary mobility that is experienced caused the administrations of European countries to turn to more “security-oriented” policies. Choosing to externalise the migration influx, the European Union raises the walls of the “European Fortress” through Frontex applications on one side, while conducting negotiations to send back those who have entered through transit countries such as Turkey. All of these policies and strategies appear to have caused the re-examination of the concept of “refugee” as defined by international law. For the “refugee law” maintained to be formed by European values appears to be losing its basis.

Contrary to the developments in Europe, it is possible to say that Turkey’s migration policies and strategies progress from a “security” based administration understanding to a “law” based administration understanding. It would be fair to accept that Turkey’s migration management understanding while having many deficiencies, progresses in the direction of being “rights-based” rather than “security-based” although the country has become the largest migration stock country with the “influxes” it faces.
Basically, this chapter represents an effort to provide evidence to the fact that Turkey’s actors, implementations and discourses regarding migration, progress in the direction of “management”.

As stated above, the fact that the progress forward does not rule out the deficiencies in migration management in Turkey. It is clear that there is a long and challenging process that must be completed. However, it should be kept in mind that the path Turkey shall lead in migration management will progress according to the effects of the developments in nearby countries, which have already become considerably heated. Another fact to be kept in mind is that a large part of the problems related to migration management is closely connected not only with the refugees and migrants but also with Turkey’s structural problems. For this reason, developments in Turkey’s democratic, legal, political, economic etc. structure would also closely influence migration management.

**Migration - Management Nexus**

Modern states, most of which act according to national state reflexes, have generally considered the issue of migration as a “security” matter rather than a “management” matter. Thus eliminating the political, economic and social “risks” attached to human mobility was seen as a responsibility of the state organ. Outside the security perspective, there have been states that have considered making use of the “opportunities” brought by human mobility. Especially the countries are known as “developed countries” approached the issue of migration as a “management” issue in order to convert the labor forces they required into capital. The USA, Canada and Australia, known as classical migrant countries owe their economic development mostly to the skilled and unskilled labour they mostly imported. It is clear that Europe’s developed industrial countries, particularly Germany, transformed into countries receiving migration in a controlled manner. In other words, we may say that there is no country among the world’s developed economies, which has not received migration as a management matter.
Without doubt, the “economic” field is not the only field that is considered when speaking about migration management. Migrants make an important impact on the political and social lives of their target countries. Their political and social impacts may be perceived as opposite to their economic impacts at the level of phenomena or perception. In most cases, national administrations leading the way to migrants’ participation in social life may create certain obstacles in the way of political and social integration. In some cases social integration may be prevented by the local community itself.

**Migration Management in Turkey**

Migration management is based on three basic components, namely actor, implementation and discourse (Geiger and Pecoud, 2010, 1). Firstly, “actor” is the basic determinant of migration management. The actor stands for policy-makers, particularly the government, who hold the political responsibility and power concerning migration management. As the implementing organ of the migration strategies and policies determined by the political decision-making mechanisms, bureaucracy consists of the implementing actors of migration management. The second basic component of migration management is implementation. The basic determinant of implementation is legal arrangements and implementations. Finally, migration management determines the discourses and narratives regarding migration.

In most cases, these three components cover intertwined processes. Although they may appear to be complementing each other as sequels, in many cases situations that are independent of each other and operate individually may be seen. However, it is clear that each of the components is a process that is in interaction with the others. While discourses that dominate the political and social areas have an impact from time to time in determining the policies, in some cases the policies may determine the discourses. It is oft seen that political actors use existing discourses as a legitimisation tool in determining legal processes. On the other hand, it is possible that problems are encountered in determining and implementing policies. The deficiencies in existing bureaucratic actors in implementing
the decisions made by the political power may bring a conflict between the two components into light.

Another point is the separation of the components that are effective on migration management.

For instance, the policy decisions of governments, which direct migration management, may be criticised or prevented by opposing political actors in different forms. In this sense, the attitudes of political groups other than the government are important and decisive in decisions to be made by political decision mechanisms. The fact that different applications or implementations within the bureaucratic process take the time to settle should be mentioned as another determining factor.

Legal arrangements’ causing applications conflicting in themselves is also a situation that is encountered quite often. Legal arrangements enacted by different bodies and corporations through the years and progressing at the level of regulations create conflicting areas in time. Although this allows some freedom of movement in terms of the implementation of the instructions given by policy-makers, it results in an inconsistent picture in terms of migration management.

The third component of migration management, discourse may also transform into a component containing areas conflicting within themselves. Firstly, clear differences may be observed between political discourses and social discourses in many cases. In many cases where the discourses of government parties and other parties governing the political decision mechanism are “positive”, the discourses may transform into “negative”. Essentially, just as it is possible to come across different political discourses arising from the diversity of political actors, it is also possible that different groups and identities within the community may develop different and even opposing discourses. Without the doubt, from time to time the visibility of “negative” discourses may become more dominant.

The interaction and communication between the three basic components of migration management appear to be rather complex and complicated (Geiger and Pecoud, 2010, 2). However, this study chooses to assess
the latest developments in Turkey’s migration management on the three components as a starting point.

The Actors of Migration Management in Turkey

The fact that the political decision mechanisms directing migration management in Turkey have been managed by governments formed by the same political orientation since the early 2000s has led to relative “stability”.

It will not be wrong to assume that policy and strategy steps determining migration management have been taken more effectively during the term of the governments formed by the same party after the 2000s as opposed to the short-living “coalition” governments formed by different parties just before the 2000s. In fact, what is important in determining migration policies is whether a strong central policy decision mechanism exists. In this process, it is possible to say that there has been an axis moving from the motivation of “security” to that of “management” in terms of migration management - without ignoring the deficiencies.

It must be emphasised that in the emergence of an understanding that proceeds in the direction of management, opposition parties that do not block the way of policy decisions by not insisting in security issues and preventing the management understanding play an important role. It is especially useful to evoke the effect of migrant influxes to Europe especially after 2014 on the European Union and member countries. While the “migration waves” brought anti-migrant “right-wing” parties within European countries’ internal politics closer to power, they also led to processes such as Brexit, where certain countries such as Britain left the Union. When Turkey became the country with the largest refugee stock in 2015, the opposition parties played an important role in preventing the migration issue from turning into a political instrument in domestic politics. While in many countries the anti-migrant sentiments that fueled xenophobia became the most effective and fruitful tool of opposition politics, opposition parties in Turkey were observed to have no significant “negative” effect on migration and migrant policies neither in their written program nor at the discourse level.
Another important actor in the formation of migration management in Turkey has been the European Union. According to İçduygu (2004), the developments experienced in migration management after 2001 have a fully “Europeanisation” character. It is a widespread and generally accepted view that the negotiations Turkey conducted with the EU have had an important motivating role in the development of the process regarding migration management in Turkey and the creation of the “migration management” understanding. The harmonization processes conducted with the EU are focused on four main targets.

“The conclusion of the readmission agreements, compliance with the visa/Schengen procedures, transformation in border management, and the abolition of the geographical limitations brought to the UN Convention of 1951 regarding migrants (İçduygu, 2012, 13).

In fact, considering the subjects on which the EU harmonization process focused, it will be seen that the basic motivation of the issues the EU required from Turkey in connection with migration was to control the migration influxes into the EU and to prevent irregular mobility. Therefore, there is also a strong argument indicating that the EU, after the negotiations with Turkey on migration, is making an effort to convert Turkey into a “buffer zone” in order to render the “European Fortress” better protected within the framework of FRONTEX applications (İşduygu and Keyman, 2000, 393). The problem of migration is indicated as the most important reason why the EU party acts “unwillingly” with regard to Turkey’s accession to the EU (Martin, 2012, 134). The perception that there would be possible influxes from third countries into Europe over Turkey as well as a significant potential of migrants from within Turkey is one of the main concerns of EU about Turkey.

There is also another opinion maintaining that EUs effect on Turkey’s new-term migration management and policies is exaggerated. Martin (2012, 127) indicates that after 2000-2005, when Turkey’s negotiations with the EU picked up speed, the process entered a stage of inactivity, and that efforts on migration management were accelerated exactly after this date. In other words, Turkey’s new term with respect to migration management coincides with the period in which the EU process entered its slowest phase.
Another opinion, which maintains that Turkey’s new migration understanding has a history reaching well before the 2000s, should also be mentioned. This opinion emphasises the fact that Turkey has been increasingly acting with a global vision within the last 30 years, which also includes the process concerning the EU. According to Kirişçi (2009, 43), economy-based developments aimed at increasing exports starting with the 1980s caused Turkey’s relations and interaction with the world to increase. Additionally, contractor activities mainly in gulf countries and then in Russian Federation countries created a source for human mobility to and from Turkey.

The economic growth based on exports also caused the emergence of a trade bourgeoisie that gradually took a larger part in global activities.

The visa regime Turkey implemented “bravely” played a significant role in accelerating global mobility after the 2000s. The mutual free visa agreements Turkey signed with various countries of the world significantly increased mobility both to and from Turkey. Turkey activated its new visa regime not only as an economic policy based on foreign trade but also as an important instrument of foreign policy (Kirişçi, 2011, 44). As a result, it must be mentioned that along with the negotiations held with the EU, Turkey’s economic, political and social internal dynamics played an important role in the emergence of the new migration management understanding.

The Preparation Process of the New Migration Management

Turkey’s EU accession application process was accepted in 1999. One of the greatest and most important obstacles before Turkey’s membership was migration (Martin, 2012, 38). For this reason, it is possible to say that concerns about how to manage regular and irregular human mobility to Europe from Turkey as a source or transit location constituted one of the most important subjects in the process starting on that date.

It is possible to pinpoint the formation of Turkey’s new migration management with the “accession partnership document” signed between
Turkey and the European Commission in 2001. The document revised in 2003 became concrete with the “national action plan” Turkey announced in line with the text of the agreement.

The national action plan laid down certain short- and medium-term targets regarding migration. The areas the plan targeted to harmonize with the EU acquis may be summarized under four main headings; the rearrangement of the visa regime, combatting irregular migration, border checks in accordance with Schengen rules, and the abolition of the geographical limitation in granting refugee status within the framework of the Geneva Convention of 1951.

A “special task force” was formed to actualise the targets by 2002. This commission consisted of officials of the Ministry of the Interior, the Foreign Ministry, the Land Forces Command, the Coastal Guard Command, the General Command of the Gendarmerie, the Secretariat-General of European Union Affairs, and the Secretariat-General of Customs Affairs. Task groups in the fields of borders, migration and asylum were formed with respect to the three basic fields determined in accordance with the accession document and the national action plan. Consequently, strategy documents were prepared in three areas by the task groups in question. The first was “Strategy Document on the Protection of External Borders in Turkey” on border management, the second “Strategy Document on the Efforts Foreseen in the Field of Asylum During the Process of Turkey’s Accession to the European Union” on asylum, and the third was “Strategy Document Contributing to the Migration Management Action Plan in Turkey” were published one after the other in 2003.

In 2003, the second “Turkish National Program on the Assumption of the European Union Acquis” was adopted through a Cabinet Council decree. The first paragraph of article 24 of this program is entitled “Initiating Harmonisation with the EU Legislation in the Field of Asylum and Developing the Capacity in the Field of Asylum”, in a manner that confirms the previous commitment with regard to migration. The third action plan was announced during the last months of 2008.

In the meanwhile, the Asylum / Migration Twinning Project prepared
within the framework of the EU 2002 Financial Cooperation program, the financial support to aim at easing the financial burden of the efforts, was launched in 2004. The project was prepared to aim at allowing Turkey to meet the financial requirements of the activities it planned to implement in the fields of asylum and migration from EU funds.

2005 heralded a process in which asylum and migration efforts started a new phase. The “Turkish National Action Plan on undertaking the EU Acquis in the Field of Asylum and Migration” prepared by the Ministry of the Interior and published following the Cabinet Council decree of 25.03.2005 was announced. The “Bureau for Developing and Implementing the Asylum and Migration Legislation and Administrative Capacity” founded on 15 October 2008 within the framework of the action plan, started preparing the administrative mechanisms of the legislation to be prepared in the field of asylum and migration.

This bureau was the first independent administrative unit founded with respect to migration management. “Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection” to be published in 2013 and the Directorate-General of Migration Management that will become operational a year later are in the nature of the continuation of this bureau’s efforts.

MIGRATION MANAGEMENT APPLICATIONS IN TURKEY

Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP)

The new migration law prepared after a ten-year preparation was adopted by the TBMM on 4 April 2013, and was put into effect under the title “Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection” in the official journal of 11 April 2013.

Before the Law on Foreigners and International Protection the entry, exit and staying procedures for foreigners - other than those under international protection - were governed by “Passport Law No. 5682” enacted in 1950 and “Law No. 5683 on Foreigners’ Residence and Travel in Turkey”. The new law repealed Law No. 5683 entirely and many articles of Law No.
It is clear that it is impossible to manage migration, which involves dynamic processes, with legislation that was prepared over 60 years ago.

It is very important that the new law was enacted for bringing procedures and work regarding foreigners and international protection, conducted by different ministries and organs onto a shared platform. The new law led to changes in many laws and regulations governing other public organs and corporations managing procedures on various fields of migration as well as subjects related to their own assigned duties (LFIP, 2014, 62-64). The law appears to have removed the contradictions and difficulties of much previous legislation that were in conflict and that slowed down the progress of the processes.

The Law on Foreigners and International Protection basically consists of five parts and regulates three main areas.

The first part of chapter one provides the “objective, scope and definitions” of the law. The second part includes an article on the “ban on refoulement”. One of the most interesting points of this part is that a comprehensive definition of migration is made for the first time in Turkish legislation. According to this definition, “migration expresses regular migration involving foreigners’ entry into, stay in, and exit from Turkey using legal pathways and irregular migration involving foreigners’ entry into, stay in, and exit from Turkey using illegal pathways as well as their unregistered employment in Turkey, and international protection” (LFIP, 2014, 3).

An important aspect of this definition is that it classifies migration as “regular” and “irregular”. In other words, it considers migration not as “legal” and “illegal” from a security-based perspective, but as a phenomenon requiring management.

Another point that is noteworthy is that the area of international protection, which was governed through administrative decrees up to that date, was secured by legislation for the first time. Also, the fact that international protection is considered as part of migration management - at a time when history’s biggest mass migration influx took place - is another novelty that is noteworthy.
The “ban on refoulement” defined in the second part is important for guaranteeing the “non-refoulement principle”, which is an essential component of international law and humanitarian values, by law.

Chapter two consists of four parts; part one explains “Entry to Turkey and visa” procedures, part two “residence” procedures, part three procedures on “stateless individuals”, and part four “deportation” procedures.

Part one regulates how and using what documents foreigners would enter Turkey, the status of foreigners whose entry to Turkey is restricted, matters on visas, persons not eligible for visas, visa types and procedures, procedures regarding foreigners’ stay in Turkey, residence permits, residence types, and the substitution of a residence permit by a work permit.

The most noteworthy subject of this part is article 27 regulating the fact that a foreigner obtaining a work permit would not require a separate residence permit.

The regulation is an important amendment that significantly reduces the workload both of foreigners and the concerned organs.

Also, an increase in the types and varieties of residence permits can be seen with the types of residence permits regulated by article 30 et sec. of the law. Accordingly, there are short- and long-term residence types according to their periods, as well as family and student residence permits. The fact that humanitarian residence and residence for victims of human trafficking have been brought as a new type is also noteworthy in that it allows persons requiring individual protection to obtain residence permits.

The long-term residence permit type grants certain new rights to foreigners. Accordingly, foreigners with long-term residence permit shall benefit from all rights held by Turkish citizens apart from military service, voting / standing for office and public office. This regulation, which is in the nature of the step prior to naturalisation, is among the novelties brought by the law.

One of the novelties brought with respect to student residence permits is that this permit regulates the employment rights of foreign students
residing in Turkey for educational purposes. In 2013, article 41 of the law that allowed students to work under certain conditions and for specific hours transferred the regulation of the principles on students’ employment to the Migration Policies Board after the International Labour Law was enacted, leading to a more flexible legal basis on the employment of international students.

This part also regulates the circumstances of deportation for foreigners as well as administrative monitoring conditions and periods and the operation of deportation centres.

The third chapter covering international protection issues consists of four parts.

The importance of the third chapter lies in the fact that international protection has been regulated by law for the first time in Turkish legislation. Part one provides the definitions of statuses such as refugee, conditional refugee and secondary protection for persons arriving at Turkish borders for compelling reasons in their countries, and under which condition these statuses should be granted or which circumstances would be excluded from the scope of international protection. For the first time, statuses of asylum have been set forth clearly and in detail.

Turkey is a conditional party to the Geneve Convention of 1951 regulating international refugee rights and its supplementary protocol of 1967. When signing conventions on refugee rights, Turkey placed a “geographical restriction” condition. Accordingly, Turkey accepted and undertook to grant “refugee” status to individuals from European countries seeking asylum in it for compelling reasons, and “conditional refugee” status to those from non-European countries. Those who do not qualify for these statuses are placed under “secondary protection” status only if they are under the threat of capital punishment, torture or similar threats.

Part two regulates various subjects concerning international protection and explains the various phases of international protection processes such as the administrative monitoring of unaccompanied minors, persons with special needs and international protection applicants. Part three
contains rights and obligations related to international law, and part four of the law on other subjects, including temporary protection.

Temporary protection is a type of international protection brought into effect in mass migration influxes. It is indicated that temporary protection shall be regulated through regulations arranged by Cabinet Council decrees as part of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection. As the law indicates, the Temporary Protection Regulation was brought into effect after being published in the official journal no. 29153 of 22 October 2014.

The same part states that refugee country information mechanisms shall be operated in order to identify the validity and reliability of declarations made by applicants and that applications shall be evaluated accordingly. That all information pertaining to applicants and international protection seekers would be kept confidential and would be shared only upon a court order or through legal counsel was guaranteed by law. General provisions on the operating procedures and principles of admission and accommodation centres are also regulated under this part.

Chapter four of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection contains common provisions on foreigners and international protection.

Harmonization, one of the crucial issues of the law, has been dealt with in chapter four. Article 96 explains how the Turkish migration administrations understand and define the concept of harmonization in the new term. The article, in which the term “integration” is deliberately not used, emphasises the participation of foreigners in the country’s political, economic and social processes as well as the “mutual harmonization” of the local community with the foreigners. It is also expressed that the subject of harmonization will be generalised through activities carried out jointly with the Directorate-General or non-governmental organisations.

The concept of harmonization, which indicates at the transformation of the local community as well as the foreigners in migration management, is one of the most ambitious aspects of the law. The fact that it is indicated that public bodies and organs will be involved in the mutual harmonization of the two communities may be considered an important novelty pointing at civilianisation in migration management.
It is also noteworthy that a legal guarantee is provided on the confidentiality and protection of personal data. Finally, there is an article providing administrative fines in the case of the violation of the law.

**Directorate-General of Migration Management**

Chapter five of the law defines the Directorate-General of Migration Management, one of the most important new actors of migration management in Turkey, operating as a subsidiary organ of the Ministry of the Interior. The first part explains the “establishment, duties and powers” of the organ. Accordingly, the Directorate-General was charged with implementing policies and strategies on migration in Turkey, ensuring coordination between the related bodies, and conducting the procedures on other subjects defined within the context of migration.

Along with the central unit, the Directorate-General conducts its activities with an organisation covering 81 provinces and 148 districts. Also, it is planned that 100 foreign migration consultancies and attaché offices should be opened in the future. The Directorate-General central organisation is organised as 12 heads of office, including Legal Consultancy, and two assistant director-generals.

The Head of the Foreigners Office regulates the entry, stay and exit procedures of foreigners, including residence permits.

The Head of the International Protection Department was established as an independent office to carry out international protection procedures. The International Protection Department is responsible for the procedures regarding persons seeking asylum in Turkey at the individual or collective levels for compelling reasons. Those seeking asylum are first registered and provided with identity cards, and the office determines in which part of Turkey they shall reside.

One of the departments under the Directorate-General, which may be considered one of the concrete indicators of the new migration management understanding, is the Head of the Harmonization and Communication Department. It is noteworthy that the concept of harmonization
is used in the title of an office and that communication issues are considered at a higher level. First of all, the choice of the term harmonization instead of integration is considered important by the authorities. Departments of the Directorate-General underline the fact that the concept of integration “comes with a baggage”, and is mostly confused with the term assimilation. They also indicate that the “Anatolian soil” has been a basin of identities that has housed many different identities throughout the centuries, and for this reason, it would be relatively easy for local communities to blend with newcomers. Also, the concept of harmonization contains important hints regarding one of the basic paradigms of the new-term migration management in that it indicates the change and transformation not only of the newcomers but also of the local community. It is also noteworthy that the subject of communication has been dealt with in the same field. Of course, practice will determine to what extent and how the targets will be actualised.

The Head of the Migration Policies and Projects Department has undertaken two missions. Firstly, it is charged with the duty of monitoring and reporting the secretarial work of the Migration Policies Board, which are listed among the duties of the directorate-general concerned with migration policies. Another is to form and have formed projects on migration.

The Head of the Department for Protecting Victims of Human Trafficking is an office that was established to remedy grievances suffered by the migrants in Turkey. Considered as one of the fundamental indicators of the new-term migration management’s practices on basic human rights and freedoms, the department fulfils an important mission in combating violations of the rights and freedom of the migrants.

It is also noteworthy that the subject of human trafficking has taken a high-level position within the body of a civilian organisation, moving beyond a mere security issue. The duty and mission of the department to take preventive measures shall be tested against the number of grievances experienced in this subject in the future.

The four boards and commissions established under the coordination of the Directorate-General of Migration Management with the new law
are also noteworthy. The Board on Migration Policies, the Migration Consultancy Board, the Commission for the Evaluation of International Protection and the Commission on Combatting Irregular Migration are new units that support the directorate-general in their own fields.

The second part of chapter two regarding the establishment of the Directorate-General identifies the Board on Migration Policies and its duties. The Board on Migration Policies is a novelty brought by the law. It was formed in order to ensure coordination and communication between various public bodies in determining Turkey’s migration policies. Chaired by the Ministry of the Interior, the Commission consists of undersecretaries of the Ministries of Family and Social Policies, European Union, Labour and Social Security, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Culture and Tourism, Finance, National Education, Health and Transport, Maritime and Communication, as well as the Head of the Overseas Turks and Relative Communities and the Director-General of Migration Management, being granted the power to invite representatives of non-governmental organisations when considered necessary.

Policy-making actors occupy a central position in determining migration management. The practices and discourses are directly influenced by the decisions made by the policy-setter. The Board on Migration Policies holds a central place in Turkey’s new-term migration management. Along with power and responsibility on inter-corporate coordination required for effective migration management, identifying, implementing and monitoring Turkey’s migration policy and strategies have been assigned to the board. Also, making and implementing decisions on fundamental issues concerning migration management is also among the board’s powers. The head of the Board on Migration Policies is the Ministry of the Interior, and its secretarial duties are conducted by the Head of the Office of Migration Policies and Projects under the Directorate-General of Migration Management.

It is foreseen that the Board should meet at least once a year upon an invitation by the head.

The third part of chapter two defines the powers and responsibilities of
the central, rural and foreign units and service units, while the fourth part identifies permanent boards and commissions and temporary commissions to carry on duties in order to support the directorate-general in its efforts.

It is planned that the Migration Consultancy Board should meet twice a year in order to provide advice on procedures remaining within the area of duties and responsibilities of the directorate-general, monitor and assess applications, and advise on regional and international migration applications and developments. The Board is formed by at least one representative at office head level from the ministries of European Union, Labour and Social Security, and Foreign Affairs, the Director-General and Assistant Directors-General, heads of the Foreigners Office, the International Protection Department, the Department for the Protection of Victims of Human Trafficking, the Harmonization and Communication Department, and Migration Policies and Projects Department, the Turkey Representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Turkey Representative of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and five academics conducting academic and scientific research on migration as well as the representatives of five non-governmental organisations carrying out activities in the field of migration. The fact that the board includes academics and representatives of non-governmental organisations are very important in that it allows the directorate-general to benefit from the knowledge and experience of civilians and the academia in its efforts.

It was planned that the International Protection Evaluation Commission should act as a higher authority to evaluate and decide on objections made in cases where the individual or mass asylum applications to Turkey are rejected or international protection is terminated or canceled. Under the chairmanship of the representative of the Directorate-General, the Commission consists of representatives of the Head of the Department of Justice and Foreign Affairs and a migration expert. UNHCR officials may also be invited to these meetings as observers. It is considered that the commission, which undertakes the role of an appeals mechanism in settling disputes regarding international protection, would fulfil an important mission with regard to the protection of basic rights and freedoms.
Another board which is believed will provide important support to the directorate-general in its affairs, the Coordination Board for Combatting Irregular Migration bridges an important gap in Turkish migration management mechanisms’ efforts to fulfil their duties and responsibilities. Established in order to maintain the coordination between the security forces responsible for checking and managing the irregular human mobility within the boundaries of Turkey and other public bodies and organs, the board is chaired by the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior or their deputy, and consists of at least one each office head-level representative of the General Staff, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the Foreign Ministry as well as of the Undersecretary of the National Intelligence Organisation, concerned security units and the Directorate-General. The Board shall also fulfil an important mission by acting as a bridge between the civilian and military units carrying out procedures related to irregular migration.

The “Removal Centres” and the “Reception Centres” built in various locations in Turkey, which will carry out activities under the Directorate-General, play an important role in developing the administrative capacity of migration management. Currently, Removal Centres with a capacity of 3000 in 21 provinces of Turkey serve irregular migrants to be returned from Turkey to their country of origin. Also, a Reception Centre with a capacity of 100 currently provides services in the province of Yozgat.
Table 1: Removal Centres

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ağrı</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Hatay</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>İstanbul</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Antalya</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>İzmir</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Aydın</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Kırıkkale</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Batman</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Kırklareli</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bursa</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Kocaeli</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Çanakkale</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Muğla</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Diyarbakır</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Tekirdağ</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Edirne</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Van</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2 943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2015 - Annual Migration Report GDMM.

**Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD / DEMP)**

Although not directly related to migration management, the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (DEMP), which has undertaken an important mission in meeting various needs of the Syrians who arrived in Turkey and who were forced to reside in Turkey under temporary protection status for the last 6 years, is an important actor in migration management. Established under the Prime Ministry through law no. 5902 enacted in 2009, the fundamental duty of DEMP is to manage disasters that occur in Turkey. In this sense, since the beginning of the mass migration influx from Syria to Turkey, the initiative for managing the crisis was largely taken over by DEMP. Currently, DEMP provides the basic needs, such as accommodation, health and education, of more than 250,000 Syrians residing at temporary accommodation centres. The organisation also covers healthcare-related costs of Syrians living by their own means outside temporary accommodation centres in various cities.
A total of 254,938 Syrians and Iraqis reside at 26 tent and container accommodation centres in 10 different provinces of Turkey. With respect to the management, control and administration of the centres, the activities carried out by AFAD are important in terms of migration management. However, terming the status of Syrians who are in their 6th year as “temporary” does not appear realistic. It appears more realistic to consider that migration management actors should accept in the near future that the temporary status is not sustainable and implement policies accordingly, so that AFAD may focus on its primary field of duties. However, AFAD’s intervention within the context of emergency and crisis management to mass migrations and human mobility in future crises shall continue to have a vital role.
Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (PTA)

The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, which was established in 2010 as an organisation acting under the Prime Ministry, has three fundamental duty areas. Primarily, the organisation deals with the problems suffered by Turks living abroad. It carries out activities to support the cultural and social lives of citizens of the Republic of Turkey living in various countries. Secondly, it has assumed the mission of acting as a bridge between Turkey and related and consanguine communities. Through various projects, it carries out activities to strengthen cultural bonds with communities close to Turkey. In connection with this, international students from various countries wishing to study in Turkey are chosen, and their scholarships and their placement in Turkish universities are coordinated by PTA. Of more than 80,000 international university students studying in Turkey in 2015, 15,000 came to Turkey through scholarships provided by PTA.

PTA holds an important position in that it carries out activities on the emigration side of migration management. Although migration management is generally associated with the area remaining within the boundaries of the country, issues concerning citizens living abroad are of paramount importance too.

Temporary Protection Regulation

Chapter four of the part on International Protection of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection indicates that the law would be regulated through a regulation. Another important turning points with respect to Turkey’s migration management is the “temporary protection regulation” brought into effect after being published in official journal no. 29153 of 22 October 2014 (Temporary Protection Regulation, 2014).

The regulation defines under which circumstances and how temporary protection would be implemented and how it would be terminated. The regulation declares that foreigners arriving in mass at the borders for compelling reasons, other than individual international protection appli-
cations, would be placed under temporary protection through a Cabinet Decree.

The regulation also explains in what manner emergency management would be carried out by which public body in the face of a mass influx, as well as specifying the duties of the bodies. It is indicated that the arrivals would be registered and transferred to accommodation centres or distributed to provinces by the Directorate-General of Migration Management.

The regulation also declares the manner in which services such as healthcare and education offered to those granted temporary protection would be provided, dwelling upon work permits and conditions. Also, the last chapter of the regulation explains how returns would be implemented and the manner in which cooperation would be achieved with other bodies and corporations in the case that the conditions in the country of origin improve.

While in Turkish legislation arrangements on mass influxes were conducted under the “Regulation on the Procedures and Principles Applying to Individual Foreigners Seeking Asylum in Turkey or Requesting Residence Permit in Turkey in order to Seek Asylum in Another Country, and Foreigners Arriving at Our Borders for the Purpose of Mass Asylum”, the latest of which was published in 1994, and various administrative arrangements, with LFIP the practice gained a legal basis for the first time.

Procedures related to foreign citizens arriving at Turkey in mass for asylum-seeking, in particular the Syrians who started arriving in April 2011 and whose number reached 2,728,726 by September 2016, are arranged under the temporary protection regulation.

Having the largest refugee stock in the world in 2008, Syria became the greatest producer of refugees by 2015. More than half of the Syrian population was displaced, and about 5 million Syrians live abroad. Turkey accommodates more than half of this population, which caused Turkey to become the country with the largest refugee stock by 2015. The fact that a temporary protection regulation that won the appreciation of the international community was prepared under such circumstances can be considered as both a success and a necessity in terms of migration management.
International Labour Law

Turkey’s activities of the recent years in the field of migration are not limited to mass migration influxes. Managing skilled migration and international capital also constitutes an important part of migration management.

The most important of these arrangements was Law No. 6735 on International Labour that was brought into effect after being published in the official journal no. 29800 of 13 August 2016 (UİK, 2016). The law aims at identifying policies addressing international labour and regulation the procedures and principles of the work permit and exemptions to be provided to foreigners. Also, new bodies and boards are being formed along with the law.

The most important of these boards is the International Labour Policy Advisory Board. Chaired by the Minister of Labour and Social Security, the Board consists of the Ministry Undersecretary, the undersecretaries of the ministries of European Union, Foreign Affairs, Economy, Interior, Development, and Culture and Tourism, as well as the Director-General of International Labour. Planned to meet at least once a year, the board is charged with advising the Migration Policies Board in line with international labour requirements, as well as developing, reporting and submitting to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security policy recommendations on international labour issues. The Board’s secretarial work is entrusted to the Directorate-General of International Labour.

Another important novelty brought by the law is the “Turquoise Card” application. The objective of the Turquoise Card is to draw skilled labour and international capital to Turkey. In line with this objective, the Turquoise Card is provided by the ministry, upon advice by the International Labour Policy Advisory Board, to persons considered to have excelled in the fields of science, industry and technology or would make a contribution to the national economy. Holders of the Turquoise Card may benefit from all rights provided by an indefinite work permit.

These arrangements are very important for the future of migration management. Indeed, novelties targeting to draw skilled labour and international capital to Turkey would make important contributions to Turkey’s development should they succeed.
Conclusion

The political, economic and social changes that have occurred in various parts of the world within the last ten years caused human mobility at global and regional level. The increasing human mobility has caused security concerns to overshadow basic human rights and freedoms even in regions considered as classical migrant countries such as Europe, USA and Australia. Developed countries, where a democratic culture and values are considered to prevail, shift into a “security-based” and “introverted” political axis due to the concerns brought by the migration influxes. It appears that the issue of migration is becoming a “security” issue rather than a “management” issue for these countries.

Turkey, that is foremost among the countries that were highly affected by global and regional changes, continues to carry out regulations in various fields, firm in the “brave” process it has entered within the last fifteen years. Located adjacent to regions of heavy conflict in the Middle East, all its neighbours being shaken by political, social or economic turmoil, Turkey is taking noteworthy steps in the field of migration. As expressed by various specialists and the international community, Turkey, subjected to the largest mass migration influxes in history, is trying to approach the subject through a novel management understanding instead of an administration policy motivated by security.

Contrary to European Union countries, Turkey does not “keep outside” the influxes, but makes effort to manage them by complying with the principles of basic law. It must be appreciated that the developments have a “positive orientation” in spite of all deficiencies.

The most important of these is the Foreigners and International Protection Law and the International Labour Law. While new laws complement legislation in their own fields, they also involve the administrative organs of these fields.

The Directorate-General of Migration Management under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Directorate-General of International Labour under the Ministry of Labour and Social Security become prominent as two important actors of the new-term migration management.
The field of migration, which had been managed through regulations and administrative arrangements since the Settlement Law published in 1934, appears to have achieved a tidier and more coherent structure based on basic human rights and freedoms through the new legal arrangements.

Discourse, which is the third leg of migration management is also undergoing fundamental changes through new legal arrangements. It can be said that there is a shift towards a universal definition of “foreigner” compared to the ethnocentric point of view that has prevailed since the Settlement Law (Sağiroğlu, 2016). The fact that the new law brings a definition of foreigner based on citizenship, regardless of race and origin, should be regarded as the most important change of paradigm in the new migration management.

There is still much to do in spite of all these novelties and encouraging changes. First of all, to what extent the new legal and administrative arrangements will reflect on implementation is still a question waiting to be answered. On the other hand, there are important deficiencies regarding the social dimension of the arrangements. Although the new management understanding tries to bring in the concept of “harmonization”, which emphasises the adaptation of the local community to the newcomers, it is clear that steps must be taken towards this goal within the community. For migration management also necessitates steps oriented at the change and transformation of the “host community”.

In spite of the existence of a heavy and urgent agenda that cause a delay in the steps to be taken, it is clear that the success and failures of the migration management will closely affect the country’s fate in other matters too.

Finally, how the community of Syrians and other nationals, whose numbers approach 3 million and whose hope of return diminishes by day, would become “harmonized” with the political, economic and social life emerges as the most important and urgent issue in the way of migration management.
Bibliography


Kirişçi, K., Turkey’s “Demonstrative Effect” and transformation in the Middle East, Insight Turkey, 13 (29), 2011, p. 33-55.


One of the most serious dramas in human history has been unfolding in Syria since 2011. When the demonstrations against the regime that started in Syria on 15 March 2011 escalated to serious clashes and consequently into civil war, a serious and dramatic flight to the neighbouring countries began. The human drama experienced by Syrians, the size of which is rare in history, was defined by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as “the largest wave of migration encountered in recent history”. In Syria, which had a population of 22.4 million in 2011, since April 2011 at least 250 thousand people lost their lives, hundreds of thousands were injured and 6 to 9 million people had to abandon their homes. According to UNHCR data, at least 4.8 million Syrians left their country since September 2016, while other sources give this number as 5.5 million. It is a reality that there are still millions of prospective refugees who are watching the belligerents for an opportunity to flee their country.

The Syrian crisis affected primarily the Syrians, but after them mostly neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. The first mass population movement from Syria to Turkey, which share a 911 km border, was in the form of a group of 252 people arriving at the Cilvegözü border entry point in Hatay’s Yayladağı district, which never stopped for the following 5 years. According to the data shared by the Ministry of the Interior Directorate-General of Immigration Management (GİGM), the number of registered Syrian refugees in Turkey has

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3 As known, Turkey does not grant “refugee” or “asylum-seeker” status to non-European persons in Turkey in accordance with the “geographical restriction” with which it signed the Geneva Convention of 1951. In Turkey, Syrians are “people under temporary protection”. In fact, the concept “refugee - asylum-seeker camps” is expressed as “temporary accommodation centres” in official parlance. The concepts of “refugee” or “asylum seeker” as used in this article are not official-legal definitions. The concepts were chosen since they see widespread use in the sociological and academic sense.
reached 2,733,655 as of 1 September 2016. The Turkish government’s policy that “the borders are, and will remain, open for guests fleeing persecution and war, the basic necessities of those arriving in Turkey shall be met, and no one shall be returned by force”, and its “open door policy” which is in full harmony with the International protection principles supporting this were continued since the beginning of the process in spite of certain occasional serious-tangible security concerns and certain deficiencies.

Although the first part of the Syrians arriving in Turkey were placed into rapidly-built camps, the increasing numbers and the continuous influx caused a much larger number of Syrians than those living in the camps to settle not only in the border region, but in all regions of Turkey, living by their own means. The number of Syrians living in the 25 refugee camps located in 10 provinces of Turkey is 254,319 as of 2016. This figure corresponds to only 9% of the total number of refugees. The remaining 91% has spread across Turkey’s 81 provinces. The registration problems that were caused by the large numbers at the beginning are being solved by day. The registrations are being renewed under the cooperation of GİGM and UNHCR. Within this framework, the numbers and other characteristics of the Syrians living in Turkey will be determined in a clearer manner. In addition to over 2,7 million Syrians, it is estimated that there are those who are still not registered, although the number of them remains under 5%. What is important here, and what is often disregarded, is the increase in the number of non-Syrian refugees within the last five years. It is also known that there are over 300 thousand refugees in Turkey, arriving from countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Pakistan, arriving through the “door opened” by the Syrians after April 2011. In other words, as of April 2016, there are 3.1 - 3.2 million refugees in Turkey, 2.7 - 2.8 million of which are Syrian and around 300 thousand from other countries. In other words, Turkey accommodates a number of refugees that reaches 4% of its own population. This has caused Turkey to become the country with the highest number of refugees in the world since 2014.

On its own, Turkey hosts more than 50% of the 5 million Syrians who have left their country. Turkey is followed by (as of September 2016) Lebanon (1 million 033 thousand), Jordan (656 thousand), (Northern)
Iraq (239 thousand) and Egypt (114 thousand). Around 1.3 - 1.5 million immigrants reached EU countries, which face a serious influx of Syrian and non-Syrian immigrants after 2014, especially in 2015. Only half of this number, that is 600-700 thousand, consists of Syrians.

**Table-1: Age and Gender Ratios of Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Groups</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,466,554</td>
<td>1,287,142</td>
<td>2,753,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>196,768</td>
<td>183,414</td>
<td>380,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>199,205</td>
<td>188,205</td>
<td>387,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>151,301</td>
<td>138,307</td>
<td>289,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-18</td>
<td>132,094</td>
<td>111,041</td>
<td>243,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-24</td>
<td>220,217</td>
<td>174,304</td>
<td>394,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>147,826</td>
<td>114,904</td>
<td>262,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>120,483</td>
<td>96,184</td>
<td>216,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>86,325</td>
<td>73,562</td>
<td>159,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>59,394</td>
<td>56,050</td>
<td>115,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>48,020</td>
<td>44,134</td>
<td>92,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>37,399</td>
<td>36,108</td>
<td>73,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
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<td>60-64</td>
<td>17,530</td>
<td>17,995</td>
<td>35,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-69</td>
<td>11,312</td>
<td>11,681</td>
<td>22,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-74</td>
<td>6,152</td>
<td>7,092</td>
<td>13,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-79</td>
<td>3,770</td>
<td>4,502</td>
<td>8,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-84</td>
<td>1,985</td>
<td>2,528</td>
<td>4,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-89</td>
<td>1,074</td>
<td>1,244</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>90+</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>1,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,733</td>
<td>100,0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Looking at the demographic data for the over 2.7 million registered Syrians in Turkey as of 1 September 2016, it is observed that the number of Syrians at 0-4 ages is over 368 thousand. Considering that the Syrians in Turkey have been in Turkey for an average of 3 years and that 125 Syrian babies are born every day, it can be said that, among these 368 thousand babies, the number of those born in Turkey within the last 5 years exceeds 230 thousand. This is an important matter that must be considered in projections for the future.

It is seen that 44% of the Syrians in Turkey consists of youth and children under 18, while over 75% consists of children and women, who require special protection. It must be considered that, especially in the process of “permanency”, the education of the children and youth and “family reunions” would be important issues. The young population also brings up the need for education. The number of Syrian children of schooling age (5-17) in Turkey is over 850 thousand. Only 36%, that is 311 thousand of these children are able to go to school. However, the number of those who have the opportunity to attend Turkish public schools and receive education in Turkish is only 62 thousand. The remaining 255 thousand children attend schools at or outside camps, which are referred to as Temporary Education Centre and provide education in Arabic according to the Syrian curriculum, and which, unfortunately, have serious problems with regard to quality. However, what is most dramatic is the fact that at least 550 thousand children receive no education at all. It is clear that this will be the most problematic area for both the Syrian refugees and Turkey in the medium- and long-term. However, the need is immensely great and costly. At least 40 thousand new teachers and 30 thousand classrooms are required in order to seriously provide education to all of the Syrian children. It is foreseen that only the yearly cost of teachers would be over 600 million $. Also, attracting Syrian children, who have to work and earn a living and who have motivation problems due to traumas, to schools would not be very easy.

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4 The official figure provided based on hospital records on this subject is 158 thousand as of March 2016. However, it is clear that the more realistic figure is over 200 thousand.

5 The gross salary of a teacher in a public school was calculated as 4,000 TL, that is 1,250€.
Predictions and Policy Regarding Syrian Refugees

The policy on the Syrians in Turkey has been built largely upon “temporariness” even in September 2016. The Syrian regime was not expected to hold for so long, and the number of refugees was not expected to be so high. It is without doubt that one of the most important reasons for this was that Syria was seen as another, even the final, step of the “Arab Spring” process. The use of violence in quenching the anti-regime demonstrations in Syria was expected to cause the overthrow of the regime in Syria, just as in countries such as Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Libya. However, this was not how things proceeded. Both the fact that the developments occurring in the countries before Syria, which mostly worked to the benefit of the Western world, made the Russian Federation and China uncomfortable and the Syrian regime’s close ties with the Russian Federation as well as the Russian Federation’s priorities in the region, coupled with Iran’s regional and denominational solidarity and interest perception shifted the balances. Syria suddenly turned into the battleground of all global and regional forces. At the UN, no decisions could be made and no common attitude could be developed. In the war environment, which became increasingly violent, “friends of the Syrian people” and “friends of the Syrian regime” started to separate. Another important and even vital development was the fact that DAESH (ISIS) suddenly became a serious actor that shook up the entire region. Thinking they had to choose between DAESH and the Syrian Regime, Western Powers started to tone down their harsh attitude against the Syrian regime and, if not supported, could not prevent the Russian Federation that claimed to be fighting DAESH in the region. This, in turn, rendered the collapsing Syrian Regime resilient. All of this resulted in one of the most violent proxy wars in the world, which still continues. There are over 1000 armed organisations of all sizes fighting in the region. Alliances rapidly shift and no party is able to get the upper hand. However, it is the Syrian people and the region that suffers. This war where over 250 thousand people lost their lives, millions are injured and more than half of the country’s population is forced to leave their homes is a great failure and embarrassment for the international community.
Beginning on 29 April 2011 with 252 people, the immigrant influx to Turkey, which has a 911 km border with Syria and which pursued an “open door policy” right from the beginning, saying “our door is open to those fleeing violence and persecution”, has continued without interruption for the last five years.

This process made Turkey the country with the largest number of refugees in the world. Developments not suiting Turkey’s expectations on the fate of the war and the number of refugees caused the most serious problem in the process management in Turkey. All administrative and legal arrangements based on the belief that the Syrians were in our country on a temporary basis started to cause difficulties and even obstacles as “continuity” and “permanence” started to assert themselves. For instance, almost all issues from the schooling condition of Syrian children to the language and curriculum of education, the vehicles in traffic bearing Syrian number plates, the provision of healthcare services and planned settlement tried to be solved within the framework of daily emergency policies.

The expectation that the Syrians would return to their countries shortly had been the basic point of reference in the process management. However, the time that passed was a term in which sociological truths rather than political choices and expectations made themselves felt. The possibility of the return of the Syrians in Turkey to their country dropped to minimum in 2016. The most important reasons for this are:

- It is still not possible to estimate when the war in Syria will end. The possibility of peace in the short- and medium-term in the country no longer exists.
- Even if the war ends today, it would be easy to guess how difficult life would be in Syria, which is demolished, destabilised, and where people harboured a deadly hostility towards each other. The issue is no longer limited to the ending of the war.
- 44.7% of the Syrians living in Turkey, that is more than 1.2 million, consist of children and youth under 18. The return of this population is even harder.
- The average period of stay in Turkey of the Syrians has exceeded 3 years, some of which have been in Turkey for more than five years.
Some of these are going to school, some are working, and some were born in Turkey. Within this framework, looking at it from a sociological point of view, it is observed that the refugees’ motivation to stay permanently in Turkey has further increased in time.

Considering the above-mentioned factors and other issues not mentioned here, it can be easily said that the likelihood of the return of the Syrians in Turkey to Syria is very low, while the likelihood of their permanent residence in Turkey has become unchangeably strong. In this case, the need for special policies based on harmonisation/integration for the Syrians becomes clearly visible.

**Sharing the Humanitarian and Financial Burden**

The extraordinary effort made, and humanitarian and financial burden shouldered, by the Turkish government and society for the Syrian refugees since April 2011 have reached an incredible size. Turkey’s having admitted around 3 million Syrians to its country in 5,5 years and spending more than 12 billion Dollars for this cause is beyond all appreciation. With this aid, in 2014 and 2015 Turkey has become the 3rd country providing the highest humanitarian aid, and is by far the 1st country when calculated according to income per capita. The attitude demonstrated by the developed countries throughout the crisis was virtually “Open the eastern border wide, but close the western border tightly, so that they do not come to us” until early 2014, which was followed by “let us give you money so that you prevent them from coming to us” after 2014. It is clear that Turkey has admitted the larger part, that is at least 50%, of the 5,5 million Syrians leaving their country and taking shelter in neighbouring countries. As of August 2016, Turkey is followed by Lebanon with 21% (1 million 33 thousand), Jordan with 13,6% (656 thousand), (Northern) Iraq with 5% (249 thousand) and Egypt with 2,3% (114 thousand). Although the total number of Syrians admitted by countries accommodating the Syrians, other than the 5 countries in the region, has seriously increased in 2015, only 600-700 thousand, that is 15% of more than 5 million Syrian refugees have been able to go to Western countries. From the door opened by the Syrians in the emotional atmosphere espe-
cially after the “baby Aylan” disaster, many refugees, particularly from Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan were observed to have reached Europe. The number of refugees reaching Europe from mid-2014 to June 2016 is around 1.2 - 1.5 million, half of which are Syrians. The highest number of refugees in Europe is found in Germany with 1.3 million and then in Sweden with 350 thousand, while this figure remains rather low in other EU countries. It is noteworthy that, in this process during which the solidarity within the EU was widely questioned, only 8 of the 28 EU countries admitted refugees.

With respect to the Syrians, it is clear that the sharing of the financial burden is as striking as the humanitarian burden, as it is irregular to the detriment of the countries of the region. The support responding to the financial aid calls made by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) within the framework of the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)\(^6\) is seen to have remained very low. The support in response to the call for 3.7 billion Dollars made by UNHCR for 2014 materialised at the level of only 61%, that is 2.2 billion Dollars. The call for 4.3 billion Dollars made for 2015, however, managed to collect a support of only 2.6 billion Dollars, that is 71%. Only 40% of the target for 2016 could be collected by August 2016.\(^7\) The resource the UNHCR planned to provide for the Syrians in Turkey within the framework of 3RP after the evaluations conducted on the development status and urgency of needs in the countries of the region was 497 million Dollars in 2014, however only 36% of this figure, that is 177 million Dollars, were forwarded to Turkey. While the support envisaged for Turkey for 2015 was 624 million Dollars, what was actually provided was only 45.8%, that is 286 million Dollars. In 2016, the amount that was collected remained only at 275 million Dollars, that is 33%, in spite of the expectation of 842 million Dollars.\(^8\) This shows how the countries of the region, particularly Turkey, were left alone in the sharing of both the humanitarian burden and the financial burden.

\(^6\) UN’s regional support programme, “The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan”, known as “3RP” is the most comprehensive and most attended project generated in the last five years. Here, need analyses are being conducted in order to support refugees in their needs. 3RP covers Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt, which are countries that accommodate the Syrian refugees.

\(^7\) UNHCR Official Website: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php

\(^8\) http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224
and the financial burden. This striking negative experience with respect to solidarity brought with it the risk of negatively affecting the attitude of neighbouring countries in the event of similar future crises. It is possible that governments will act more cautiously with regard to refugees in the future. This, in turn, will cause any humanitarian dramas to escalate into great calamities.\(^9\)

**The Future of the Syrian Crisis**

One of the largest-scale mass migration movements that the world has ever faced, the Syrian crisis has given rise to an extraordinary situation also for the countries in which the asylum seekers have settled. Within the last 5 years Turkey has come across a humanitarian crisis in a size it had never before encountered. The high level of social acceptance demonstrated by the Turkish society, which has admitted almost 3 million Syrians in such a short period of time, is very significant. The fact that no very serious problems were encountered until mid-2016 in spite of the fact that only 8-9% of the Syrians live in camps while the remainder lives across Turkey and, to the contrary, best efforts were made by the community to help the Syrians in spite of occasional concerns, is very valuable. Generally it may be said that the level of “social acceptance” in Turkey regarding the Syrians is considerable. Occasional protests and negative events are important signals, but do not change the general picture. However, social acceptance is not an indefinite condition that can be sustained forever as it is today, and is highly fragile. In other words, the high level of social acceptance does not mean that the society has no concerns regarding the Syrians. The continuation of the social acceptance demonstrated by the Turkish society through extraordinary financial and humanitarian sacrifices may be ensured only through the management of the process in a manner that would obtain the support of the society and ensure its participation. An important misconception on this subject is the expectation that the fact that the Syrians are neighbours, are from the same religion etc. would facilitate social acceptance. Many

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field studies have indicated that the Turkish society views the subject more as “urgent humanitarian aid to people escaping persecution”. There are serious differences between the subject of “Living together with the Syrians” and the mature and supportive attitude that has been demonstrated up to today. What is more important is the fact that it does not seem possible that the problems could be overcome through “brotherhood or coreligionism”. As observed in all large mass immigration movements in the world, the first important concern of the societies subject to immigration has been a concern for security. This is followed by disruptions in public services such as healthcare and education, caused by the newly arriving masses. However, the most serious problem that will determine the relations in practice will be the competition caused by “cheap labour” in the labour market. The fear of losing one’s job and therefore welfare and routine can rapidly increase the reaction against immigrants in general. The comprehensive study conducted by the Hacettepe University Immigration and Politics Research Centre - HUGO in October 2014 indicates that the Turkish society has put a serious cultural distance between itself and the Syrians, that the concerns are very widespread and high-level, that they wish the Syrians to return to their country as soon as possible, and that they are clearly against the possibility of them being granted citizenship. This situations shows how important and necessary the support of the Turkish society is in the policy on the Syrians. In order that around 3 million people may live in harmony with the Turkish society, it is first necessary to provide the Turkish society with healthy information and to alleviate its concerns. Otherwise, the possibility that such concerns may escalate to xenophobia, and even racism, is unfortunately very high. For this reason, it is essential that data is collected using scientific methods and policies are built upon these. An important issue is that the healthy sharing of information with the public has not been achieved until today. It is very important that the process is conducted “based on right” to a greater degree, that universal rule of law is respected in this matter, and that the civil society is granted the highest degree of initiative. As it is known, as from 15 July 2016, the Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey were granted the right to work subject to certain conditions. However, the
fact that the unemployment rate in Turkey is currently 10.2% and that 3.2 million Turkish citizens are currently unemployed, as well as calculations indicating that around 1 million new job fields should be created for the Syrians, indicate how difficult the issue is, and how this would strengthen the unrecorded zone. At this point the refugees become the “competitors” of the real poor and unskilled persons in the country. The fragile social acceptance is passing a very important test right at this point.

The tendency of the Syrians in Turkey to remain permanently increases by day. This is in keeping with the nature of the process, which has also been observed in other places of the world. People, who progressively succeed in holding on in the country they live, choose to stay in that country especially if their country of origin is in a worst state, and particularly if there is a war raging there.

Although the Syrians living in Turkey claim that they could return if peace is once more established in their country, they also accept that this has become impossible to achieve in the short- and medium-term. In other words, it is a reality that a serious part of the Syrians in Turkey would not return to their country, but would permanently live in Turkey. This reality must be shared with the Turkish society, which has demonstrated extraordinary social acceptance and support to the Syrians, and its support must be sought. The first way to achieve this is transparency and sharing. The misconceptions that emerged in almost all predictions made during the last 5.5 years on the Syrian regime, the number of arrivals and their period of stay, as well as the lack of information sharing, further increases the concern of the society. It is imperative that the policy on Syrians has a dynamic structure. Harmonisation policies based on the knowledge that a larger part of the Syrians will remain in Turkey must be initiated. Otherwise, the Syrians will become a “competitor” for every citizen who is not able to benefit from public support, or who is not able to benefit adequately from such support. This, in turn, would bring with it the risk of overturning the already fragile social acceptance.
Local Governments: The Unseen Heroes of the Refugee Crisis

The issue concerning the Syrians in Turkey was considered within the framework of “temporariness” based on the prediction that the crisis in Syria would not last this long. Especially AFAD and the Directorate-General of Immigration Management of the Ministry of the Interior conducted works within the framework of “emergency management”. However, after the Syrian had started to live first in the border regions and then in the urban areas across Turkey, an important pressure was formed on local governments. Only 9% of the total number of Syrian refugees lives in the camps. The remaining part is trying to hold on to life across Turkey. The numbers of the refugees in certain provinces and districts have exceeded the population of these provinces and districts. In this sense, that Kilis, with an original population of 90 thousand, accommodates 125 thousand refugees is a very striking example. Looking at the provinces in which the Syrians in Turkey reside, it is seen that the number of Syrians in 4 provinces are above 300 thousand, above 100 thousand in 7 provinces, above 50 thousand in 13 provinces, and above 10 thousand in 21 provinces. These striking circumstances can be seen in the ratios of the number of refugees to those of the population of the provinces. The ratio of the 2.7 million Syrian Refugees in Turkey to the population of Turkey of 79 million is 3.47%. Among the first four provinces with the highest population of Syrians, with the exception of Istanbul, the ratio is over 20% in Şanlıurfa, Hatay and Kilis. The ratio in Kilis has reached 110%. In 14 provinces the ratio of the number of refugees to the province population is above 5%.

With 369,699 refugees as of September 2016, Istanbul became the province with the largest number of registered refugees, to whom temporary protection certificates were granted. The distribution of the Syrian refugees in Istanbul is rather interesting. Although the ratio of Syrians in Istanbul to the population of Istanbul is 2.6%, great differences at district level can be seen. In 18 districts out of Istanbul’s 39 districts, the number of refugees exceeds 10 thousand. The Syrian population is over 20 thousand in Istanbul’s 7 districts (Küçükçekmece, Bağcılar, Başakşehir, Esenyurt, Fatih, Sultanbeyli, Sultangazi), while in two district (Küçükçekmece, Bağcılar), this number is over 30 thousand. It is clear that the number of refugees in some districts is greater than those in certain EU countries.
Table 2: The First Ten Provinces with the Largest Syrian Populations in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>İstanbul</td>
<td>408,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şanlıurfa</td>
<td>396,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatay</td>
<td>377,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
<td>318,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>148,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mersin</td>
<td>135,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilis</td>
<td>123,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursa</td>
<td>99,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izmir</td>
<td>93,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardin</td>
<td>93,216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In Turkey, local governments and regulations, particularly the Municipal Law, charge local governments with only serving “citizens”. Although the law includes the point of “service to fellow townspeople”, it is clear that the local governments are rather restricted with regard to services to refugees. More important is the problem of resources. The primary source of income of municipalities in Turkey is the payment made per capita by the Bank of Provinces. This amount is calculated based only on citizens. In other words, the state support paid according to a population of 90 thousand in Kilis disregards the additional 125 thousand people, making a payment only for 90 thousand. Local governments are not made additional payments considering the refugees they accommodate, as is the case especially in Europe.¹⁰ This potentially causes serious hitches in local services depending on the population. Refugees arrive not because they are invited by municipalities, but within the framework of the government’s policies, and almost all of them consist of masses in

¹⁰ For a news article summarising the situation in Germany on this matter
need of aid and free public services. In other words, the number of mass- es requiring support by the local governments has suddenly increased by over 10, 20, 50 and even 100%. Municipalities are not entitled to refuse service to persons residing within the boundaries of the province or the district. This potentially causes serious distress.

In connection with the recent developments regarding refugees in Turkey, the Municipal law requires rearrangement with a consideration of 3 points:

1. The legal-administrative obstacles before municipal services being provided to refugees must be raised.
2. Municipalities must be provided with additional financial support to be calculated according to the number of refugees in order that services may be provided to refugees.
3. The municipalities must assume a special role with respect to the harmonisation of the refugees, and must be provided with the necessary finances and personnel to achieve this.

In the refugee crisis that has existed in Turkey since 2011, the representatives of local governments, making efforts to do their job in the background and even having to take risks from time to time, have played as important a role as the self-sacrifice of the Turkish society. Within this framework, the existing social peace must not be overlooked.\footnote{The Marmara Union of Municipalities Immigration Research Workshop (MAGA) is conducting a comprehensive academic study on 39 district municipalities and the metropolitan municipality in Istanbul in order to identify the work and requirements of municipalities with regard to refugees, and to submit the findings to the policy-makers. The study was completed in January 2017 and shared with the public. (www.marmara.gov.tr)} We must not forget that central arrangements made in Ankara can never achieve their purposes before the development of local harmonisation processes.
### Table-3: Distribution of the Syrians in Turkey According to Provinces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>İL SIRA</th>
<th>İLER</th>
<th>KAYIT EDİLEN</th>
<th>NÜFUS</th>
<th>İL NÜFUSU İLE KARŞILAŞ-TIRMA YÜZDESİ</th>
<th>İL SIRA</th>
<th>İLER</th>
<th>KAYIT EDİLEN</th>
<th>NÜFUS</th>
<th>İL NÜFUSU İLE KARŞILAŞ-TIRMA YÜZDESİ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ADANA</td>
<td>148.991</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>3,50%</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>KAHRAMAN-MARAŞ</td>
<td>85.634</td>
<td>1.096.610</td>
<td>3,46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ADYAMAN</td>
<td>24.103</td>
<td>602.774</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>4,00%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>KARABÜK</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>236.978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>AFYON</td>
<td>3.776</td>
<td>709.015</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>0,53%</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>KARAMAN</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>242.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AGRI</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>547.210</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>0,16%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>KARS</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>292.660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>AKSARAY</td>
<td>1.068</td>
<td>386.514</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>0,28%</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>KASTAMONU</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>372.633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>AMASYA</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>322.167</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>0,06%</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>KAYSERI</td>
<td>52.465</td>
<td>1.341.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>ANKARA</td>
<td>61.874</td>
<td>5.270.575</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>1,17%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>KIRIKKALE</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>270.271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>ANTALYA</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>2.288.456</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>0,01%</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>KIRKLARELİ</td>
<td>2.063</td>
<td>346.973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>ARDahan</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>99.265</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>0,07%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>KIRŞEHİR</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>225.562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>ARTVIN</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>168.370</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>0,02%</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>KILIS</td>
<td>123.273</td>
<td>130.655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>AYDIN</td>
<td>6.884</td>
<td>1.053.506</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>1,37%</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>KOCAELI</td>
<td>24.416</td>
<td>1.780.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>BALIKESİR</td>
<td>1.756</td>
<td>1.186.688</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>0,15%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>KONYA</td>
<td>69.241</td>
<td>2.130.544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>BARTIN</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>190.708</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>0,01%</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>KÜTAHYA</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>571.463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>BATMAN</td>
<td>18.850</td>
<td>566.633</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>3,33%</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>MALATYA</td>
<td>18.552</td>
<td>772.904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>BAYBURT</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>78.550</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>0,04%</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>MANİSA</td>
<td>5.769</td>
<td>1.380.366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>BİLEÇİK</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>212.361</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>0,22%</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>MARDIN</td>
<td>93.216</td>
<td>796.591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>BİNGOŁ</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>267.184</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>0,27%</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>MERSIN</td>
<td>135.457</td>
<td>1.745.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>BİTLIS</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>340.449</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>0,18%</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>MUĞLA</td>
<td>8.229</td>
<td>908.877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>BOLU</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>291.095</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>0,33%</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>MUŞ</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>408.728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>BURDUR</td>
<td>7.764</td>
<td>258.339</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>3,01%</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>NEVŞEHİR</td>
<td>5.273</td>
<td>286.767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>BURSA</td>
<td>99.420</td>
<td>2.842.547</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>3,50%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>ORDU</td>
<td>2.953</td>
<td>346.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>ÇANKAKALE</td>
<td>3.386</td>
<td>513.341</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>0,66%</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>OSMANİYE</td>
<td>39.960</td>
<td>512.873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>ÇANKIRI</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>180.945</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>0,16%</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>RİZE</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>328.979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>ÇORUM</td>
<td>1.392</td>
<td>525.180</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>0,27%</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>SAKARYA</td>
<td>6.360</td>
<td>953.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>DENİZLİ</td>
<td>6.760</td>
<td>993.442</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>0,68%</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>SAMSUN</td>
<td>3.589</td>
<td>1.279.884</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>DIYARBA-  KIR</td>
<td>28.673</td>
<td>1.654.196</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>1,73%</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>ŞANLIURFA</td>
<td>396.728</td>
<td>1.892.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>DÜZCE</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>360.388</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>0,14%</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>SİIRT</td>
<td>2.993</td>
<td>320.351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>EDİRNE</td>
<td>6.493</td>
<td>402.537</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>1,61%</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>SİVAS</td>
<td>1.833</td>
<td>618.617</td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>ELAZIĞ</td>
<td>4.790</td>
<td>574.304</td>
<td>78.741.053</td>
<td>0,83%</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>ŞANLIURFA</td>
<td>396.728</td>
<td>1.892.320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The fundamental difference in Turkey with respect to the status and future of the refugees is the issue of “temporariness-permanence”. Naturally, crisis management and the immigration policy must be built upon this. At the beginning the Syrian crisis was not expected to last so long. However, now it appears impossible for Turkey to continue its policy regarding the Syrians based only on “temporariness”. The problems deferred or neglected with the expectation of temporariness may bring along very serious problems in the future. In developing strategies, it is important that a dynamic process management with a knowledge-based approach should be primarily considered, and that the opinions of specialists, academics, the civil society and international corporations and institutions should be made use of. It is vital that strategies regarding “permanence” are centred on the human being and rights, and that the Turkish society’s support is sought on this matter.
Policy Priorities

• **The Reality Must Be Accepted and a Strategic Decision Must be Made** The Syrians who have been arriving at Turkey since April 2011 and whose numbers have exceeded 2.7 million in September 2016 are now a reality of Turkey, and their permanence is becoming a fact by day. Above, we indicated, with its reasons, that it would be impossible for the Syrians to leave Turkey even if the war ends today. However, it is observed that the state has still not made a strategic decision, and that it still assesses the matter on the basis of temporariness. This is an important handicap in the management of the process, in the waste of resources and energy, and the peaceful construction of a shared future. Facing the reality must be the first step.

• **Education**

Turkey’s first important harmonisation policy regarding the Syrians in Turkey must concern teaching the Turkish language to, and educating, the Syrian children and youth under 18 year of age, which constitute 34% of the population. As of 2016 there are 850 thousand Syrian children of schooling age in Turkey. However, only 62 thousand of these are able to attend Turkish schools and receive education in Turkish, while 255 thousand receive a rather inadequate education in Arabic at schools specified as “temporary education centres”. Unfortunately, at least 500 thousand children have not been able to go to school for years. Now this problem is a problem of Turkey as much as one of the Syrians; all children must urgently be taught Turkish and integrated into the Turkish education system. Serious consideration should be given to the use of continuing with education in Arabic for both the future of the Syrian children and Turkey. However, it must not be forgotten that this subject would give rise to an immense financial burden.

It is a fact that 40 thousand additional teachers would be required for 800-850 thousand teachers, which would result in a cost of over 600 million € a year only with respect to teachers.
• Employment Rights
Universally, “employment rights” hold an important place in all mass immigration events. Although Turkey does not accept the Syrians as refugees, it has granted many of the rights granted to refugees. Since 15 January 2016, all Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey have been granted employment rights. However, in practice, only around 8-10 thousand Syrians have officially obtained work permits. It is known that it is not easy for the Syrians to find jobs in a country like Turkey, where the unemployment rate is very high and skilled labour is in demand. This situation aggravates unregistered employment, resulting in a serious exploitation of labour. It is generally accepted that currently at least 400 thousand Syrians are working in Turkey. However, efforts must be made to provide an arrangement on this matter, both to reduce unregistered employment, and to provide the Syrians with work conditions that are suitable for human dignity. In Turkey new arrangements are also being made to facilitate the employment not only of the Syrians, but also of all skilled foreigners, making contributions to the economy through “Turquoise Cards”, similar to the practice in the USA. The latest legal arrangement on this matter is the International Labour Law of July 2016. However, since this arrangement especially dwells on skilled workers, it probably will prove useful for a very limited number of Syrians.

• Proper Registration
The efforts made with regard to the Syrian refugees, actors of one of the greatest humanitarian crises in the history of the world, are very important and valuable. However, in order that the process may be better managed, healthier and more detailed registration is necessary. In this respect, the “re-registration” process initiated by GİGM and UNHCR is very important.

12 The research commissioned by TİSK on this subject contains important details and recommendations: M.Murat ERDOĞAN-Can ÜNVER (2015) Türk İş Dünyasının Türkiye’deki Suriyeliler Konusundaki Beklenti, Görüş ve Önerileri, TİSK, Ankara.
• **New Legal-Administrative Arrangements and New Corporate Structures**

With Turkey moving its efforts regarding the Syrians from a temporary to a permanent basis, the need for new legal and administrative arrangements and, more importantly, corporate structures will automatically arise. It is clear that a ministry or undersecretariat/office structure will be needed to carry out and manage harmonisation policies along with the Directorate-General of Immigration Management in order that Turkey is able to manage this process properly. Otherwise, resources and generations will be lost.

• **Roles Specific to Local Governments**

The local governments have undertaken a very important role in the last 5.5 years, and have succeeded in conducting the process properly in spite of limited powers and resources. However, their powers and facilities must be increased in order to render this success sustainable. Such delegation of powers is very critical with regard especially to the local harmonisation processes.

• **Security Concerns**

Concerns regarding the loss of jobs and security affect almost all communities subjected to mass immigration, putting pressure on politicians. This is also valid for the Syrians too. The state must develop very careful and long-term strategies on this matter.

• **Community Support**

Refugee policies closely affect all citizens, especially those of low income and education levels. Therefore, in a country where the number of refugees amount to 3.5-4% of the population, obtaining support from the community on decisions to be made is very important. The sensitivity that rose especially with regard to subjects such as “citizenship” has shown that the fragile social acceptance may rapidly turn over if attention is not paid to social support. This, in turn, would be unfair against the Turkish society, who has shown an extraordinary solidarity and self-sacrifice until now. It is necessary to take the matter seriously and, leaving sentimentalism aside, to turn towards rational policies.
Another important fact regarding the Syrians in Turkey, which has been revealed after the 5.5 years that have elapsed, is that almost all of the Syrians will continue to live with the Turkish society no matter how the war proceeds. Accordingly, efforts must be made to discover how a sustainable culture of living together can be developed. We must develop our own policies without expecting much support from the international community, which has never been much. In other words, we must take the question “how will Turkey live in peace with more than 2.5 million Syrians, how will a common future be built” more seriously, and carefully identify the role of local governments in this.

**Bibliography**


FRAMWORK FOR LIVING TOGETHER WITH SYRIAN REFUGEES IN TURKEY


SYRIAN ASYLUM-SEEKERS IN TURKEY: 
A TEST CASE FOR “STATE CAPACITY”¹

Introduction

The process of globalization made states currently to face with many domestic and international challenges testing their political and institutional strength. A state’s capacity to respond those challenges underpin its success and legitimacy. The Arab Spring, starting with the self-inflammation of a street seller in Tunisia shaking the political landscape in the Middle East and North Africa, actually provides a crucial case study in this respect for all countries of the region. The states in the Middle East and North Africa faced with immediate challenges in terms of the legitimacy of their political institutions and the capacity to respond to the humanitarian crisis caused by the problems of refugees and migration as a result of the civil war in Syria and Libya. The studies reveal already existing population pressures on the weak states of the Middle East and North Africa and a fear in the West in general and Europe in particular because of its geographical proximity that the collapse of those weak states would lead to a humanitarian disaster.² This study concerns the dimensions of the “state capacity” in Turkey. The Arab Spring mainly affected Turkey through repercussions of the civil war in Syria. Having 911 km border with Syria, Turkey has been responding challenges including migration and terrorism. In particular, the Syrian civil war brought Turkey under the pressure of responding to a grave humanitarian crisis. Turkey’s “open door policy” with Syria implemented since April 2011 brought an influx of people seeking protection and humanitarian as-

¹ Prof. Dr. Kıvanç Ulusoy, Faculty of Political Sciences, Istanbul University Volkan Çatır, PhD. Student, Istanbul University (kivancu@istanbul.edu.tr)
sistance. Political and institutional adaptation to the massive problems caused by migration from Syria seems to be the major issue that would occupy the agenda of Turkish policy makers in the coming years.

This article concentrates on the implications of the migration crisis caused by the civil war in Syria on Turkey’s “state capacity”. The first section focuses on the concept of the “state capacity” elaborated by Michael Mann in terms of its dimensions such as the “despotic” and the “infrastructural” power. Briefly underlying many dimensions of the “state capacity” and the academic controversy about this blurred concept, the paper deals with its key properties focusing on the effective and legitimate ways to formulate and implement public policies including health, education and housing. The second section dwells on the current level of the Syrian migration problem affecting Turkey. In addition to providing the scale of the “social question” that Turkey has been facing as a result of the Syrian crisis over the past five years, the paper deals with the dimensions of the state response, including policy suggestions to increase Turkey’s “state capacity”. The concluding remarks will be brief and focusing on the relevance of the concept of the “state capacity” for the case of the Syrian migration problem broadly defined as a transnational “social question”.

“State capacity” as a Novel Framework of Analysis

There is no consensus on the definition of the concept of the “state capacity”. However, a broadly shared tentative definition refers to a state’s ability to make and implement policies together with societal actors leading to a rational distribution of resources to ensure human development. In this respect, the “state capacity” concerns the implementation of policies without any normative quality regarding whether the policy is good or bad. The concept gained an increasing significance facing with the failed states in Africa, Middle East, Balkans and the Caucasus in the late 20th century. It has become a framework of studying the implementation of the European Union’s (EU) acquis by the Central and East European countries along the accession process. The Fragile States Index included the asylum issue as one of the crucial indicators to assess the states’ fragility or failure. The World Bank measures the state efficiency through its capacity used for the benefit of society. In this sense, there is a pos-
itive correlation between the “state capacity” and human development. In a similar vein, worldwide indexes measuring effective governance and legitimacy of the states such as Freedom House Index, Worldwide Governance Indicators and World Values Survey take the concept of the “state capacity” in its various dimensions from political to administrative, coercive and deliberative as crucial variables.³

A refined version of the concept includes the “legitimacy” dimension, in addition to the “strength” of the state measured by ability to make and implement policies which broadly refers to its coercive and administrative capacity. In fact, Michael Mann puts forward one of the earliest and the most elaborate definition of this concept. Defining the state as a complex structure as an institution and in terms of its societal function, Mann explains the state capacity through two central forms of power: “despotic power” and “infrastructural power”. Setting out from Weber’s definition of the state based on bureaucracy, its centrally governed political relations, territorial domain and monopoly of force, Mann reformulates the “autonomous power of the state” which shows itself in the above mentioned two interrelated forms of power. “Despotic power”, associated with the monopoly to use force, refers to a form of government that elites can take and implement decisions with “unlimited power” and without seriously deliberating with society. Contrary to the despotic one, the “infrastructural power” refers to a form of government that policy decisions are taken and implemented through a process of “deliberation” among social actors.⁴

Mann claims that the greatest differentiation between “infrastructural power” and “despotic power” relates to the approach to address “society”. While state exerts force on society “despotic power”, “infrastructural power” refers to a form of power that the state exercises its power through society. In Mann’s definition, the state with a strong “infrastruc-


tural power” would actually have a strong rule-making and implementing capacity. For Mann, a “despotic” government and an “infrastructural” government are separate analytically but they are related in practice. The greater consistency the “infrastructural” government demonstrates in making binding rules, the greater a “despotic power” may be created over society including marginal political groups and minorities. Democratic countries are able to instantly recognize and manage social demands by using “infrastructural” tools, while countries in the process of democratisation are able to implement state reforms with greater ease by utilising their “despotic power”. Though paradoxical, Mann indicates that the “despotic” government provides support in strengthening infrastructural government in countries making an effort for democratisation. Therefore, for Mann, the states should have both capacities.⁵

Mann’s two-dimensional model of the “state capacity” triggered an important intellectual debate. First of all, and in addition to the means to collect revenue and increase legitimacy, Mann underlined a series of processes contributing to the general capacity of the states defined by the growth of bureaucracy and judicial apparatus. In broad terms, the followings contribute to general state capacity: the processes leading to the division of labour within states main activities coordinated centrally; an increase in literacy enabling messages to be communicated throughout the state; the development of coinage weights and measures; an increase in speed of the transmission of messages and transport of people and resources. There are also measurable variables which could be considered as the indicators of the “state capacity”. They include the number of administrative personnel, police officers, judges; the size of the army or labour available to the state; money spent on welfare policies; or the amount of tax collected.⁶ As the recent studies operationalizing Mann’s framework of analysis shows, the “state capacity” becomes a core concept as the state institutions play a

crucial role in terms of economic development, civil conflict management, democratic consolidation and international security.\(^7\)

The state administration, comprising policy-making and implementation, and the regulation of public services and economic activities, refers to the bureaucracy’s capacity to manage human resources, information, finance and physical resources necessary for implementing the collective decisions in the most effective manner. However, the “strength” of the state, as underlined by Mann, not only involves a capacity to make decisions in a manner that covers and binds all but also requires the “political power” to implement them. In this context, cooperating with civil society ensures the public support and legitimacy of policies. Therefore, the “infrastructural power” plays a vital role in the state’s power to penetrate to society. In this context, Mann’s formulation of the “state capacity” could be supplemented by a novel concept of “deliberative capacity”, conveying a capacity of the states to cooperate with civil society to ensure public support in regards to public policies. Deliberative capacity also underlines the significance of involving relevant stakeholders that would in turn help to mobilise critical sources to formulate robust public policies.\(^8\) This is particularly true in developing countries where the state institutions are relatively weak vis a vis vibrant societies. In addition to a continuous friction between tradition and modernity creating substantive contradictions in formulating public policies, a weak administrative structure creates serious problems of implementation caused by problems of complete penetration of the state over society.\(^9\) Therefore, in

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developing political contexts, “deliberative capacity” actually functions as a cement between society and the state. A weak “deliberative capacity” have adverse effects over the state capacity.

In this respect, Fragile State Index published annually by the Fund for Peace provides us a general perspective of Turkey’s state capacity. The indicators of the index which cover the state capacity of 178 countries include the followings: security apparatus, clashes among groups, asylum-seekers and displaced people, the legitimacy of the state, public services, human rights and the rule of law, and the polarisation between elites. The index actually provides a decisive assessment of the “success” or “failure” of the states in terms of these indicators. Over the past two years Turkey’s status showed a slight change moving the group of countries requiring an increased level of warning.10 One of the majors reasons of this decline is revealed through the indicators of asylum seekers and displaced persons, which is directly linked to the implications of the civil war in Syria. This involves a multi-dimensional assessment from domestic politics to foreign policy. Syrian migration crisis has reached a dimension well beyond what was expected and the ambiguity regarding the future of the civil war in Syria continues. While Turkey strengthened its legal arrangements and created new organizations to deal with the crisis from April 2011 onwards, the fact that the crisis in Syria has been affected by overall global and regional power balance made it difficult for Turkey to manage the crisis. In the cases of crisis like the civil war in Syria with social, political and humanitarian implications reaching well beyond the borders, domestic administrative and political measures to strengthen state capacity have limits.11 Various EU reports also underline a sharp decline in Turkey’s “state capacity”, associated with the ability to under the banner of ability to assume obligations of membership which generally refers to administrative capacity.12 The Syrian crisis played a major role in this decline. Below there will be a detailed analysis of the

12 The European Union (EU), Progress Reports on Turkey (various years), Brussels. See, www.ec.europa.eu
implications of the Syrian civil war and the resulting transnational social, political and humanitarian problems on Turkey’s “state capacity”.

The Syrian Refugee Crisis as a Test Case

The civil war in Syria brought the world one of the most drastic humanitarian crisis. Turkey as a border country to Syria faced this with all its dimensions. First of all, Turkey faced with a confusion in regards to the status of migrants from Syria. They could be identified as “asylum-seekers” or “refugees”. Turkey tried to deal with this through a domestic legal regulation. However, international terminology defines “asylum-seeker” with a temporary status, while “refugee” have a permanent status in the country they reside. The Geneva Convention of 1951 has the first international arrangement defining the concept of “refugee” together with rights and responsibilities. It also brought a geographical boundary such as “European countries”. The geographical restriction was removed with the Protocol of 1967. Turkey ratified both the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol in 1962 and 1968 respectively. Along Congo, Madagascar and Monaco, Turkey maintains the restriction to “European countries” identifying those from European countries as “refugees” and those from other countries as “asylum-seeker” and “guest”. The first specific arrangement regarding Syrians in Turkey was the Directive on Reception and Accommodation of Syrian Arab Republic Nationals and Stateless Persons who reside in the Syrian Arab Republic (No. 62) dated 30 March 2012. This Directive clarified the ground and principles of the “temporary protection” in cases of “mass asylum”.13

However, this directive created implementation problems in the Turkish domestic law. The negotiations with the EU brought the need to form a single legal regulation resulting in the adoption of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection No. 6458. This Law includes the “non-refoulement principle” (Art.4) guaranteeing the safety of the migrating individual, the definition of the concept of “refugee” (Art. 61) and the definition of “temporary protection” (Art.91) drawing the framework of

13 For this legal arrangements, see, www.goc.gov.tr.
the legal status of the Syrian migrants. It also provides the formation, duty, powers and responsibilities of the Directorate-General of Migration Management operating under the Ministry of Interior.\(^\text{14}\) However, this concept adopted from the EU’s Temporary Protection Directive of 2001 contains no details of action in case of mass migration and on the rights of refugees.\(^\text{15}\)

However, the rise in the number of Syrian migrants brought the need of new legal arrangements. The Temporary Protection Regulation of 2014 cleared many issues in regards to the Syrian migrants. In addition to emphasizing the temporary character of the “temporary protection” status and closing the door to grant them “refugee” or “asylum-seeker” statuses (Art. 7), The Regulation underlined that the decision on “temporary protection” would be made by the Cabinet Council upon a proposal made by the Ministry of Interior (Art. 9). The regulation also indicates which public services from health, education, access to labour markets, social benefits and services and translation that the Syrian migrants could benefit (Art. 26).\(^\text{16}\) Nevertheless, soon it became clear that these regulations were not sufficient as the Syrian asylum-seekers stayed more than expected. The arrangements made regarding the work permits for asylum-seekers was a case at this point. Another regulation by a Cabinet Decree aimed to contribute to the prevention of the socio-economic damage caused by an increase in unregistered labour and the resulting adverse labour conditions.\(^\text{17}\)

In the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Turkey applied an “open door policy” to asylum-seekers. The first group from Syria came on 29 April through the Cilvegözü border crossing point in Hatay. This movement continued without interruption. They were first placed in the tent cities established in Hatay. Following years, almost 260 thousand Syrians are accommodated at 26 centres established in 10 provinces. While the Ministries of Interior, Exterior, National Education, Health, Food, Agriculture work with relevant issues, the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority

\(^{14}\) Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, Official Journal, 04/04/2013, No. 6458.

\(^{15}\) İltica ve Göç Araştırmaları Merkezi (İGAM), Sivil Toplum Örgütlerinin Türkiye’deki Suriyeli Mülteciler İçin Yaptıkları Çalışmalar İle İlgili Rapor, (Ankara: Anıl Matbaası, 2013).

\(^{16}\) Geçici Koruma Yönetmeliği, Official Journal, 22/10/2014, No. 29153.

\(^{17}\) “Geçici Koruma Sağlanan Yabancıların Çalışma İzlerine Dair Yönetmelik”, Official Journal, Date 15/01/2016, No. 29594.
(AFAD) and the Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay) administer the camps and accommodation centres. The Directorate-General of Security deals with issues of registration and identity cards. The administrative organization under the deputy prime minister has been responsible not only for camps and accommodation centres, but also for procedures regarding Syrian migrants outside camps. With a major increase from 2013 onwards, the number of asylum-seekers approached 3 million by December 2016 according to data by the Ministry of Interior. More than 250 thousand Syrian migrants have been placed in the ten accommodation centres located mainly in border provinces such as Hatay, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Kilis, Mardin, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye, Adıyaman, Malatya and Adana.

Though most of the Syrians could not be gathered in the camps for a variety of reasons from personal cases to camp capacities and kinship to local Turkish people, Turkey provided services to all of them under “temporary protection” status. However, the reports indicate that asylum-seekers living both inside and outside of the camps seriously affected the country in general and the cities they live in particular. Living in almost all provinces, the Syrian migrants created a major transnational social question shaking the capacities of local and central institutions, exacerbating already existing economic conditions, and creating social and cultural tensions. While in the first two years border towns like Şanlıurfa, Hatay and Gaziantep ranked up in the top ten provinces that the Syrians lived, recent data shows that İstanbul turns to be target of the majority of Syrian asylum-seekers. Kızılay plays a crucial role to provide the necessary humanitarian assistance and public services to Syrians with 17 tent cities and 8 container cities established in 10 provinces and employing 185 personnel. It also contributed to the fund 52,00 TL provided to 142,619 asylum-seekers staying at 11 temporary accommodation centres and 62,00 TL provided to 147,389 asylum-seekers living in

Hatay, Gaziantep, Kilis, Şanlıurfa and Kahramanmaraş in cooperation with the United Nations Food Programme (WFP) to meet their food expenses. Another fund is the monthly aid of 100 TL per person covering one million Syrians through the Social Harmonisation Aid Programme. This has been provided through the cooperation between the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, the WFP, the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO). Kızılay also provides asylum-seekers with vocational training and psycho-social support through its social centres.23

Despite all its efforts, Turkey’s Syrian policy is criticised for being inconsistent. First of all, the initial regulations regarding Syrian migrants were criticized by civil society such as Turkey Bar Association (TBB), Turkish Medical Association (TTB) and Mazlum-Der.24 They claimed that the initial regulations were inaccessible in terms of content as if they were kept secret from the public. Turkey’s policies are closely related to the developments in Syrian civil war where regional and global powers and their interests involve. However, Turkey’s highly polarised domestic politics is the major reason of the inconsistent government declarations and ineffective policies towards the Syrian migration crisis. Turkey’s political elite, both government and the opposition, have failed to reach a broad consensus on this vital issue.25 While the opposition parties criticized the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government’s Syria policy in terms of its negative implications on domestic stability, peace and social cohesion, foreign agents like the EU Commission Vice-President Timmermans accused the government of following denominational acceptance and distribution of Syrians asylum-seekers. Timmermans Turkey opened camps to Sunni Arabs and there are camps only for Turcomans, Kurds and Ezidis. He accused Turkey of following a policy based on Sunni Islam towards Syria. For him, this is the result of Turkey’s foreign

policy, aiming to establish a state based on the Sunni Islam within Syria.26

The Syrian crisis actually started to create serious problems of social peace especially in the provinces where AFAD located refugee camps because of their multi-ethnic and multi-religious character. A major incident occurred in Kahramanmaraş province where Turkish Alawis live. The large public protests around the camp was suppressed by the police. The location chosen for a camp for 27 thousand people covered an area where around 20 Alawi villages used as pasture and the locals expressed their concern in regard to the possibility that Islamic State (ISIS) terrorists would come to their province.27 The locals suspected a deliberate state policy, while the press underlines the government’s unwillingness to share information. Choosing a location where denominational clashes were previously experienced has the potential to strengthen the possibility of a civil conflict. This is true for other provinces like Hatay where substantial Alawi population reside. However, the criticisms focus on the state policies designed without consulting and cooperating with civil actors. Gradual understanding that the Syrians migrants would stay more than expected triggered a public criticism of policies from the point of transparency and coherency.28 Various reports and reputable surveys reveal that the JDP government’s migration policy has not been able to derive strong support from the public and Tayyip Erdoğan, highly respected by his own party and voters, was unable to convince them for the first time on a specific issue: granting citizenship to Syrians.29 In a similar vein, Turkish parliament’s hurried motions about the Syrian migration crisis have been inadequate and repetitive. The TİSK report concludes that the size of the crisis to be experienced in the next decades with Syrian migrants has not been adequately understood by Turkish politics, society, media and academia. Perhaps the most important exception is the

world of business and economy. The report further emphasised that the lack of strategic decision-making decreases the motivation and the impact of public institutions, thereby causing a waste of critical resources and capacity.

The Syrian crisis revealed also the administrative deficiencies of the state in Turkey particularly in terms of public service, planning and effective usage of human resources. Turkey established accommodation centres and camps under the AFAD’s coordination for Syrians. They have been praised by international agents as they offered better conditions for Syrians compared to other countries. Following his visit to the İslahiye camp on 7 December 2012, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon thanked Turkey for its “open door” policy and hospitality. In a similar vein, the UNHCR described the camps he visited as “five-star” camps. Though receiving favourable feedback regarding migration, the arrow often points in negative direction. The negative feelings about the JDP government’s overall handling of the Syrian crisis actually shadows favourable points. In particular, the government’s incapacity to predict the implications of the civil war in Syria affected the citizens’ perception of its successful efforts to contain the impacts of the crisis in Turkey.

For instance, the TİSK report shows that the expectation that the Syrians would return their homes in a few days or in a few weeks prevented dealing with registration as a priority issue. Though governors and institutions such as Kızılay and AFAD operating at the border regions took partial measures to organise the distribution of humanitarian aid and to prevent abuses, transforming them into healthy, central and joint registers took a lot of time. A report on the health reveals the inadequacy of the coordination among institutions in terms of registration, stating that almost in every province different practices are carried out for the Syrians.

In Istanbul where the largest number of Syrians reside, local authorities

had a serious capacity problem in conducting systematic registration, leading asylum-seekers easily resort to illegal activities and exposes them to abuse.\(^{33}\) The data provided by the Directorate-General of Migration Management shows that until January 2013, 20 months following the first entry of the Syrians, no official central registration was conducted.\(^ {34}\) Due to this problem, clear information on the number of Syrians in Turkey and on whether asylum-seekers leaving Turkey have been struck of the records cannot be obtained. The TİSK report reveals that local administrators and NGO representatives do not trust the official figures, the concrete indicator of the lack of administrative capacity. A questionnaire conducted in Istanbul revealed that 83% of the respondents does not find the figures the state provides regarding the Syrians convincing.\(^ {35}\)

The lack of coordination between central and local governments has been emphasised as the most important issue at this point. Until recently, the local governments in Turkey’s border provinces have been unwilling to take action other than instructions they receive from the centre.\(^ {36}\) In addition to existing deficiencies in central organisations, the municipalities where asylum-seekers live in large numbers have expressed their capacity problems arising from economic and infrastructural issues. Financial difficulties arise as the budget channelled to local governments have been allocated based on the local population without taking into account Syrians. In provinces like Kilis, the city had clear infrastructure problems caused by the increasing population.\(^ {37}\) Even the provincial organizations of the JDP in Ankara and Istanbul provides aid Şanlıurfa and Gaziantep at their own initiatives to prevent the tension between local people asylum-seekers.\(^ {38}\) Moreover, the humanitarian assistance and services including health, education and aid provided to Syrians both within and outside the camps vary according to region. This reveals a weakness of

\(^{33}\) Suriyeli Sığınmacılar Rapor: İstanbul Örneği, (İstanbul: Fikir Enstitüsü 2014).


\(^{35}\) Suriyeli Sığınmacılar Rapor: İstanbul Örneği, (İstanbul: Fikir Enstitüsü, 2014).

\(^{36}\) “The Role of Municipalities of Turkey and Lebanon in the Syrian Migratory influx”, (İstanbul: UCLG-MEWA).


systematic perspective in dealing with this grave social question.\textsuperscript{39} 

The public services especially in the border provinces suffered from a blow with the arrival of Syrians asylum-seekers. As underlined, the Temporary Protection Regulation guarantees food and accommodation as well as education, health, access to the labour market, social benefits and translation services. Deficiencies in public services especially of those living outside camps is due to their large numbers. The ORSAM reports underline that 30-40\% of the capacity of public hospitals in border provinces serve only Syrians. Hospitals experience a capacity problem in terms of human resources and physical conditions, and locals are increasingly unhappy with this situation leading to frictions with civil servants and tensions with Syrians.\textsuperscript{40} According to the data provided by AFAD, by the end of 2016 the state provided 19.621.502 polyclinic services, 918.694 hospital referrals, 915.326 hospitalisations, 170.270 births and 758.972 surgery services to the Syrians.\textsuperscript{41} In addition to the deterioration of the overall health services, the AFAD has been late in paying for the health expenses of the asylum-seekers in the camps, causing difficulties in accessing health services.\textsuperscript{42} The Turkish Association of Physicians reports that the regions in which the Syrians live in large numbers were already below the average of Turkey with respect to health services even before the migration crisis.\textsuperscript{43} Therefore, an extraordinary condition has emerged with respect to health situation following the Syrian crisis. 

The provision of educational services to the Syrians continues both at camps and outside camps. The undersecretary of National Education stated that there are around 900 thousand students at schooling age, around 509 thousands of these are provided with education, 12,630 Syrians are teaching at temporary education centres with 600 TL monthly being paid

\textsuperscript{39} Council of Europe, Report of the fact finding mission to Turkey by Ambassador Tomas Bocek, Special Representative of the Secretary General on migration and refugees, 30-May- 4 June. 2016. p.14
\textsuperscript{41} See, https://www.afad.gov.tr
\textsuperscript{42} Council of Europe, Report of the fact finding mission to Turkey by Ambassador Tomas Bocek, Special Representative of the Secretary General on migration and refugees, 30-May- 4 June. 2016.
\textsuperscript{43} TTB, Savaş Göç ve Sağlık, (Ankara: TTB Yayınları, 2016).
to those in camps and 900 TL monthly to those outside camps, and that
1.5 billion dollars were spent for the education of Syrian asylum-seekers
between 2014-2016 in addition to investments.\textsuperscript{44} Initially some schools
outside of the camps could not admit Syrian students because of uncertain legal procedures. However, the inclusion of Syrian children in Turkey’s education system required an increase in the teaching and classroom capacities. In addition to the adaptation problems that children in both sides-local population and Syrians-, the professors had to improve skills to teach in mixed classes. Scholars underline that probably one of the most important problems that requires an immediate and comprehensive response is in the area of education as it will have long term impact on Turkey’s social cohesion and economic development and security.\textsuperscript{45}

An effective financial management constitutes an important element in public policies. According to AFAD data of 2016, the amount Turkey has spent on asylum-seekers is 12 billion dollars, and the international aid has amounted to 512 million dollars. This indicates that Turkey was actually left alone by the international community in the earlier phase of the crisis. This situation has not change in substantive terms over the past year.\textsuperscript{46} This data also triggers a questioning of Turkey’s foreign relations too. A pro-government think thank analysis claims that as Germany spends 13,000 thousand euros a year on a single asylum-seeker, Turkey, by accommodating 2 million Syrians, actually saves European countries from an economic burden amounting to around 26 billion euros.\textsuperscript{47} In fact, the economic burden Turkey faces with has reached to an extraordinary size. Through the Kızılay Kart, asylum-seekers living in temporary accommodation centres have been provided with aid amounting to 399,360,765,00 TL since October 2012, while those living outside camps in 10 different provinces have been provided with aid of

\textsuperscript{44} http://www.meb.gov.tr/mustesar-tekin-turkiyede-509-bin-suriyeli-ogrenci-egitim-aliyor/ha-
ber/12258/tr
\textsuperscript{46} See, https://www.afad.gov.tr
\textsuperscript{47} E. Bayraklı and K. Keskin, Türkiye, “Almanya ve AB Üçgeninde Mülteci krizi”, SETA Analiz, November 2015.
82,866,503,00 TL since June 2015. However, these figures reflect a small percentage of the total expenditure. Hitherto the official figures fail to provide adequate information about many other forms of expenditures. One of the reason is a disagreement between international organisations and Turkey with respect to the distribution and the amount of resources in connection with financial aid. While the international organizations allocate resources on a project-based, Turkey claims that her economic burden is not limited to the state’s direct spending. The overall economies of the border provinces such as Hatay, Kilis, Gaziantep, Mardin and Şanlıurfa have been adversely affected by the Syrian civil war and the resulting humanitarian crisis.

Probably the key reason of many failures in Turkey’s response to the migration crisis following the Syrian civil war is the lack of public involvement in the process of decision-making and implementation of policies on various aspects of this vital issue. This has also been the reason why the government’s policies derived little support from the society at large. The main implication was on the disturbance of the social peace especially in the border provinces where there is a great hatred towards the Syrians which might spill-over to larger social protests against the government. This issue becomes urgent as the Syrians continue to stay despite the relative normalization in Syria over the past year. At this juncture, the consultation with civil society actors and increasing transparency of the Syrian migration issue is of crucial significance. The social tension in border towns looks so serious that the state is required to step forward with a deliberative process that would include not only the locals but also the Syrians. This urgency becomes acute with the rise of the Islamic State in Syria which made transnational terrorism as a side effect of the Syrian civil war. The JDP government actually received the weakest support

during its office of 13 year and public considers the government’s Syria policy wrong. The government further weakened support for its migration policy because of its attitude towards international non-governmental organisations providing services to the Syrian migrants. While Turkey has been criticized because of restrictions brought to international non-governmental organisations, the lack of joint action with them and policy makers deaf ear to the social and economic concerns brought to public agenda by the Turkish organizations weakened both international and domestic support to Turkey’s policies.\textsuperscript{52} Similar concerns have been brought by the civil society organizations formed by the Syrians too.\textsuperscript{53}

Finally, the media constitutes a crucial leg of the efforts to develop the state’s support to migration policies and social response to the Syrian asylum-seekers in Turkey. The media could play an important role in preventing a polarisation between locals and asylum seekers. A recent study on this subject indicates that, while presenting news on the asylum-seekers, the media mostly dwells on religious and political dimensions depending on the newspaper’s own point of view.\textsuperscript{54} The marginalizing and demonizing language used in media actually contributes to the creation of negative judgments towards the asylum-seekers. With such a negative and misleading information, the media actually undermines Turkey’s capacity to deal with this transnational social and humanitarian crisis.

**Conclusion**

The Syrian civil war and the resulting migration crisis has been a test case for the “state capacity” in Turkey. The migration problem that Turkey faced with following the civil war in Syria has the potential to affect almost all areas of social, economic and political life. In this context, the state capacity has the potential to reveal many dimensions of this transnational humanitarian crisis. Beyond being a foreign policy concern or

\textsuperscript{52} İltica ve Göç Araştırmaları Merkezi, (İGAM), Sivil Toplum Örgütlerinin Türkiye’deki Suriyeli Mülteciler İçin Yaptıkları Çalışmalar Ile İlgili Rapor, (Sivil Düşün AB Programı), (Ankara: Anıl Matbaası, 2013).

\textsuperscript{53} www./istanbul.mazlumder.org/suriyeli_multeciler_raporu

solely a migration issue, the current situation that Turkey has been dealing with a major “social question”. First of all, the lack of coordination between government branches dealing with the Syrian asylum-seekers, the inability of the government to include various civil society sectors in the making and implementation of the policies toward the Syrian asylum seekers and finally the social tension that the crisis created reveals deep problems of the “state capacity” in Turkey. The Syrian asylum-seekers reaching more than 3 million, apart from constituting a social and political force, indicates major change in the context of the state activity in Turkey. In this context, formulating policies and implementing them through the participation of the opposition and deliberation with the national and international NGOs would no doubt develop the Turkish state’s legitimacy, which is the function of “infrastructural power”. The contrary would make the state appear “despotic” and seriously harm its capacity. A holistic, distinct and clear strategy towards the issue of the Syrian asylum-seekers would have decisive impact on the state’s infrastructural power as it would expand the autonomy through furthering political and administrative capacity. The humanitarian crisis that Turkey faced with following the civil war in Syria shows that transparency would make the implementation of policies with greater ease and legitimacy. In fact, the migration crisis could be a chance for a state reform in Turkey. The social question that the humanitarian crisis emerged as a result of the civil war in Syria could be an opportunity for Turkey’s policy makers to increase institutionalization of the disaster management, improve already existing humanitarian aid institutions and local governments’ capacity, border control. The Syrian migration crisis revealed that Turkey’s educational, health and housing structure have already problems and need a serious reform. The protests and opposition to government’s policies actually is a result of the deterioration of already weak social services especially in the border provinces. Turkey is not the only country in this respect. In all the countries bordering Syria, the public policy making and services had already serious problems. The Syrian civil war and the resulting migration crisis brought the public services in those countries, especially in their border provinces, to the brink of total
The Syrian migration crisis also revealed some serious weaknesses in the structure of making and implementing public policies. The state centric mentality dominates all levels of public policies and excludes any possibility of formulating and implementing them in cooperation with civil society actors. Turkish policy makers urgently needs to improve deliberative capacity in this context. Briefly stating Syrian migration crisis revealed the lack of deliberative content in public policy making and implementation. This is valid not only in terms of state-society interaction but also within state branches as the coordination problems between central and local governments along the Syrian migration crisis management demonstrated. The cost of the lack of deliberation will be high as Turkey’s social cohesion is seriously at stake because a serious amount of Syrian migrants will not be able to go back to their country. Therefore, a perspective focusing solely on technical and administrative capacity problems won’t be adequate, this paper offers an urgency of a comprehensive deliberative approach.

A BLESSING? A BURDEN?
AN ANNOTATION ON TURKEY’S SYRIAN ASYLUM SEEKERS AND MIGRATION ECONOMY

Introduction

Turkey is first among the countries that have been most severely impacted by the immigration wave caused by the events that started in Syria in March 2011 and rapidly escalated to a civil war. It is observed that in our country, which hosts almost 3 million asylum seekers, the discussions on media and among the local community are maintained on two main axes. The first and most widely mentioned issue concerns the unrest and lack of security caused by risk groups consisting of beggars and criminals coming from depression areas and slums. These people making a living by begging or crime in Syria maintain their lifestyle in our country, begging or committing crime in Turkey. The main problem concerning these groups is that, although they constitute a small proportion of the total asylum seeker population, they negatively affect the local community’s opinions as they are highly visible in the public sphere, giving rise to generalisations concerning the entire population of Syrian asylum seekers.

The second main discussion concerns the economic dimension of the subject, where discussions mostly focus on the burden brought by the migration, constituting the main theme of this study. That hosting such a large number of asylum seekers would place a heavy burden on the Turkish economy, which is still in the process of development and which is fragile in terms of economic indicators, and would even pose a serious threat is a main one among the concerns that are mentioned. In fact, as of 2016 270 thousand Syrian asylum seekers are provided with services at 26 temporary accommodation centres in 10 provinces, and the amount spent by Turkey for the Syrian asylum seekers is 109 12 billion Dollars at UN standards, and around 30 billion Dollars in total (URL-1). Add-

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1Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ahmet KOYUNCU Necmettin Erbakan University, SBBF, Sociology Department Faculty Staff, koyuncuahmet42@gmail.com
ing the employment of the Syrians to this figure, the discussion becomes even more heated.

Of course, where migration is concerned, subjects such as employment, termination, cheap labour, child labour, unemployment, poverty and public aid are discussed at first hand, mostly the negative effects being emphasised. It must not be forgotten that these issues that are frequently mentioned on the media and among the local community reflect an aspect of social reality. Considering the large-scale migrations that took place especially after the Industrial Revolution, it is seen that these subjects that are brought up receive a social response. However, discussing the matter only in connection with burden or negativities is first of all contrary to the character of immigration. In fact, each migration brings along its own economy.

Viewing the matter from this angle, it must be remembered that Syrians are first and foremost consumers, and would contribute to the country’s economy by purchasing the goods and services they require (food, clothing, accommodation, hygiene, health, education etc.). Also, a large part of the humanitarian aid provided to the Syrians in the camps and directly to Syria is supplied through local companies. Aid materials from all over the world addressing Syria are supplied by the companies at the border provinces, which created an opportunity for companies operating especially in the textiles and foodstuffs sector. This, in turn, causes an increase in production while allowing exports, which suffered difficulties with the civil war, to pick up once more (Lordoğlu and Aslan, 2016: 796 & ORSAM & TESEV, 2015: 18).

Also, the sector representatives themselves indicate that the Syrians fulfil the demand for unskilled labour especially in the seasonal sectors that are not preferred by Turks, allowing these sectors to operate at full capacity. Along with this, it should not be forgotten that, by being employed for unskilled labour, the Syrians enable part of the local community already employed in these sectors to find employment in better-paid jobs of a higher status.

Also, adequate skilled-experienced labour does not exist to allow our country’s industry to achieve its targets for 2023, and it seems difficult
for the existing education system to help meet the required skilled labour demand by 2023. Therefore, it is important that the skilled labour required by the country’s industry should be identified among the Syrian nationals residing in our country, and skilled Syrian labour should be brought into the concerned sector as a quick solution to the shortage of skilled personnel.

Considering its developing economy, one of our country’s priorities is to bring in foreign capital and enrich investment opportunities, and increase the number of more competitive businesses at national and global level, thus contributing to employment. Within this context, the contributions capital-owning Syrians would make to the country’s economy in fields such as sectoral diversity, employment, exports, market share and competition should not be denied. This would also allow supplying data to strategic action plans that would contribute to directing large-scale investment decisions and ensuring institutionalisation in companies that are members of chambers and stock exchanges, thus creating a basis to strengthen corporate capacity.

At this point, an issue that is never considered or never brought to attention concerns the construction of Syria after the war. Obviously the war will not go on forever, but must end one day. On that day, the first subject to consider will be the reconstruction of Syria in every respect. At this point, an issue that is frequently ignored concerns the new possibilities to be offered by cooperation and joint ventures with capital-owning Syrians with respect to the Turkish economy and the political, social and cultural relations between the two countries during the reconstruction of Syria.

Within this context, our study concerns a possibility for looking at the other side of the coin with respect to immigration in general and the Syrian asylum seekers in specific, remembering/reminding the gains and, though partly, bringing a fresh insight, in the light of data obtained through official figures, reports, scientific studies, observations and interviews held with the business world in order to indicate the subjects’ less mentioned economic aspects, but without ignoring the negativities and burden brought by migration, in other words avoiding the pitfall of praising asylum seeking using the Syrians as a reference point.
As of August 2016, of the 3 million Syrians who have taken shelter in Turkey, around 270 thousand (10%) live in camps, while the remaining majority (90%) live outside the camps, distributed across various provinces of Turkey (URL-1).

Although a positive point of view emerged during the first days when the Syrians started to arrive in Turkey, due to the fact that they were perceived as guests and partly filled in the labour shortage, the following periods replaced this perception with concern due to the heavy influx of asylum seekers and the large size of their needs. The fact that the war has not ended and such a possibility being out of the question in the near future, forced the asylum seekers to find a job / to work in order to get by. The employment of people, who were unemployed or who were working as unskilled workers or in daily jobs in Syria, for all kinds of job at lower wages and without social security, has affected labour and wages adversely. As will be seen in the research conducted and the reports prepared (Koyuncu, 2014: 78-79; Sanduvaç, 2013: 17-18; AFAD, 2014:65) most of the asylum seekers arriving in our country are unskilled. The fact that the ratio of those who were professionals in Syria is only 5% summarises the situation. Therefore it is possible to see that the asylum seekers, who must support their families, work at any job they can find regardless of the pay.

The fact that the Syrians are prepared to work at wages that are higher compared to their own countries but lower compared to Turkish standards triggered the local community’s (workers and small business owners) fear of losing their jobs, and there were even those who suffered from this. The subject was brought to the media many times and became a hot topic among the local people from time to time, even leading to protest marches claiming that the Syrians lowered the job market (such as İzmir - Işıkkent). Of course there are individuals among the local populace who suffered from the process. However, looking at the bigger picture one can see that the situation is not is not as dire as reflected, and in fact the unskilled asylum seekers have closed an important gap in some sectors.

Sector representatives’ statements on the subject support this argument.
Hikmet Tanrıverdi, President of the Istanbul Union of Ready Wear Exporters, emphasised that a serious unskilled labour problem emerged in Turkey especially with the development of the services sector, that employers have difficulty in finding unskilled labour in the manufacturing industry, especially in ready-wear and iron and steel, and that for this reason the employment of the Syrians would contribute to these sectors (URL2-). Arslan Erdinç, Chairman of the Board of the Aegean Union of Metal Exporters, in a similar vein, said that their sector’s greatest problem was the difficulty of finding labour and for this reason they wanted to hire Syrian asylum seekers, that with this request they met Minister of Economy Zafer Çağlayan and certain governors, and that they were awaiting news from Ankara. Erdinç emphasised that Turkey does not have an unemployment problem, but a problem of not liking jobs, saying “Universities do raise employees, but these people do not work in the sector. We make announcements. I made statements on television and in newspapers numerous times, but what they want is to become managers; they do not want to work at factories... The period between November and March is our peak season... Today factories work at a capacity under 50 percent. For there are no unskilled workers...”, providing important observations on the current condition (URL-3). A similar request was made by businessmen from Konya. For the purpose of employing the Syrian guests in order to overcome the need for unskilled labour in Konya’s industry and thereby providing a solution for both the industry’s problems and the guests’ accommodation and maintenance needs, the MÜSİAD Konya Branch President, the President of the Konya Chamber of Industry, the President of the Konya Chamber of Commerce came together and wrote a joint letter addressing Faruk Çelik, Minister of Labour and Social Security on 01.01.2013. It is known that businessmen from Antep also had a similar request, and that the requests were communicated to Ankara in a report under the leadership of the Metropolitan Mayor Fatma Şahin. It is possible to provide further examples regarding the employment of the Syrian asylum seekers. What is common to all requests is to meet the requirement for unskilled labour, particularly in seasonal sectors and in the manufacturing industry. In fact, in a large part of these sectors there is a need for unskilled workers and, given the current conditions and the offered facilities, it is observed
that the local people do not choose to work in these sectors. The words of an employee in the shoe manufacture industry clarifies the matter.

“There is work for those who want it in the industrial estate. People always want their children to study, but once the children study they do not work. There are vacancies in all sectors, not only here. When the educated do not like the jobs and do not work, people just loaf around. Here, in Aykent (Konya Shoemakers Industrial Estate) there are vacancies. Even the bosses bring their own children. Those who say “we lost our jobs when the Syrians arrived” are not prepared to be content. They just loaf around, they do not work. And that gap is filled by the Syrians. In fact, what these men (the Syrians) do are light jobs, the Turks generally do not like the job, or find the pay too little, so we employ the Syrians... They generally do works such as cleaning and attaching buckles or prepare boxes for the shoes... For this reasons, they do not take up the real jobs here in our industrial estate. These men know nothing about the shoe machines. On the other hand there are jobs for Turks, but they are not satisfied with the pay. Another factor is that, since our jobs are seasonal, they consider the pay too little and look for other jobs.” (Koyuncu, 2014:135).

The study conducted by Lordoğlu and Aslan revealed similar results, indicating that asylum seekers are largely employed in sectors not requiring skill, such as agriculture and construction, while fine and difficult jobs requiring qualification are not given to the asylum seekers. In this sense, it is emphasised that the difference between Syrian workers and domestic workers lies in accepting working under challenging conditions, while in works requiring mastery and skill, such as stonemasonry, the daily wages paid to Syrian craftsmen are not different from those paid to domestic workers (2016: 792-793).

It is observed that the working Syrian asylum seekers are mostly employed in seasonal sectors such as construction, agriculture, shoemaking, textile, domestic service, cleaning and childcare. Since they generally do not require skill, are low paying, seasonal and do not offer social security, these are sectors that are not much preferred by the local population,
where off the book activities are frequent. It is observed that similar results are reflected to the report entitled Impacts of Syrian Asylum Seekers on Turkey, prepared under the cooperation of ORSAM&TESEV. The report, too, observes that “Interviews held with the business world reveal the fact that the local population do not wish to work in the agriculture sector or as factory workers, and that there is a large demand for labour in this field. Therefore, the Syrians do not take the local people’s job opportunity, on the contrary, they close the gap in lines of work requiring unskilled labour. However, in interviews held with the people and the workers, it was said that the local people were fired to employ Syrians. There is a perception that, even if local workers lose their jobs for different reasons, this happens due to the asylum seekers.” (2015: 18).

An important point to be considered here concerns the economic facilities as well as the social, cultural and political potential of the city receiving immigrants. For instance, it is observed that the Syrians are virtually considered a remedy for the unskilled labour demand in cities with developed industries and economies, such as Istanbul, Gaziantep, Bursa and Konya. It is seen that the interviews held within the scope of studies conducted in Konya with the support of the Ministry of Development with the representatives of the textile and shoe manufacture sectors, in which the Syrians are employed in large numbers, have yielded important conclusions. Almost all of the businessmen in the concerned sector emphasise the need for employees in the sector, saying “if it was not for the Syrians, at least 80% of the workshops here would have shut down” (Topçuoğlu et al., 2015: 98). Additionally, it must not be forgotten that the businesses in these sectors, which were able only to carry out 8 or 12 hours of production due to a shortage in employees in spite of their equipment pool allowing 24/7 production, are now able to operate 24/7 thanks the employment of the Syrians. The fact that the Syrians have closed this gap to a large extent may be considered an important gain for Turkish economy. Moreover, looking at TUİK data, a drop is observed in the unemployment rates of cities with developed industries, which were expected to rise with the arrival of the Syrians.
Table 1: Unemployment Rates by Province (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>İstanbul</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursa</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konya</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: http://www.tuik.gov.tr

In this sense, the common opinion is that the Syrians meet the demand for (unskilled-cheap labour), bringing life to the sector. Claims that the local people lost their jobs and were not able to find employment with the arrival of the Syrians are criticised by representatives of the sector. Turkey’s unemployment rates according to years appears to verify this claim.

According to TÜİK data, considering unemployment rates by year for the period of 2010-2016 not adjusted for seasonal effects, it is observed that the claim that the employment of Syrians increases unemployment does not correlate with the rates, and that moreover the unemployment rate is lower for the years during which the Syrians immigrated to our country in larger numbers.

Table 2: Unemployment Rates in Turkey Between 2010-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016 (first 5 months)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1007

In fact, the unemployment rate in 2010, when there were no immigrations yet, was higher than today. Attributing the rise in these rates from 2012 to
today to the Syrians, however, would be a reductionist approach. Indeed, the increase in the rates is directly related to the international economic conjuncture. It is known that the world economy failed to overcome the economic crisis of 2008, many Western countries demonstrated negative or very small economic growth, and that the economy slowed down in developing countries. The fact that Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Southern Cyprus in the Eurozone requested financial aid from the EU, that many countries were severely impacted by the crisis in spite of a series of measures taken in order to solve the structural problems and to ease the economy in the Eurozone, and the rising unemployment rates summarise the situation.

Additionally, although the dropping oil prices and the improvement in financial conditions became an advantage for developed countries, the money policies implemented by the developed countries and the low commodity prices have an adverse effect on developing countries. Recovery has not yet been fully achieved due to the ongoing high levels of indebtedness in developed economies and the environment of confidence that has not yet reached stability. It is observed that growth is slowing down in developing economies, although the reasons differ according to country. Brazil and Russia, on the other hand, continue to shrink. Downward risks related to global economy and the structural problems in the labour market naturally cause an increase in unemployment rates (Ministry of Finance, 2015: 3-4).

While there are various speculations about the employment of unskilled asylum seekers, it is observed that Turkish businessmen are not very willing to employ asylum seekers, particularly Syrians. They give priority to the local people. However, they indicate that the shortage of skilled and unskilled labour is at its peak in all sectors, and that for this reason they employ Syrian personnel. The primary reason why Turkish businessmen choose to employ Syrian workers is that they are unable to find skilled and unskilled Turkish workers. It is emphasised that for this reason in many sectors qualified labour is largely filled in by Syrian workers (Topçuoğlu et al., 2015: 97-108). Moreover, it is seen that corporate companies do not employ asylum seekers due to legal obligations and possible fines that may follow.
The fundamental problem regarding the employment of unskilled asylum seekers is lack of communication arising from different languages. Also, failure to adapt to the use of technology in the sector, failure to complete the assigned works in time, deficient or faulty work, continuously requesting breaks, complaining of the high tempo of the work, and failure to attend regularly (not showing up at work regularly) without informing the employer are the most frequent complaints of employers employing Syrians (Koyuncu, 2014: 78). However, both the Syrians and Turkish employers indicate that the Syrians are increasingly adapting to work life, including an improvement in language skills.

As will be appreciated, the same does not apply to all of the asylum seekers. There are also those who are extremely satisfied with the Syrians they employ. Examining those satisfied with the Syrians they employ, it is seen that the personnel in question consists of those employed in skilled (such as engineer, technician, educationalist) and professional works (Koyuncu, 2014: 79). While complaining of the Syrian employees work ethics and work culture, Turkish employers indicate that these problems are gradually being solved (Topçuoğlu et al., 108: 2015).

The main complaints of the asylum seekers are, however, not being employed, being given jobs outside their field of specialisation, sectoral differences, long working hours, high tempo, legal problems, lack of social security, failure to obtain the pay corresponding to the labour, discrimination in terms of jobs and wages between Turkish workers and Syrian workers, not being paid in time, not being paid at all at times, mistreatment of the Syrians (humiliation, insults) (Koyuncu, 2014: 80).

In conclusion, considering the existing conditions in the Middle East and in Syria, it is clearly seen that the Syrian asylum seekers will be here for a long time. This situation naturally forces the asylum seekers to establish a new life and order here. Sector representatives mention the need for unskilled labour in seasonal sectors and in the manufacturing industry, particularly in provinces with developed industries. In short, considering the current conditions and the opportunities offered, the existing conditions have become opportunities for asylum seekers ignoring challenges and difficulties in order to support their families and hold on in the city.
as well as for sector representatives who experience difficulties in finding unskilled labour.

**Skilled Labour and Asylum Seekers**

One of the priorities of our country in reaching its targets for 2023 is to bring foreign capital into our country, increasing investment opportunities and contributing to employment, and another is to develop skilled labour. In fact, the 10th Development Plan for the years 2014-2018 prepared by the Ministry of Development emphasises the importance of national and international investments, indicating as priority targets the development of skilled employment opportunities by taking regional, local and sectoral labour dynamics into consideration.

This way, it is expressed that steps to be taken to develop a competitive production structure that is open to abroad under the leadership of the private sector shall be supported. It is seen that in the plan, developing legal processes and the infrastructure regarding the business and investment environment in Turkey, activating the labour market, creating a centre of attraction for skilled labour and, at local level, strengthening corporate capacity are foregrounded (Ministry of Development, 2013).

In this sense, although Turkey has gone a long way in realising its targets for 2023 with its developing industry, diversifying sectors, increasing exports, competitive strength and market facilities, and its growing trade volume, our country still does not have adequate skilled-experienced labour in order to achieve the targets for 2023. The fact that vocational and technical high schools were prevented from functioning as a result of coefficient restrictions and the demand for such high schools was almost totally ended during the 28 February process, then the failure to ensure cooperation and coordination between vocational and technical high schools and the fields requiring skilled labour, especially industry, the failure to solve the structural problems etc., indicate that it would be difficult for the current education system and the existing potential to meet the skilled labour need in question by 2023. Therefore, it is essential that the potential of the individuals who are skilled and who produce added
value from among the foreign nationals residing in our country should be identified and brought into the production and investment environment, and priority should be given to strategic research, planning and feasibility studies aiming at contributing to local and regional development. These people will assume an important role in the quick solution of the shortage of the skilled personnel required by various sectors.

Engineers, technicians and especially intermediate staff have the potential to fill in an important gap. Another point that should not be overlooked here is that skilled labour is not limited to the industrial sector. It is very important that brain power such as lawyers, physicians, judges, chemists, prosecutors and academics are made use of in a more efficient and active manner. In fact, although many states, particularly EU countries, place many obstacles before the immigration of refugees in general and Syrians in specific (most of which are contrary to the international law formed by the West itself), they appear to be considerably willing in accepting brain drain. The above-mentioned skilled-experienced people are forced to work in jobs outside their field of specialisation (such as construction, agriculture, manufacture) due to reasons such as difficulties in diploma equivalency or their professional formations not having an equivalent in Turkey, and immigrate to, or look for opportunities to immigrate to, countries offering them better opportunities.

However, these people present the potential to make a great contribution with regard not only to their fields of specialty, but also to the field of country specialists, which is one of our greatest shortages. They have an accumulation of knowledge that could provide much benefit regarding foreign policy as well as the social formations of the asylum seekers and the immigration policies to be created at this point.

Another important point that should not be forgotten here is not that skilled personnel are preferred by developed or developing countries, particularly by the West, and that the immigration of skilled personnel is facilitated. However, if a return would happen after the war ends, the skilled people would be more willing. Indeed, these asylum seekers consist of professionals/skilled personnel who were not able to find what they were looking for in Turkey for the above reasons, in other words,
who were not able to achieve their standards in Syria, and will be more willing to return in order to obtain their former status and standards. In any case, it is clear that these people would be needed in the reconstruction of Syria following the war (Koyuncu, 2014: 117).

The problems regarding skilled personnel are not limited to these. Turkish businessmen have indicated that the financial burden regarding work permits being very heavy and the bureaucratic procedures taking much time are among the most important obstacles before the employment of skilled personnel. Turkish businessmen have expressed that they have made attempts to obtain work permits with regard to highly skilled personnel, and have even worked with Syrian personnel in this capacity, albeit in a limited manner. They stated that the fact that an amount of 4,000 Dollars should be deposited in the bank for a work permit constituted an important obstacle, since most Syrians do not have the means to deposit such amount. On the other hand, Turkish businessmen have also said that they are willing to deposit this amount, but the fact that there was no guarantee that the intended Syrian personnel would continue working posed another problem. Also indicating that depositing this amount for each skilled and unskilled personnel would not be possible, they demand the easing of the procedure regarding work permits. A large part of Turkish businessmen demand the facility to provide employed Syrians with social security. This demand is higher especially at larger businesses. That “they would not shrink from providing social security, and in fact they were not able to employ Syrians only for this reason” has often been stated by many Turkish businessmen. They indicated that, contrary to popular belief, providing social security for their personnel does not bring them a heavy financial burden, and that a very heavy pecuniary, penal and moral responsibility is placed on their shoulders in the case of an occupational accident (Topçuoğlu et al., 2015).

In this context, our country has the potential to provide many advantages to investors and skilled personnel in terms of its industry, trade and employment opportunities. Moreover, it does not seem possible for the skilled personnel and intermediate staff required by our country to be met with the existing facilities. For this reason, identifying the fields of specialisation of foreign skilled personnel arriving in our country although
against their own wish, their employment in accordance with their fields of specialisation, urgently carrying out any legal arrangements related to this subject, making more active and efficient use of these people, this way closing the gap of skilled and intermediate staff required by our industry would help offer the asylum seekers a better quality life.

**Syrian Investors: Investment, Cooperation and Partnerships**

Ensuring sustainable economic growth, increasing investments, creating greater employment opportunities, following technological developments and producing technology, and increasing the existing resource potentials has become even more important today, when the capital is becoming globalised and where international investments and competition at the international markets are becoming prominent. Ensuring foreign capital investments provided that the necessary precautions are taken is very important especially for countries like Turkey that suffer from a savings gap, that are forced to allocate a large part of public resources to current expenditures and thus fighting a current account deficit, that fail to achieve the expected exports rates and that are not able to allocate adequate resources to investments considered necessary.

Gains provided by foreign capital such as contributing to production, increasing sectoral diversity, bringing new technologies to the country, providing tax income, its export potential, creating new fields of employment and markets, increasing competitive strength, contributing to exports etc. must not be overlooked.

In fact, among the targets of the 10th Development Plan are to ensure that SMEs become brands, are institutionalised and develop innovative business models, placing the international cooperation capacity on a strong foundation, handling development in a trans-national perspective, contributing to policies aiming at spreading development in the close geography, and increasing mutual economic activities with neighbouring countries. Also, it is seen that developing the investment environment, and to this end developing the necessary legal processes and the infrastructure regarding the business and investment environment in
Turkey, activating the labour market, creating a centre of attraction for skilled labour and, at local level, strengthening corporate capacity are foregrounded (Ministry of Development, 2013).

Within this context, the contribution to be made to the country economy by foreign capitalists taking refuge in our country, especially Syrians with capital, should not be overlooked, and the legal arrangements necessary for this must be carried out urgently. Although a large part of holders of large capital has migrated to Western countries (considering the opportunities provided to them, including citizenship), it is know that there is still a large capital potential in our country, and part of this potential reflects on official figures.

According to TOBB data, examining the foreign capital partnerships established in Turkey, it is seen that, while there were no companies of Syrian capital before 2012, 489 out of 3,875 companies incorporated in 2013, 1,257 out of 4,736 companies incorporated in 2014, 1,600 out of 4,729 companies incorporated in 2015, and 873 out of 2,157 companies incorporated in 2016 have Syrian partners (URL-4). TOBB data indicates that, examining companies with capital from foreign partners, while there were no companies with Syrian capital before 2012, Syrian investors took the first place after 2013. Of course, although they do not rank first in terms of the foreign partner capital ratio in the partnership, the contribution Syrian capitalists made to the country’s economy cannot be denied.

According to the “List of Foreign Capital Companies Operating in Turkey” published by the Ministry of Economy’s Directorate-General of Incentive Implementation and Foreign Capital in its website, the number of Syrian companies in Turkey are 2,827 as of June 2015, and 1,709 of these companies, that is over 60%, carry out their business in Istanbul. Gaziantep ranks second with 471 companies (Ministry of Economy, 2015). In fact, according to the report “The Syria Among Us” published by the Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce (GTO), while there were 12 companies of Syrian nationality registered with the GTO before the Syrian civil war, it is indicated that this number reached 347 in 2014 and 471 by August 2015. Examining the distribution of these companies according to field of operations, it is seen that they mostly concentrate on the foodstuffs.
and textile sectors. According to the report, the number of Syrian national companies registered with the Kilis Chamber of Industry and Commerce is 70, while this figure is 56 for Şanlıurfa and 250 for Antakya. The Syrians also open small-scale shops such as bakeries, grocery stores and restaurants that are not registered with the chambers throughout Turkey, especially in border provinces, where they sell products traditionally preferred by Syrians. However, the fact that most of these businesses are off the record, causes unfair competition among local business owners. It was found that in Gaziantep only 26 of such small businesses were registered with the Union of Chambers of Business Owners and Craftsmen. (GTO, 2015: 12-13). This point that was indicated in the report was mentioned in the Dünya Newspaper of 2 September 2015, stating that there was more than 10 thousand Syrian businesses across the country together with off the record businesses (Dünya Gazetesi, 02.09.2015). The reports also mentioned that these businesses, specified as small businesses and operating off the record, consisted of barbers, grocery stores, telephone shops, peddlers, restaurants, bread production, tourism-travel agencies, local product shops as well as those carrying out small-scale production such as knitwear, rugs, blankets etc. within small-scale industry and at workshops (Lordoğlu and Aslan, 2016: 802; Topçuoğlu vd., 2015: 89).

According to Ali Altunel from the Syrian Commerce Office, who delivered a press conference in 2013, the investments arriving from Syria to Turkey create a portfolio of billions of Dollars. A large part of the Syrian investors invest in the free zone, particularly in the fields of foodstuffs and textiles. In Mersin only, a 3-4 billion-Dollar investment potential emerged from Syrian investors. Renting storehouses at the Mersin Free Zone, Syrian investors conduct transit export from the free zone via sea with respect to products such as cotton yarn, grains, legumes, textiles, foodstuffs, and fresh fruits and vegetables (URL-5)

In addition to this, the fact that our border provinces are preferred in connection with the supply of humanitarian aid to Syria from within Turkey or from abroad has made it possible for production and exports to increase. This situation created opportunities especially for companies operating in the fields of textile and foodstuffs. This, in turn, causes an increase in production while allowing exports, which suffered difficulties
with the civil war, to pick up once more. For instance, the trade between Gaziantep, where the largest number of asylum seekers are found, and Syria has greatly increased, the exports to Syria for 2013 increasing 467 percent, that is almost five-fold, compared to 2012. The fact that the export largely consists of foodstuffs and cement products indicates that this trade is closely related to the damage caused by the war (Lordoğlu and Aslan, 2016: 796 & ORSAM & TESEV, 2015: 18). This situation was reflected on the data regarding exports according to country, and Turkey’s exports to Syria have approached the pre-war data in spite of the ongoing war.

Table 3: Figures Related to Turkey’s Export and Import with Syria According to Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Exports $</th>
<th>Imports $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016, first 6 months</td>
<td>642 365</td>
<td>27 755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1 522 032</td>
<td>51 506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1 800 962</td>
<td>115 499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1 024 473</td>
<td>84 909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>497 960</td>
<td>67 448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1 609 861</td>
<td>336 646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1 844 605</td>
<td>452 493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>551 627</td>
<td>142 585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>184 267</td>
<td>545 240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>307 778</td>
<td>311 459</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.tuik.gov.tr

As will be remembered, grounds of improvement and agreement were achieved in the relations between Turkey and Syria before the war, and the two countries’ political leaders’ mutual visits opened the way for economic relations. Visas were raised through agreements, customs duties were abolished for certain goods, and many cooperation agreements were signed in fields such as collective housing, civil aviation, tourism and health. As a result of all these developments, the export rates that were at 500 million Dollars also increased, approaching 2 billion Dollars
before the war. However, the human drama in Syria and political disagreements caused these figures to recede to those of 10 years previous. Today, however, in spite of the war situations and the negative political ground between the two governments, it is seen that exports have almost achieved the pre-war figures.

In the light of all these, one may conclude that the number of companies incorporated by or with the partnership of Syrian investors increase by day. In this sense, it is necessary to see the Syrian asylum seekers not only as consumers, but also in the light of their contributions to the country’s economy. Indeed, it must also be remembered that it is not only that Syrian capitalists make investments, but Syrian tradesmen who have very good connections with the Middle Eastern and North African countries conduct trade from Turkey, forwarding Turkish goods to these markets through their business contacts, thus improving exports, the market share and competitive strength. Moreover, foreign capital may also enrich opportunities and diversity in investment, increase the number of competitive businesses at national and global level, and thus strengthen regional competition opportunities and the logistics infrastructure.

Within this context, it is fundamental that first investment opportunities should be improved for Syrian businessmen. Indeed, the most important problem regarding investments is the difficulty and multitude of legal requirements and bureaucratic procedures.

The research lead by the MÜSİAD Konya Branch and conducted in cooperation with the Ministry of Development (MEVKA) indicates that Syrian investors do not choose to incorporate companies due to the difficulty of the official procedure and of obtaining a licence (Topçuoğlu et al., 2015: 106). A similar observation was made by Hossam Tatari, owner of the Tatari Group, who moved his factories in Syria to Turkey due to the civil war.

Moving his textile factory, where during the first stage 200 people were employed and which cost 10 million Liras, to Mardin and deciding in favour of a 300 million Lira investment at the Mardin Industrial Estate, Tatari indicated that many Syrian businessmen made their investments in Egypt and Jordan due to legal and bureaucratic obstacles. Stating that
he decided to make an investment in Turkey since his business partner was from Mardin, Tatari said that many Syrian businessmen would come to Turkey for investments should Turkey provide special counselling for Syrian businessmen and develop the infrastructure (URL-6). Another statement, which is in the nature of a confession on the subject, came from Asım Güzelbey, Gaziantep Metropolitan Mayor of 2013. Güzelbey indicated that around 400 million Dollar of capital arrived from Syria to Antep, but Turkey was taken unawares, the Syrian businessmen who were not able to obtain residence permits could not deposit their money in banks, and this capital was transferred to other countries as Syrian refugees were not permitted to work (URL-5).

According to the Research for Identifying the Economic Potential of the Syrian Guests in Konya and Cooperation Opportunities (2015: 105-108), which provides important observations on the subject, the root cause of the problem is not only the multitude of legal and bureaucratic procedures, but also the fact that Syrian investors are not adequately informed in carrying out these procedures. Also, bureaucratic problems regarding work permits and Syrian investors’ personally owning property are mentioned.

Within this context, the primary issue for Syrian investors is trust. In fact, negative experiences suffered by Syrian investors (being defrauded) poses a risk not only for the investors having these experiences, but also for potential investors. The investors wish to cooperate with trustworthy businessmen and business owners both in the business and investment partnerships, and in their trade with Turks. At this point, support to be provided by respectable corporate business organisations such as chambers of commerce, chambers of industry and MÜSİAD appears to be very important. Also, Syrian businessmen also request being accepted as members to concerned professional chambers.

At this point, a database regarding Syrian investors and skilled labour must be prepared and shared with sectors in need of such data. Forming mechanisms that would support Syrian investors conducting activities in our country or who are willing on this subject with respect to bureaucratic and legal procedures, provide them with information and data on the sectors in our country, the structure of these sectors and their shares in,
and contributions to, the economy, and create a platform of cooperation 
and partnership between businessmen of the two countries would close 
an important gap.

One of the most important emphases of the report is on post-war coop-
eration and partnerships, which is almost never brought to attention in 
discussions concerning the Syrian asylum seekers and especially Syrian 
investors. Accordingly, Syrian investors openly declare their intention to 
carry their cooperation and partnerships to be established with Turkey in 
the present to Syria after the war. At this point, it seems possible that the 
priority sectors would be especially the construction sector, textiles, auto-
mobile spare parts and the manufacturing industry. Turkish businessmen, 
too, are willing to make investments in Syria after the war. They have 
indicated that their primary choices would be their own fields. In fact, 
many industrialists stated that they traded with Syria before the war, and 
that this trade could be continued and transformed into investments in 
Syria. Also, considering that Syria would be restructured after the war, 
they repeatedly emphasised that investments could be made in many sec-
tors, but at this point the state and related corporations should lead them, 
providing them with support. If the necessary legal basis for this request 
for cooperation and partnership mentioned by investors of the two coun-
tries is created and the businessmen are directed correctly, it is clear that 
this would contribute to cooperation between the two countries in many 
fields, particularly in economy, in the post-war reconstruction of Syria.

Conclusion

The “Open Door” policy followed by the Turkish Government in the face 
of the human tragedy in Syria, the fact that Turkey is reliable and the 
many facilities it offers to the asylum seekers, and also the fact that many 
Syrians have relatives or acquaintances in Turkey, played an important 
role in the asylum seekers’ choosing our country, rendering Turkey a cen-
tre of attraction for asylum seekers. Also, it is seen that they are not very 
willing to seek asylum in Europe due to the increasing Islamophobia, 
xenophobia, racism and humiliating attitude against refugees in Europe.
Considering the war and the current conditions in Syria, it appears that the asylum seekers will remain in our country for quite some time. Under these circumstances, it does not seem possible for the Syrians to maintain their lives with aid from the government, NGOs or their neighbours. This circumstance is not sustainable in terms of economy and brings a very heavy burden, while negatively affecting the local people’s perception towards the asylum seekers. This is also mentioned by the Syrians who wish to earn a livelihood and establish a new life. In fact, it is clear that a greater part of the asylum seekers have established a new life here in parallel to the extension of their stay in Turkey, and that they would feel the need to reconsider their decision to return.

This human drama in Syria has had negative impacts on our country, and many discussions, columns and articles have been published on these problems. However, unfortunately the asylum seekers’ contributions to the country are mostly being overlooked. This study set off from data, reports and research with the intention of making a modest contribution in showing the other side of the coin within the context of these discussions, and has emphasised that the asylum seekers, with their unskilled and skilled labour and their investors, are not just a burden to our country, but also possess a potential to make important contributions.

Of course, while all this discussion is in the nature of a response to an important lack of information and even partial information pollution, the main question that currently occupies the mind of the public is hidden in the expression “what will be done about these Syrians?”

Actually, the answer to this question is directly related to what will be done about the Syrians’ legal status. Indeed, the problem of legal status lies beneath the current arguments, criticisms and negative impacts concerning the Syrians. As known, the Syrians are under the status of “temporary protection” or, as expressed by the National Assembly, “guests”, although this status has no equivalent in international law as well as not being sustainable for Turkey. At this point, three main headings emerge with respect to the solution of the problem.

The first is to send the asylum seekers back regardless of the war and ex-
isting circumstances in Syria. However, such a path is not something that can be accepted by this noble nation, which has never left the oppressed to their fate even in the most difficult days of its history, let alone this being a requirement of the international treaties to which our country is a party.

The second is to provide the Syrians with refugee status. For this, Turkey must first abolish the geographical condition it annotated to the Geneva Convention of 1951 and carry out the necessary official procedure to enable the Syrians to take advantage of this status. In practice, the government has already actualised many facilities entailed in the refugee status for the Syrians with the arrangements it made during the process. Nevertheless, the refugee status may be considered an option to place these on a legal basis. However, the controls and sanctions of the international treaties to which Turkey is a party and of Western organs, which are the addressees of these treaties, in other words, interference with Turkey’s internal affairs, is inescapable. Considering the attitude displayed by the West with respect to Turkey’s struggle against terror and terrorist organisations, and especially its attitude following the attempted coup of 15 July, the suitability of such an arrangement for the solution of the problem and the interests of the asylum seekers and the country should be discussed.

The third option would be to grant the Syrians citizenship, from which emerges the hottest debate. However, it should not be wrong to say that these discussions mostly consist of political discussions based on vote and mostly cliché criticisms claiming that the asylum seekers are a burden. It is clear that the discussions would settle on a more meaningful platform when the subject is considered from a more rational perspective, even from the framework of cost-benefit. As mentioned above, the fact that it is not possible for the Syrians to return to their country presently brings with it the necessity to create themselves a life in Turkey as their stay extends. All reports and studies reflect the fact that they would not be very willing to return even if the war is over, which would be better understood if we consider our citizens who went to Germany as guest workers. Moreover, it was emphasised above that evaluating the asylum seekers only from the light of negative impacts and burden does not reflect the truth. Even if the subject is appraised in connection with the negative impacts, the solution of problems such as cheap labour, child la-
bour, the need for unskilled labour, work permits, poverty and public aid would only be possible through citizenship. In any case, these people already benefit from many public services (such as education, health, public benefits). In other words, the Syrians already benefit from the same services offered to Turkish Citizens, or from similar services, in many areas of high expenditure. Moreover, due to their status, while benefitting from these services they are also kept free from many legal obligations, particularly taxes, to which Turkish Citizens are subject.

Another important matter that must be considered here is the camps where 12 billion Dollars was expended at UN standards up to today. In fact, almost half of the total amount spent for the Syrians was spent for the camps, which also provides data to the claim that the asylum seekers are a burden. These criticisms are not unjustifiable. At this point, it is essential that a solution allowing the asylum seekers in the camps to stand on their own feet should be found. It is known that a large part of the asylum seekers staying at the camps are unskilled, have come from rural areas, and were occupied in agriculture and stockbreeding. It is possible for these people to be settled on lands belonging to the treasury, currently in disuse, in Central Anatolia and especially in East and South-East Anatolia without allowing a certain ethnic or denominational grouping, renting these lands to these asylum seekers, thus providing them a dignified life in which they can support themselves and their families. This way, an obstacle may be put before terrorism, while putting the unused land and pastures to use.

Another important point is that, granting citizenship to the asylum seekers will enable skilled labour and investments by capital-holding asylum seekers to be brought into the country’s economy. In short, although it must be thoroughly discussed, granting citizenship to the Syrians appears to be prominent among the existing options in terms of actual politics. Setting off from the example of our citizens who went to Germany as guest workers and stayed there, the Syrians may be granted the right to dual-citizenship, thus allowing those who wish to return to Syria after the war.

Finally, considering that many of the developed countries of the world, particularly the USA, which has the largest economy in the world, are im-
migrant countries or have grown thanks to immigration, it is possible for the asylum seekers in our country to prove themselves a blessing rather than a burden with the necessary precautions and arrangements in place.

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CONTRIBUTIONS BY IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES TO THEIR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN: THE SYRIAN EXAMPLE

1. Introduction

While for many years international migration was only appraised in relation to the development of immigrant-receiving countries, the situation is changing today and the relationship between migration and development is being restructured. Consequently the workers’ remittance transfer which at the beginning was accepted as a money transfer yielding little profit, has today begun to be seen as a means of development for source countries. Due to the remittance transfers in question, people’s living conditions such as consumption, education, health and safety improve, and this also causes the formation of migrant networks. In this respect diasporas play an important role. For instance the Turkish and Moroccan diasporas in Europe have constituted an important income for the source countries, and labour migration has been therefore supported by them. In these circumstances international migration in fact creates a mutual gain for both the migrant, the country of origin and for the country where they work.

From the second half of the 20th century in particular, international migration has become one of the most important factors affecting economic relations between international migrant countries. According to the report published in 2015 by the United Nations it was estimated that at the beginning of the century 3% of the world population, roughly 175 million people, lived and worked abroad. This figure reached 222 million in 2010 and finally 244 million in 2015. Approximately two thirds of these migrants live in Europe (76 million) and Asia (75 million). These

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continents are followed in turn by North America (54 million), Africa (21 million), Latin America (9 million) and Oceania (8 million). The most significant result of the report for Turkey is that after 2014 across the globe Turkey is the country housing the most migrants. The fact that Lebanon is second reveals how important the Syrian crisis and the migrant flow from Syria, the focal point of this study, is on a world scale.

The workers’ remittances sent to the country of origin by international migrants from the countries to which they have migrated have made, and are making, a significant contribution to their countries’ economies, particularly to developing countries. According to the World Bank’s same report, international workers’ remittances, after direct investment, ranked as the second external financial source for developing countries. On the other hand, according to World Bank data, while the amount of workers’ remittances transferred in 2010 on a global scale amounted to 325 billion dollars, in 2011 this figure reached 351 billion dollars, which represents an increase of 8%. The countries which obtained the most funds from workers’ remittance transfers were India (58 billion dollars) China (57 billion dollars), Mexico (24 billion dollars) and the Philippines (23 billion dollars) respectively. These countries are followed by Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Vietnam, Egypt and Lebanon. In 2014 the cash amount sent by international migrants to their homelands eventually reached 436 billion dollars, and this means an increase of 4.4% compared with the previous year. These figures prove that workers’ remittances constitute the second most significant financial movement. This type of cash flow has reached more than five times the amount transferred as aid to developing countries from developed countries. On the other hand, the money spent for the development of poor countries has remained at the level of only a third (129 billion dollars in 2010) of this transfer.

The aim of this study is to examine the effects on the Syrian economy of workers’ remittances sent by migrants and refugees leaving the country through legal or illegal means as a result of the civil war and crisis, which has continued for the last five years, in the light of experiences gained by countries such as Turkey and Poland which have experienced similar cash flows in their histories. Here the study of the labour migration re-
relationship between Turkey and Germany may display Syria’s potential after that country has settled down. The labour migration from Turkey to Germany, which began in 1961, led to a fund transfer of 20 billion dollars from 1984 onwards, and that amount was for the Turkey of that time one of the most important items in the financing of foreign deficit.

In this context, Syria’s overseas labour stock estimated to have reached 5 million, constitutes an extremely important potential in the economic development process which Syria’s economy will have when the civil war and crisis has ended. The analyses in this study are essentially based on the reports published, and estimates made, by the United Nations and the World Bank. The institutions preparing these reports acknowledge that the official figures are well below the real cash flow. The basic reason for this result, especially in the Syria example, is the fact that the migration is illegal, the migrants and refugees are working unofficially in the countries to which they migrate, and consequently are sending money through unauthorised people who meet the demand in this market instead of official bank transfers.

There are a great number of studies attempting to estimate the amount of the annual international migration and migrant stock. Almost all of these studies make use of the data sets produced by immigrant-receiving countries rather than the figures of emigrant countries. The assumption that gives rise to this approach is undoubtedly that the immigrant-receiving countries are far better equipped and more experienced on the subject of compiling data sets than the emigrant countries. In spite of this, since data coming from immigrant-receiving countries are based on census and official figures, the data belonging to those migrating and working illegally are very limited. According to a study conducted in 2002 (Passel, Capps and Fix, 2004), 26% of migrants living and working in the United States of America, that is to say a total of 9.3 million migrants, work illegally and unregistered. In another study (Docquier and Mar-fouk, 2005), conducted on people migrating from OECD member countries to the Gulf states, researchers observed that there was a total of 9.6 million migrants in 6 Gulf states. A point that should be taken into account in this and similar studies is the difference in reliability be-
tween the annual migration amount and the migrant stock data. In these types of studies, however consistent the migrant stock data, based on the non-existence of information of migrants returning to their source countries, annual migration amount data are not equally reliable.

2. Theoretical Infrastructure

Especially according to the Neo-classical economy theory at macro level, developed on the migration phenomenon by Lewis in the 1950’s and later by Harris and Todaro in the 1970’s, the basic reason for migration is the difference in basic economic conditions between the country of origin and the immigrant-receiving country. In this case migration flows occur from countries with poorer economic conditions to those with better conditions.

However, to see migration as a displacement from poor countries to rich countries would be to consider the phenomenon of migration a movement that is less important than it actually is, as is true in the Syria example. While a country may have most of the driving factors in a period of a manifest political crisis or conflict and become an emigrant country, together with overcoming this period emigration may decrease from the country in question. Thus intense waves of migration caused in particular by war, civil war or natural disasters usually tend to verge towards the neighbouring countries from the country of the source of migration. People forced to migrate from source countries with more than one neighbour choose the countries whose housing and working conditions are more favourable. On the one hand this choice lessens the cost of the migration, and on the other proves that the migration is only temporary, that the migrants have migrated only for compelling reasons, with the wish to return to their country. The proximity between the place left and the place to which the person migrates also relieves the psychological burden on the migrant and increases productivity in the country migrated to.

Beside this, in migrations caused by the unavoidable conditions specified above, temporary migration may become permanent after a while according to the attractive features of the destination country and in particular the advantages of the economic conditions it provides to the
migrant which, in turn, may cause a change in the migrants ties with their country of origin. In situations where migration turns to family union, moral and material links with the country of origin decrease, which directly affects the worker’s remittance transfers.

It is also possible to explain the migration flows towards Turkey from Syria, where the migration is impossible to study at micro level in terms of reasons and continuation, with the new (migration) economic theory discussing international migrations.

However as with all other theoretical explanations there is no theory which can completely explain migration, its reasons and results. According to the new economy theory pointing out that migration is attempted by an individual of a family to work in another country based on a decision made by the family for the improvement of the family’s economy rather than the individual’s decision and interest, migration, apart from meeting the needs (housing, consumption, education, health etc.) of the family left in the country or origin, produces results such as the realisation of various economic activities that will allow making investments and acquiring property in the country of origin, as well as benefitting its social development. We may encounter this type of migration, which has become a new economic and social strategy for many developing countries in recent years, as legal or illegal. While with migration done by legal methods remittances made by migrants between the country of origin and the receiving country are ensured by banks and intermediaries keeping records, unrecorded transfers used in illegal migration are made without being taxed, beyond the control of the state or financial institutions. While the numerical size of this type of transfer made by go-betweens in particular and its contribution to the country of origin can only be determined as an estimation, studies generally reveal that this cash flow is among the most important sources of income in times of economic crises and emergency arising from natural disasters, situations such as famine in the country of origin. In forced migration due to war in particular, the remittances sent by migrants to the country of origin, investments and the purchase of property are important in terms of health services and the continuity of consumption rather than meeting needs such as education. In migrations with family reunification in question, a part of
these remittances are used for the family members to reach the country of migration. Over a longer term, we see that the remittance transfers in question are used in the construction of schools, places of worship, access to the use of water and electricity, and for the construction of places of trade or living quarters. However because this remittance causes consumption without production, in many cases it gives rise to inflation in the country of origin and makes living conditions even more difficult.

3. The Possible Effects of Foreign Financing on the Local Economy

In this part we will dwell upon theoretical frameworks in which the possible effects of workers’ remittances on the local economy are appraised. It is thought that workers’ remittances would have a positive effect on economic development. For example workers’ remittances are seen as a very important source for the Maghreb countries with a Mediterranean coastline. Thanks to the remittances from their countrymen working in European Union countries, economic development in the Maghreb countries continued even in times of economic crises. Some of the countries acknowledged as the world’s poorest countries have an economic structure dependent on workers’ remittances. The best example of this type of country is from the African continent. Another important feature of these countries in comparison with other emigrant countries is that the percentage of women joining the labour migration is higher compared to other countries. Developing Asian countries display similar structures with regard to migration. For example, there is intense emigration from South East Asia to the developed Middle East and European Countries and to the USA. If we look at the Philippine example we see that the emigrating population forms 20% of the total labour force, and the amount of workers’ remittance they create is at a level of around 20% of the Philippine GNP.

Although empirical studies conducted have exceptionally reached a contrary conclusion, these types of studies prove the match of theory and reality. In theory it is claimed that workers’ remittances have an effect on the local economy by means of three different channels.
The effect of workers’ remittances on the accumulation of capital: Workers’ remittances are funds which can be given directly to the investor or can cause the accumulation of capital, whether social or physical, of the remaining family members of the individual living abroad. It is necessary to mention the indirect effect as well as this direct effect. An increasing flow of capital to a country increases the credit notes of that country and of the investors in that country, and this leads to sliding trends in the cost of capital, increasing the accessibility of capital. On the other hand, as is known, stability is one of the most important factors in the decrease in the cost of capital. Funds entering the country as workers’ remittances increase countries’ stability and produce a slide in the cost of capital.

The effect of workers’ remittances on the labour force participation rate in the local economy: There are two conflicting theories under this heading.

Negative effect: The increasing workers’ remittances provide a noticeable amount of ‘labour income’ to the individuals remaining in the country of origin, increasing the welfare level of the individuals. Taking the family members remaining in the country of origin into account, the increasing welfare level may reduce the rate of individuals’ participation in labour, creating more spare time. The increase in purchasing power deters the individuals from working more.

Positive effect: as mentioned in item ‘a’, the increase in the workers’ remittances received by a country will lower the cost of capital. On the other hand these fund transfers will increase the purchasing power in the local economy, and therefore the domestic demand. Low capital cost and increasing domestic demand will lead to an increase in investments in the country, and consequently an increase in employment and the labour participation rate.

Workers’ remittances and productivity: If workers’ remittances are considered as capital entering the country, it can be said that the quality of this capital is better than the local capital produced by financial markets and consequently more productive. It is possible to say that another positive effect of workers’ remittances on the capital markets is that it increases the depth in the financial markets, thus increasing the capital amount directed to the banking system, consequently triggering economic growth.
4. A General View of the Syrian Economy

The civil war that has been continuing in Syria since 2010 has had a very severe impact on the Syrian citizens. Before taking a general look at the economy, it would be fitting to provide a summary of the balance of the civil war. According to the report published in 2015 by the United Nations, 250,000 people have lost their lives since the beginning of the civil war, and according to the report published by the Syrian Centre for Policy Research (SCPR) in 2016, 400,000 people have lost their lives. The estimated number of wounded is more than 1.2 million people. Considering that the population of Syria is about 23 million, the number of dead and wounded alone shows that 8% of the people of Syria were directly affected by the civil war. The humanitarian dimension of the war unfortunately cannot be measured by the number of dead and wounded. According to the UNHCR’s 2016 report the number of people forced to internal migration in Syria has reached 7.6 million. Again, according to the same report the number of those migrating to neighbouring or regional countries such as Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey alone has reached 4.8 million. On the other hand, 900,000 Syrian citizens sought asylum in various European countries between 2011 and February 2016. Approximately 30% of the primary schools, 22% of the hospitals and 18% of the public institutions in the country became unusable. One of the most significant indicators to express the current situation in the country is that life expectancy in 2010 was 70.5 years but fell to 55.4 in 2015, which corresponds to a decrease of 25%.

The ongoing environment of conflict has caused serious damage to the country’s hospitals, education, energy, water, agriculture, transportation, housing and other infrastructures and to public and private assets. According to the World Bank’s Damage and Needs report, the total amount of damage in the 6 large cities alone (Aleppo, Daraa, Hama, Homs, Idlib and Latakia) as of the end of 2014 is estimated between 3.7 and 4.5 billion dollars. According to the SCRP the cost of renewing the physical infrastructure which has been destroyed in the entire country is estimated as 75 billion dollars. Studies conducted by the United Nations suggests that the country requires an investment of 180 billion dollar in order to bring the GNP to the pre-war level.
It is impossible to think that this severe destruction would not have a negative impact on the country’s production capacity. The GNP figures which can be envisaged as a summary of output confirm this.

**Chart 1: Progress of Syria’s GNP**

![Chart showing progress of Syria's GNP from 1950 to 2010](image)

Source: The World Bank

As will be seen in Table 1, from 1960, when official figures were shared with the public, until 2007, when the last official figure was announced, it can be said that the Syrian economy demonstrated a modest growth. The figures for after 2007 however, are more in the nature of estimations. According to estimates Syria’s GNP has shrunk at a yearly average of 10% in the last six years. The value in 2015 is expected to fall approximately by 40 billion dollars to the level at the beginning of the 2000’s. The most significant role in this decrease is attributable to the drop in petrol production, Syria’s major product, from 400 thousand barrels a day in 2010 to 100 thousand barrels. According to an article in the Telegraph newspaper in May 2016, however vague the figures are, it was stated that the cost of the country returning to its 2010 economic level could only happen with an expenditure of 4 times the GNP of the same year.

Looking at the expenditure constituting the GDP we see that investment has fallen to almost nil, and that basic expenditure as an indicator consists of state expenses and household consumption. Unfortunately the
data we have (and almost all are estimated data) do not allow us to make deeper analyses. However, as a result of the profound destruction in the country, to argue that household consumption will not go beyond human needs will not be a particularly ambitious prognosis.

5. Evaluation of Data on Migration after the Civil War in Syria and on Workers’ Remittances

The fact of migration became a common concept for the Syrian people particularly after 2010. Thirty percent of the Syrian population was forced to migrate either internally or externally. Table 1 shows the distribution of emigration from Syria according to groups of countries, continents and chosen countries accepting the most immigrants.

Table 1: Distribution of migration from Syria according to groups of countries, continents and chosen countries (2010, 2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>According to Country Groups</th>
<th>According to Continents</th>
<th>According to Countries Chosen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Developed Countries</td>
<td>Developing Countries</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1 094 693</td>
<td>241 506</td>
<td>853 187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5 011 509</td>
<td>319 873</td>
<td>4 691 636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>357,80%</td>
<td>32,45%</td>
<td>449,90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

As can be seen from the table the migrant stock provided by Syria in the last 5 years has risen from around 1 million to 5 million. These figures equate to a rise of 357%. However on looking at this increase according to country groups it is seen that a large part of the burden created by Syrian migrants is laid on developing countries. While the number of migrants received by developed countries since 2010, when the civil war began, has risen 32%, this figure was at a level of 450% for developing countries. It is possible to see the spread of the situation in the distribution according to continents. While the migrant increase in the conti-
nents of America and Europe, where there are mostly developed coun-
tries, was at a level of 41% and 16% respectively, this figure in Asian and
African countries was at a level of 465% and 358% respectively. Going a
little deeper into the analysis we see that the migrant burden is basical-
ly laid on neighbouring countries. The number of migrants in Lebanon
With about an increase of 6000% this figure rises to around 30000% for
Turkey. When discussing migration figures it must not be forgotten that
these figures are only official figures, and that illegal migration particu-
larly in countries neighbouring Syria is far above the official figures.

It is inevitable that migrants fleeing abroad, even if illegally, will pro-
vide a cash flow to the country. Generally it is known that these money
transfers known as ‘workers’ remittances’ are an important input of for-
eign currency for developing countries in particular. If we consider with
respect to Syria that petroleum income dropped as much as 25% of its
level before the civil war, how important workers’ remittances are for the
Syrian economy becomes clearer.

Chart 2: The Ratio of Workers’ Remittance to the Gross Domestic Product

![Graph showing the ratio of workers' remittance to GDP]

Source: World Bank CIA World Factbook Estimates

The ratio of workers’ remittances to the GDP is an indicator that can
reveal the importance of this type of cash flow. This situation is indicated
in Chart 2. Because the GDP data is based last on 2010, the ratio after
this year is calculated both by considering the 2010 data as fixed (blue line) and by using World Bank figures (orange) for the figures after 2010. Here by definition it will be more consistent to comment over the estimated GDP ratio. As will be seen from the chart, even in 2014 workers’ remittances had risen to around 5% in proportion to the GDP.

When one considers that in the 1960’s and the 1970’s when Turkey most needed foreign currency, and the principle source of foreign currency apart from exports was workers’ remittances, and that the remittances sent by Turks living in Germany was only at a level of 1% in proportion to its GDP, it appears more clearly how important this figure is for Syria.

Workers’ remittances have an indisputable superiority compared to other types of cash flow. Compared to direct investment or portfolio investments, workers’ remittances are more consistent. In other words, workers’ remittances are not too affected by turmoil in the economy. This fact can be proved with the little change in workers’ remittances during and after crises, compared with other capital flows.

6. An Evaluation on Syria’s Workers’ Remittances

It is just as difficult to provide proper data on the workers’ remittances obtained by Syria as to provide the number of migrants. In this respect the most consistent data set we have is the Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook compiled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, this data set, too, has two fundamental problems: The first can be qualified more as a technical problem. The IMF data set is a set of data emerging as a result of the compilation of data reported by the countries’ Central Banks. However among the Central Banks a technical consensus has not been reached on the subject of which money transfers will be classified under the ‘Workers’ Remittances’ entry. In different Central Bank statements the concept has been recognised under various money transfer definitions and names such as ‘Workers’ Remittances’, Compensation of Short-term Employees and ‘Other Current Transfers. Even more importantly, even though most Central Banks have defined workers’ remittances as money transfers made through the financial sec-
tor, it is also seen that the monetary equivalent of cash or even merchandise brought from abroad is being recorded as workers’ remittance in addition to this definition. The second important problem is that illegal immigrants transfer money by illegal means, which are consequently not recorded. As previously stated, while there are 9.3 million illegal immigrants even in a developed country such as the USA, in this study in which we are discussing Syria specifically one cannot imagine that the workers’ remittance data obtained by Syria express true figures. In spite of this fact, analyses are successful in revealing how important workers’ remittances are for the Syrian economy.

However it is necessary to support all these theoretical results with policies too. The efficient use of the foreign currency entering the country is a process that must be controlled by policy-makers. Here, setting of from the example of Turkey, we can put forward several predictions:

a. The money entering the country has to be directed definitely at investment and consequently to production. If the transfer home of workers’ remittances, which have the effect of expanding the continuous emission volume without corresponding goods, fail to also cause an increase in production through investment, the general level of prices will tend to continually increase. In this context workers’ remittances may be one of the significant reasons for a high cost of living, rapid price increases and other inflationary pressures.

b. It is inevitable that the funds created by workers working abroad will move to areas providing economic benefit to the fund holders. If the Syrian economy does not have the financial depth to form these opportunities, it is inevitable that the workers will collect their savings in savings deposits in foreign banks. If we return to the Turkey example, guest workers’ diverting their savings to Turkey had no meaning other than providing a living for the family members remaining in the country and paying the instalments on building plots, land, flats, buildings and housing cooperatives savings. However much these items are items that would boost economic activity, when the potential movement these funds can create is taken into account, they may be considered the lesser of evils. (Ekin, 1986)
Conclusion

It is beyond dispute that, for the money which can flow to Syria as workers’ remittance from abroad to be put to good use, a minimum financial depth needs to be constituted in the Syrian economy. This depth will be attractive to Syrians living abroad because it will increase the return on their funds, will lower the cost of fund inflows into Syria, and enable the money coming in to turn to investment, and accordingly to production capacity. Here again, the data and developments pertaining to the war period takes away our ability to comment. For this reason we will rely on Muhammed Al Hussein’s (2009) assessment report which he wrote in 2009 immediately prior to the war. In his article Al-Hussein mentions that the Syrian banking sector made notable progress in the eighties and nineties, but the banking sector in the country was still dominated by a great number of small-scale banks. In a statement he delivered in 2008, President Esad stressed that the necessary policies had to be carried out to attract foreign multinational banks to the country. In the environment after the war, if the scenarios projected before the war come to fruition and Syria’s financial depth increases, the use of the money from abroad will be faster and more productive.

Bibliography


TRANSFORMATION OF TURKEY’S EDUCATIONAL POLICIES ADDRESSING IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES

As victims of displacement, one of the most significant problems of today, refugees are under a serious threat with regard to access to education, which is a most basic human right. Today, considering the refugee population in the whole world comprises mostly children and that the average immigration period can be 20 years, a young refugee can spend their whole school age displaced and with limited access to education (UNHCR, 2016a). According to the latest data by UNHCR, only 2.3 million of the 6 million refugee children of school age in the whole world are able to attend school. While fifty percent of these children have access only to primary education, this percentage falls to 22% in secondary education (UNHCR, 2016b). Taking into account that access to quality education has effects not only on the individual success, well being and prosperity of these children and adolescents, but also on the stability and welfare of the society which they have joined and/or one-day hope to return, it is clear that national and international policies for refugees/immigrants deserve a central place. UNHCR and UNESCO emphasise that rising generations with the opportunity to advance themselves through education programs and psychological, and rehabilitation support gain peace-keeping abilities and skills and that this way education comes to the fore as a security priority with its protective and strengthening role in addition to its promise of a future opportunity (Dryden-Peterson, 2011; Sinclair, 2002, 2007).

86% of world refugees are in developing countries and one quarter of

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these are located in underdeveloped countries with inadequate education systems UNHCR, 2016a).

Policies developed in the areas of education and migration demonstrate serious variations according to the place of settlement of the refugees / immigrants newly arriving in the country as well as to the development level and strength of the education system of countries (Dryden-Petersen, 2015; Sinclair, 2007; UNICEF, 2015). In many countries newcomers live in camps for many years, and are not included directly into the countries’ education systems (UNHCR, 2011a, 2012, 2015). As to western countries, where the number of newcomers is relatively low, it is possible to enter directly into the education system (Bourgonje, 2010). Education provisions in Turkey allowing refugees and those whose target country or staying place will not be Turkey are a subject which also needs attention. In a current research dated 2015, Dryden-Peterson underlines the fact that a “black box” emerges in the literature when the education processes of refugee children at their stops before arriving in Western countries is compared to literature in Western countries.

Turkey however is an example in which in a short time, over 90% of the population arriving in the country has settled mainly in cities, and their demand for education has reflected intensively on the system. In the light of this information, analysing the response of the education system of Turkey, the country accommodating the largest number of refugees since 2015, to the refugee influx, and the transformation it experienced, is extremely valuable as a reference point for a benchmark in refugee studies.

Following the civil war that started in Syria in 2011 and in accordance with the adopted open door policy Turkey was faced with the largest and most different migration movement in its history, while its education system had to face a serious challenge regarding the education and integration of an increasing young population. According to the latest data by the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), as the crisis entered its sixth year, 990,410 of the Syrians under temporary protection were of schooling age (GİGM, 2017). When taken into account that this data concerns only the registered population, it is obvious that the actual number is very much higher.
Turkey, in line with its national legislation\textsuperscript{4} and the international treaties to which it is party\textsuperscript{5}, gives priority to policies on primary and secondary education, one of the basic rights of Syrian children and adolescents living under temporary protection within its boundaries. However, the pressure of the daily increasing young population on resources and infrastructure, and the size of today’s refugee crisis and the problems with respect to the legal status of the refugees, has left the education system facing serious difficulties.

These difficulties are important in that they demonstrate the responsibility taken by Turkey not only with regard to the children and adolescents who remain in the country and are a part of the education process in various ways, but also for those who are in search of a different future in the global sense. For example while access to the right to education by Syrian children and adolescents who were registered and were granted temporary protection status has been attempted to be provided and supported through public policies, difficulties are being experienced in including people choosing to remain outside Turkey’s registration system for various reasons, notably to travel to European Union member states to apply for asylum. As is shown in the news which we frequently witness in the press, Syrian refugees using illegal ways, attempt dangerous journeys most of which end with death in order to be able to reach European Union countries which they think will provide them with better international protection conditions. The European Union countries however, are unwilling to accept these people. Consequently, especially recently the matter has gained a character that requires urgent intervention also within the European Union.

\textsuperscript{4} While the right to basic education of all children and youths are guaranteed under the Constitution of the Turkish State, refugees’ right to education was placed on a legal basis under an integrated and rights-based approach through Law No. 6458 on Foreigners, the Directorate-General of Migration Management formed under this law, and the International Protection discussed since 2008 finally brought into effect in May 2014, and the Temporary Protection Regulation identifying the legal framework and status of the Syrians in Turkey.

\textsuperscript{5} The right to basic education of asylum-seeker/refugee children and youths was guaranteed by the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights, to which Turkey is a party.
On 18 March 2016 an agreement (EU, 2016) was signed between the European Union and Turkey, focusing on the return of Syrian refugees travelling to the Greek Islands from Turkey through illegal ways. In this framework the European Union had declared that it would provide Turkey with financial support amounting to 6 billion Euros. Even though this agreement which was shaped by a discussion process in which the states voiced their sensitivities and reservations widely on sharing the material and moral burden, has not been successfully implemented, and the problems related to burden sharing as well as the dangers refugees faced in their search for rights became more visible in the process.

Considering that we are looking for a solution to which other world governments make a limited contribution compared with the European states in close proximity to the crisis, all Turkey’s work for the Syrians today has gained greater value. For this reason the efforts shown in the field of education and the creation of public policies constitute a basic indicator underlining and rendering visible the responsibility Turkey has taken especially in areas related to children and adolescents. It has to be mentioned hat the responsibility assumed in the field of education constitutes one of the most significant contributions Turkey made in order to cope with this refugee crisis of global scale.

Despite these serious efforts and the public policies formed under the responsibility undertaken, when we look at numeric data, it is difficult to say that Turkey’s contribution in a field such as education, which is vital for children and adolescents, is entirely sufficient. In line with the intense efforts of the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) and UNICEF, as of 2017 about 480,675 of the Syrian children in Turkey have been included in the education system. While this number represents a 54% increase compared to last year, around 510,000 children still remain outside the education system, thereby not being able to benefit from education, which is one of the most fundamental rights, facing the threat of being a ‘lost generation’.

Looking at the distribution of the schooling rate, while now 90% of children in camps housing a small Syrian population of 257,423 find access to education, in the cities where the majority lives (2.7 million), this
percentage remains low. The Syrian children and adolescents included in the system receive education within two main frameworks. Data are constantly changing, according to the latest update on the issue (MoNE presentation at “Türk Yükseköğretim Sisteminde Suriyeli Öğrenciler Ulusalarası Konferansı” at Mustafa Kemal University, Hatay on March 9th 2017) while 292,765 students receive education in Temporary Education Centres (TEC) following a revised Syrian curriculum, in which the education language is Arabic, the remaining 187,910 children continue their education in Turkish schools.

At this point it has to be noted that refugee education must be conducted under long-term public policies supporting short and medium-term solutions and a sound development process.

Despite the efforts of the MoNE, UNICEF and various central and local institutions and organisations, schooling rate remaining at the level of 52% and the negative effects that this situation will have on Turkey’s future emerge a need for the subject to be considered in a more comprehensive manner and for an attempt to answer a great deal of questions which international refugee literature due to its special characteristics is struggling to answer, especially through the support of field research.

It is extremely important that Turkey’s contribution to the settlement of this global refugee crisis originating from Syria is laid on firm and sustainable foundations. Following this introductory section in which we have revealed the basic framework of the subject, the transformation in Turkey’s curriculum and public policies addressing the education of the Syrians under temporary protection in the face of the forced migration and the response of the education system to this unprecedented challenge will be analysed, and there will be a summary of discussion as to what the essential features of sustainable public policies should be.  

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6 This study aims to provide a wide readership with information on the subject. Chapter is written during, and after the authors’ project entitled ‘Turkey’s Education Policy in relation to Syrian Migrant Children: An Analysis within the Framework of the Istanbul Example’ (No: 115K100) which they produced as specific to Istanbul, supported by the TÜBİTAK (Scientific and Technological Research Council). The authors thank TÜBİTAK, which supported them in beginning the research related to Syrian children’s education in Turkey.
The Period Before the Syrian Forced Migration

Exactly one year before the beginning of the Syrian crisis, as of 31 January 2011, there were 17,271 people registered in Turkey, 10,391 of which were refugees and 6,680 asylum-seekers waiting for application results (UNHCR, 2011b, p.22). According to the UNHCR’s data, 90% of the asylum-seekers arriving in Turkey during this period were from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Somalia (UNHCR, 2011b, p. 22). Looking at the legislation on education for an evaluation of this period, which approximately 10% of the registered population were children of school age, it is seen that although Turkey guaranteed the right to education to asylum-seeking and refugee children together with all other children within the framework of the Constitution and “Law No. 222 on Primary Education and Education”\(^7\), there were serious problems in the implementation.

While the Asylum Implementation Guidelines of 2006 stress the importance of access to fundamental rights, certain requirements relating to procedure were brought for this right (UNHCR, 2011b, p. 28). Although these guidelines basically encourage all schools and NGOs to support the refugee children’s access to education, it does not include any legal enforcement or obligation (Tolay, 2014, pp. 116-117). Looking at the related circular by MoNE\(^8\), it is seen that a residence permit\(^9\), rendering their stay in Turkey legal, is required for the registration of the asylum-seeking and refugee children with schools. Consequently, at this point the residence permit fee and registration became a serious obstacle for access to education, and the children of families who could not pay


\(^{9}\) To legalise their stay in Turkey, asylum-seekers and refugees residing in one of the 51 provinces identified by the Ministry of the Interior must register with the relevant police department and then pay a fee for a residence permit every six months. While in 2011 this fee was 511.30TL for an adult, it was 330.15TL for each child. Those who could not pay this fee lost their legal statuses in the country as well as their access to fundamental rights and aid provided by the state. Although two circulars on the subject published by the Ministry of the Interior in 2011 set forth criteria whereby asylum-seekers and refugees who were in financial difficulty could be exempt from this fee, the problems in implementation continued (UNHCR, 2011b).
the fee were deprived of their right to education (UNHCR, 2011b). Here the basic determinant from the point of policy-making is that the need to develop a specific policy ensuring access by asylum-seekers and refugees to education was not considered among priority issues due to the restricted numbers of applications before the crisis. In short, while asylum seekers and refugees had access to education at a fundamental rights level, it is understood that in practice there were both socio-economic and procedural obstacles preventing the enjoyment of this right.

The Beginning of the Crisis

Following the conflict, the first Syrian asylum seekers began arriving in Turkey in April 2011, and by June the number of Syrians staying in camps close to the border had reached 7,000 (Ferris, Kirişçi, & Shaikh, 2013).

While in October the same year it was announced that an “open door” policy would apply to those arriving from Syria with the expectation and prediction that the entries and crisis would end in the short term, eight camps were made ready and this policy was set in a legal framework through “temporary protection” in order to ensure the provision of basic humanitarian services including education. Although the need to create a basic policy addressing the Syrians started to emerge even then, the main axis of the discussion developed in the direction of policies focused on urgent humanitarian aid and temporary protection rather than comprehensive policies, due to the assumption that their stay would be short-term.

Although there are no official documents to examine with regard to education services provided to the Syrians between 2011-2012 due to the confidentiality of the temporary protection circular, the fact that the units concerned with the administration of the camps were managing the process well was indicated in studies concerning the camps. While the facilities such as centres, schools, social facilities and vocational training courses in the camps are appreciated by international institutions\footnote{See: Report of 30 April 2013 by the International Crisis Group, one of the first reports to be published on the camps, which used the statement “the best refugee camp I have ever seen” made by a European official as its title.}, it is
also seen that the educational needs of the Syrian asylum seekers in the camps are also provided along with their other needs. According to Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency’s (DEMP) first announcement dated 30 October 2011, 2,448 Syrians are provided with education in 67 classes and 127 branches in the camps established in Hatay (AFAD, 2011).

Although in this early period, it is understood that the necessary systems were established in the camps in order to enable the Syrian children and youths to continue with their education, policies focusing on emergency aid were in the foreground in order to increase the schooling rate and to allow the running of the process in a field such as education, which requires long-term planning. As mentioned above, although there are no official documents concerning education open to the public during this period, statements made by Ömer Dinçer, the Minister of National Education of the time, would help understand the government’s perspective on the matter. In fact, in a statement he gave on 13 November 2012, the Minister said that “education has started in the camps ...” for Syrians, and that they were conducting “all educational efforts as the Ministry of National Education” (Öz, 2012).

For the first time on 31 July the Minister stated, with respect to the education services addressing the Syrians, that they had made preparations to provide education in containers as in the previous years, that “the courses will be taught in Arabic according to our own curriculum”, and that “they are working in a manner that would not encourage the families to stay in Turkey” (Dünya Bülteni, 2012). In another interview he gave in 8 September, prior to the 2012-2013 academic year, he mentioned the topic of the Syrians’ education with a single sentence, saying that they were making efforts to provide education in prefabricated classrooms in the tent cities, which indicates that neither the public nor the decision-makers consider the subject too comprehensively yet (MEB, 2012). During a visit to Balıkesir on 28 September 2012, the Minister answered the question whether there were any efforts made to overcome the difficulties caused by the lack of knowledge of the Turkish language of some refugee children starting school within the boundaries of the province, saying that he had no knowledge of this subject, that the education to the Syrians was provided at classrooms prepared in the camps
and their vicinity by teachers trained in the region, with a command of
the Arabic language, and that they may take measures according to this
new situation (Hürriyet). In another statement he delivered on 3 October
2012, the Minister said the following with regard to the education of the
Syrians (MEB, 2012):

“We provided our children at the refugee camps with prefabricated class-
rooms. We are trying to provide children of schooling age with education
to the best extent possible. For them we sent them our teachers who have
a good knowledge of the Arabic language and who were raised in that
region. We have not fully received information on classrooms, students
and teachers as we are still at the beginning of the education. The local
administrators are making efforts for the children's education too. ... We
did not make efforts to teach the Syrian children Turkish. We see them
as guests in our country, and expect that they will return to their coun-
try when the circumstances in Syria improve. The education provided to
them was not designed to enroll them into schools and grant them diplo-
mas. They are being educated as guest students. Our aim is to prevent
them from experiencing trouble with adapting to their own country's ed-
ucation when they return.”

As seen, during this period the provision of education to the Syrian chil-
dren is designed to suit the camps. The statement indicating that no ef-
forts were being made to teach the Syrian children Turkish is a good
example supporting the concept of temporariness and giving an insight
into how the situation is perceived. The education policies are based on
the assumption that they will return shortly, and are emergency-oriented
and addressing emergency arrangements. As understood, while during
this period the MoNE did not have a policy on the education of the
Syrian refugees outside the camps, there was also a lack information con-
cerning their presence.

As expressed by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Erdoğan, Director of the Hac-
ettepe University Centre of Research on Immigration and Politics, during
that period the decision-makers, on the assumption that the Syrians would
return to their country, were trying to overcome the problem through short-
term solutions rather than facing the problem of education (Girit, 2015).
On the other hand, it is clear that this was not a one-sided expectation or decision. In fact, at the GES Global Education Summit of 27 March 2016, which he attended as a speaker, Yusuf Büyük, MoNE Deputy Undersecretary of the period, who was responsible for the education of the Syrians under temporary protection, stated that, although there were efforts to provide education in Turkish at the camps during the initial phases, the Syrians were not interested, and it was decided that the language of education should be Arabic. Especially in the context of the education of refugees, it is very important that the decisions and policies are made with the consent of, and contribution by, the asylum-seekers/refugees as well as the host community in order to ensure the implementation of these policies (Oh & van der Stouwe, 2008; Sinclair, 2007). As understood, the “guest” status of the Syrians were then relatively accepted by the Syrians themselves as much as by the host community and decision makers, accordingly this expectation of temporariness clarifies the short-term policies regarding education.

The Extension of the Crisis and Its Impacts on the Education Policies: The First Identification Efforts, Searches for a Policy

As the clashes started to intensify during the second half of 2012 the crisis in Syria reached a new dimension, and the influx of asylum seekers into neighbouring countries rose dramatically. While the growing influx of asylum seekers11 started to stretch the state’s capacity, indicators that the crisis would not be resolved any time soon started to abound. In fact, the international visibility of the crisis started increasing during this term, and the Republic of Turkey, which believed it could manage the crisis on its own until then, made its first call for international assistance (Kirişçi, 2014). In the midst of this forced mass migration, in April 2013 Turkey enacted the first comprehensive immigration law that had been expected for a long time -since the country had always been subject to immigration in history- and the law was brought into effect a year later, in 2014.

11 While the number of Syrian asylum seekers living in the 4 camps within the boundaries was 11,000 in September 2011, in March 2012 the number of camps rose to 8, while the number of asylum seekers amounted to 65,980, and in September there were 133,709 asylum seekers in 13 camps. On 5 April 2012, the number of asylum seekers entering Turkey through the border was over 2,800 in just a single day (Dinçer et al., 2013, p. 25).
Under these circumstances, 2013 was virtually a turning point for education, as well as in that it represented the making of long-term decisions regarding services to be provided to the Syrians. While the fact that the clashes continued and it was understood that peace would not be possible in the short term clarified and foregrounded the need and demand for education, it also revealed the need for a comprehensive policy. On the other hand, the ever increasing Syrian population outside the camp became visible during this period, giving rise to the need to develop services addressing these people whose problems were difficult to attend to. As a state organ responsible for the Syrians taking refuge in the country, the Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (DEMP) delivered a statement on 6 March 2013, indicating that the population outside the camps was increasing, and efforts to develop an aid system were underway (AFAD, 2013).

The first public report regarding the Syrians living outside the camps was the study conducted by Mazlum-Der in September 2013 on the Syrians living in Istanbul (Yılmaz, 2013). In the meanwhile, a study conducted by DEMP on the Syrians living outside the camp, the first data from which was shared with the public in October, demonstrates that this population had gained importance in the eyes of the decision-makers, and that efforts for assessing the situation were underway. According to the statement delivered by DEMP president Dr. Fuat Oktay on 2 October 2013, there were over 200,000 Syrian asylum seekers in the camps, and more than 300,000 outside the camps. According to a questionnaire conducted with the UNHCR regarding the education of this population, while 83% of the children in the camps were able to continue with their education, this ratio was around 14% outside the camps (AFAD, 2013). Reports published during the same period document the existence of schools operated by Syrian administrators and teachers, following the Syrian curriculum and providing education in Arabic for the Syrian students who were newly emerging in the cities. The USAK&Brookings Institute report of November 2013 indicates that there were 55 of these schools across Turkey (Dinçer et al., 2013, p. 25).

By examining the work conducted by the MoNE during this period, it will be seen that two circulars dated 26 April and 26 September, respec-
tively, were published in connection with the education of the Syrian children and youths.

The first circular\(^\text{12}\) sent to the governor’s offices, which was basically in the nature of inspection and identification rather than a solution, admitted the existence of schools opened to meet the educational needs of the Syrian children and youths in cities with a high population of Syrians. Thus, the activities of these schools managed by local governments, national and international organisations started to be monitored systematically. The circular published during this time, when the population outside the camps was increasing, indicates that an awareness towards comprehensive and systematic solutions under the Ministry was starting to become clearer, that the need to form a sustained education policy to address this population was admitted, and that efforts to this end were initiated.

As a result of these observations, the first comprehensive circular on the subject was published on 26 September 2013, at the beginning of the academic year of 2013-2014. The circular\(^\text{13}\) contains articles aiming at improving educational practices at the camps, ensuring flexibility in the curriculum and increasing cooperation, and is the first detailed document addressing especially the education outside the camps. The circular puts an end to the ambiguous statements encountered at the beginning of the crisis related to education at the camps, expressing that the education program and curriculum were prepared by the High Commission of Education of the Syrian National Coalition under the supervision of the MoNE, in accordance with the Syrian curriculum and in the Arabic language.

The topic deserving particular attention is that the refugees outside the camps were being foregrounded for the first time in connection with policies regarding education. Article 9 of the Circular addresses increasing the enrollement rate of the children of the Syrian families holding residence permits to public schools, within the scope of the above-mentioned

\(^{12}\) MEB circular of 26 April 2013 on the “Measures Addressing Syrian Citizens Accommodated in Our Country Outside the Camps”.

\(^{13}\) MEB circular of 29 September 2013 on the “Education Services Addressing the Syrian Citizens under Temporary Protection in Our Country”.
circular on “Foreign National Students” of 16 August 2010.\textsuperscript{14} Article 10, however, concerns the supervision and supporting of the efforts carried out by local governments, national and international organisations, and increasing the cooperation between them, with regard to the education of the Syrian children lacking residence permits. As will be understood from the above mentioned article, the MoNE paved the way for the use of the education centres addressing the Syrians, of whose activities it was aware in the previous circulars, to the schooling of the population outside the camps, with a flexible and multi-stakeholder approach.

However, MoNE was not willing to take the necessary steps that would abolish the condition seeking a residence permit, which would allow the enrolment of the population living outside the camp to the public schools. This approach, which once more established that being registered was the precondition for gaining access to the rights and services provided to immigrants provided by the state granting protection, is important in preventing unregistered immigration and the tragedies accompanying it. On the other hand, as frequently discussed by human rights organisations, the direct link states establish between “the provision of services” and “having a legal status” causes grievances to asylum-seekers/refugees in many cases.

Although there is still a considerably large unregistered population in Turkey, who have no access to the right to education, the population living in the cities, which have reached to a significant figure as of 2013 and increased social awareness among the host community, made it necessary for the MoNE to take more urgent and result-oriented steps in the new academic year. It is understood that the efforts aim at adopting long-term, sustainable policies and practices to enroll children in schools and granting them diplomas. As analysed by Seydi, who made the first publication in the field of education to our knowledge, through documents, statements and news on the subject, 2013 was a turning point in Turkey’s approaches and policies addressing the Syrians (Seydi, 2014).

\textsuperscript{14} See p. 162-163
A Turning Point in Crisis Management: Law on Foreigners and International Protection, and Searches for Comprehensive Policies

The crisis that changed dimension and intensified with an increase in the clashes, shifting balances and international intervention in 2014 further increased the influx of asylum seekers into Turkey, the size of the destruction reducing all hope of return. During this process, the need for education became a grievance with increasingly serious consequences for the children who had been kept from school for a long time. Tens of thousands of children and youths who did not have the chance to shift to an education system outside their country in a different language or access the temporary education centres for the Syrians became part of a search for a future in a country where they newly arrived with their families -or alone-, having already lost a large part of the opportunities life could have offered them. The education of the Syrian newcomers as the basis of a healthy future has become the problem not only of Turkey, but also the entire world. The “No Lost Generation” initiative, which was initiated with contributions by UNICEF, UNHCR, Mercy Corps, Save the Children and World Vision and which supports refugee children living outside camps in accessing education, emphasises the importance of this topic.\(^{15}\)

The dual structure that started to form in the field of education with an increase in the population living outside the camps in early 2013 has now become clearly apparent. The schools addressing the Syrians, which are only located in settlement areas close to the border, have started to spread to all provinces where asylum seekers are present (Kirişçi, 2014). Although the Syrians who have obtained residence permits have been allowed to send their children to public schools, the demand for public schools has remained limited due to bureaucratic difficulties on the one hand and adaptation problems caused by the language barrier and the difference in curricula on the other. While around 6,000 children received education under the Turkish curriculum in Turkish schools along other students during the 2013-2014 academic year, there were around 40,000 Syrian students enrolled in schools following the revised Syrian curriculum used in the camps and providing education in Arabic (UNICEF, 2014).

\(^{15}\) http://nolostgeneration.org
While the need for a comprehensive and well-structured policy placed on a legal basis has become fully apparent, Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection\textsuperscript{16} that was brought into effect in May 2014, though being discussed since 2008, and the Directorate-General of Migration Management (DGMM) established following its adoption have played a central role in the decision-making process regarding the subject. The refugees right to education -as with other rights- was placed on a legal basis with an integrated and rights-based approach with the adoption of the Temporary Protection Regulation identifying the legal status of the Syrians in Turkey and forming the framework based on the law.\textsuperscript{17} It is clear that a new phase began in crisis management with this law, and this new phase represents a new level in education.

The clearest indicator of this reflecting on the field of education has been circular no. 2014/21 of 23 September 2014 entitled “Education Services Addressing Foreigners”, which was published by the MoNE at the beginning of the 2014-2015 academic year, considering the dual structure that de facto emerged. The aim of the circular is to grant the right to education to all foreign children residing in the country under international treaties to which the Republic of Turkey is party and Law No. 6458, considering the country’s changing immigration structure, and to eliminate problems and concerns experienced in practice with regard to this subject. The fundamental difference of the circular is its integral nature. In its contents, the objectives, basic programs, responsibilities and duties related to the education of foreigners have been handled in detail.

In the circular, the existence of the Temporary Education Centers (TEC) receives regulation and justification. It envisages the establishing of TECs -in cooperation with stakeholders where necessary- within and outside camps, to meet educational needs in the case of a crisis or mass influx. The TECs shall conduct their activities under the province / district directorates of national education and their opening shall be subject to the governorate’s approval. The third article explains the status of the TECs as follows:

\textsuperscript{16} http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/yabancilar-ve-uluslararasi-koruma-kanunu_327_328

\textsuperscript{17} Article 89-1 The applicant or the individual granted international protection and their family may benefit from the primary and secondary education services.
“...they shall allow the students to continue with their education remaining uncompleted in their own countries, and shall prevent loss of year should the students return to their countries or wish to pass on to any type and level of education institution under the MEB (MoNE) and continue their education in our country. The activities in question shall be carried out over the weekly class schedules and teaching programs to be specially determined by the Ministry in order to ensure unity in implementation.”

The fourth article regulates the principles regarding enrolment:

“In order that foreigners of schooling age or those adults who wish, arriving in our country due to a mass influx, may enroll in the temporary education centres or educational institutes of any type and level under our Ministry (except for higher education institutions), they shall be required to have been granted a “foreigner identification certificate” by the organisation in question, and the students shall be enrolled in the temporary education centres or education institutions under our Ministry, which are considered suitable, through student placement and transfer commissions.”

As seen, through the circular the existence of these schools, known as Temporary Education Centres (TEC), providing education to the Syrians at camps and outside the camps, in cities, was accepted, and the conditions for their accreditation by the MoNE were identified. The circular also repealed the previous circular of 16 August 2010 on “Foreign National Students”, allowing those who do not have a foreigner identification number through a residence permit to enroll in Turkish schools using a foreigner identification certificate. In short, the de facto dual structure emerging during the asylum seekers crisis was accepted by the NoNE, and the Syrian children were allowed to legally enroll in public schools under the MoNE and in the accredited TECs. Also protecting the right to access education of those who do not hold residence permits, this arrangement, although it may not exactly be construed as allowing unregistered immigrants to benefit from the services provided by the state, allows the immigrants who have been registered in a different manner through an identification certificate to access education, thus constituting an important step in rendering a system addressing the education of refugees in Turkey sustainable.
The most important reflection of this practice is the distinct effect of the circular on the enrollement rate. Also with the support of organisations, around 325,000 of the Syrian children of schooling age whose numbers amount to 850,000 in Turkey have been able to become part of the education system in the 2015-2016 academic year. Around 200,000 of these children receive education at the TECs, while the remaining children receive education at Turkish schools (UNICEF, 2016).

The fact that a large part of the children going to school choose the TECs in spite of the necessary facilities in place to enable the Syrian children to enroll in Turkish schools is a fundamental subject that should be tackled in making policies. According to the most recent study on the subject, throughout Turkey a total of 248,902 students receive education in 425 TECs, 36 of which are in the camps (Coşkun & Emin, 2016). Although 166,399 students are educated in 389 TECs outside the camp, the large number of the population outside the camp and the difficulty of urban conditions cause the schooling rate in cities to remain at a rate as low as 25%.

Coordinators have been commissioned to monitor the activities carried out at the TECs, which are found in 21 provinces outside the camps, whose language of education is Arabic, which follow the revised Syrian curriculum, and which are accredited within the framework of protocols by commissions established within the body of district Directorates of National Education, and to ensure coordination and unity in implementation. The inspection activities of these coordinators, who are generally chosen from among the administrators of Imam and Preacher Schools in the districts due to their knowledge of Arabic, remain limited to administrative inspections due to the heavy workload, the language barrier and the foreign curriculum, this, in turn, bringing up equivalence problems concerning the contents and quality of the education (Özer & Komşuoğlu, 2016).

While this figure represents a 50% increase in the schooling rate compared to the previous year, the large increase in the number of asylum seekers during this period (according to DGMM (GİGM) data, the number of Syrians under temporary protection which was 1.5 million in 2014 reached 2.5 million in 2015) made Turkey the country accommodating the largest number of refugees and, also increasing the population not going to school, caused around 550,000 children to remain outside the education system.
In order to form a reliable and sustainable framework regarding equivalence, MoNE recently ended the exit tests carried out by the Syrian Provisional Government, and initiated a practice involving an equivalence exam for students who have graduated from the TECs at high school level and who continue on to the 12th grade. The exam was applied on 27 June 2015 in the province centres of Adana, Adıyaman, Batman, Gaziantep, Hatay, İstanbul, Kahramanmaraş, Kayseri, Kilis, Malatya, Mardin, Mersin, Osmaniye and Şanlıurfa. The regulation on the test and the equivalence procedures was conducted through two letters by the MoNE, dated 9 July and 20 August 2015, respectively, entitled “Equivalence procedures for students of Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan nationality”. According to information obtained from the MoNE Deputy Undersecretary on 11 March 2016, although the questions were in Arabic in the exam held the previous year, 3500 out of 7500 students passed, while this year’s exam was sat by 8,000 students, 4,000 of which were granted an equivalence certificate and transferred to universities (MEB, 2016b).

Although the equivalence exam aims at alleviating concerns on the contents and quality of the education provided at the TECs, some of which serve a large number of students, the inadequacy of the infrastructure and physical conditions of the centres give rise to worries. Some TECs are in danger of shutting down due to education quality as well as the lack of funds. Circular No. 2014/21 addressing the solution of the infrastructure problem provides that some of the public schools within the boundaries of the district should be allocated to the TECs during certain hours. Gaziantep is noteworthy as an example province where this practice has yielded good results.

20 MEB Education Board letters no. 7112335 and 208250102 of 9 July 2015 and 20 August 2015 on “Equivalence Procedures for Students of Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan Nationality”.
21 For instance, the school known as Shamuna, providing services in Esenler, has 1100 students. Although there are other schools at this level, it is said that most have a small number of students, as small as 50, and that education is carried on under very difficult circumstances (Özer & Komşuoğlu, 2016).
22 During the speech she delivered at the GES Global Education Summit, Gaziantep Metropolitan Mayor Fatma Şahin indicated that the schooling rate reaching 98% in Gaziantep, where 70 thousand refugee children are receiving education, was made possible by supporting dual education in line with the joint decision of all administrators of the
Driven by the sensitivity of the issue and pressure it may put on the existing infrastructure in the districts, MEB and UNICEF are cooperating on a new project in order to overcome the acceptance problems that may be experienced with regard to the host community. At the GES Education Summit organised in Istanbul on 27 March 2016, MoNE Deputy Undersecretary Yusuf Büyük announced that work was being carried out, within the framework of the project, to ensure a 10 USD contribution per Syrian student receiving education in the public schools allocated to the TECs in the afternoon. This practice aims to create a fund for these schools, whereby the problems and pressure arising from the use of buildings and dual education may be alleviated to a degree. Another problem experienced with regard to these centres is that they were requesting a contribution (around 100 TL monthly) from the students until recently. Although during the same session Yusuf Büyük stated that inspections were underway to discontinue this practice of contribution, there is information to indicate that this practice still continues. In fact, one of the most recent studies conducted on the TECs mentions that school administrations demand some kind of donation, if not a contribution, from the wealthy parents (Aras & Yasun, 2016).

In spite of all these problems regarding the quality of education, equivalence and adaptation, one of the most important reasons for the TECs to be chosen by the Syrians for the education of their children is their hope that they may one day return to their country, and their effort to keep their children within the Syrian education system. Although the extension of the civil war has reduced this expectation, the families’ concern that their children would forget their language and culture -which is a concern frequently observed in refugee studies-, as well as the language and adaptation problems they may possibly experience in the Turkish schools reduced the demand for public schools (HRW, 2015). Additionally, as emphasised in the introduction, it is also known that those wishing to officially seek asylum in Western countries do not chose the Turkish schools in order to avoid registration in Turkey (Aras & Yasun, 2016).

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23 Information obtained from Bağcılar Municipality employees, WALD, Refugee Settlement Project Education Programme, 2 September 2016, Istanbul.
On the other hand, it is also understood that families’ lack of information on the registration procedure, the confusion caused by the different legal statuses arising from the fact that holders of foreigner identification cards and foreigner identification certificates must register over different systems, and the varying attitude of the officials in charge on the subject are among the deterring factors (Özer & Komşuoğlu, 2016). It is clear that the Turkish government must eliminate these differences in application, confusions and lack of information at local level in order that the free education opportunities provided to the Syrians by schools under the MoNE can be made use of. At this point, the recent information brochures work can be pointed out as an example for good practices (Aras & Yasun, 2016).

The fundamental problem regarding the existence of the TECs is, however, the inadequacy of the Turkish education provided at these schools, and its negative impact on the two communities’ efforts to build a common life in the future. It is clear that the five hours-weekly Turkish education included in the TECs curriculum to enable the students to adapt to the society following graduation and to ease their transition to further education or the labour markets proves inadequate while indicating at a search for a solution to this problem (Aras & Yasun, 2016).

The dual structure placed on a legal basis by circular no. 2014/21, although frequently encountered in refugee studies especially in connection with meeting the urgent education needs of asylum seekers in the country of first asylum, is not preferred in the long-term. For instance, although the action guide prepared by the UNHCR with respect to the education of urban refugees presents variations according to circumstances, underlines the necessity, in principle, for the children newly arriving at the country to be included in the mainstream education system in order to assure their coexistence in harmony with the other children in the medium and long term. Importance is also given to preventing any dual systems that may develop during this process (Dryden-Peterson, 2011; UNHCR, 2011a). In the case that it is not possible to structure the process as targeted and problems were encountered especially in the context of emergencies involvement in the main system, the UNHCR ac-
cepts, as a transitory arrangement, the dual system supported by national or international NGOs and formed by the refugee groups. It supports all efforts made by the host country’s concerned organs both with respect to accreditation and the contents, quality, auditability and accountability of the education provided at these centres (UNHCR, 2011a, p. 5).

As a document coinciding with the recommendations of international literature, the MoNE 2015-2019 Strategic Plan is prominent at this point. Articles 7 and 8 among the strategies identified to ensure access to education concern the refugees, the foreigners under temporary protection, and the stateless in Turkey.

According to the article 7, “efforts shall be made to ensure the integration of these students to the education system during their stay in order that they may receive education” (MEB, 2015, p. 37). Within the same scope, Article 8 indicates that “efforts shall be made in cooperation with international organisations in order to eliminate the problems experienced in equivalence issues and the general difficulties suffered with relation to education in this field” (MEB, 2015).

As a sequel to these efforts, in August, at the beginning of the 2016-2017 academic year, MoNE announced a roadmap for the education of the Syrian children (MEB, 2016a). The “Immigration and Emergency Education Office” was formed within the body of MoNE, which initiated a corporate restructuring to develop long-term and comprehensive policies to provide quality education to all children within the boundaries of the Republic of Turkey, and not only to Syrian children.

It may be seen that the plans to use the TECs for the purpose of transitioning to Turkish schools, as indicated by MoNE officials in the previous term, have started to be implemented as of the 2016-2017 academic year. According to this roadmap, new primary schools shall be opened at TECs with an adequate physical infrastructure, and those that are inadequate shall be associated with the closest primary school, where the MoNE curriculum shall started to be implemented at the newly formed preschool and first year classes. Passing to schools under the MoNE shall be encouraged in order to accelerate transition and adaptation to the
Turkish education system at the intermediate classes, and intensive Turkish language lessons shall be given in order to facilitate the adaptation of students studying at the TECs. In order to solve the language barrier and adaptation problems at schools under the MoNE, Turkish language courses shall be organised via the Public Education Centres. Children who have paused their education shall be supported in the necessary subjects in order to ensure their adaptation to the class levels, and courses may be opened. It was indicated that an education programme may be applied in their own language outside school hours especially to eliminate the parents’ concern that their children may forget their native language and culture. It is clear that MoNE is considering the Syrian parents’ concerns.

As understood from the statement delivered by MoNE Assistant Undersecretary Ercan Demirci on 2 September 2016, the decision for integrating these children into the Turkish education system was made together with the representatives of the Syrians in Turkey (MEB, 2016b). As seen, MoNE, too, accepts that excluding the asylum-seeker/refugee community in decision-making and policy considerations in a topic as sensitive as education is not sustainable.

While the effects of the road map remain to be seen, as per 2016-2017 academic year, 480,615 students have been included into the education system, 187,910 of which are integrated into the public schools under MoNE.

Assessment

An analysis of the transformation of Turkey’s legislation and public policies on the education of the Syrians under temporary protection has given rise to the need to plan the rights and services provided to the refugees as short- and medium-term solutions responding to urgent needs as well as in the form of long-term public policies. The fact that the TECs will continue to exist for a while as a short and medium-term solution is clear due to the necessity of handling the risk of Syrian children remaining altogether outside the education system on a basis of urgency. It is seen that the Syrians in Turkey, the political initiatives of Syrian origin,
the state officials, and national and international NGOs focusing on the schooling rate support the continuation of these schools in order to ensure that the enrollement rate does not drop / is increased. On the other hand, as understood, the MoNE emphasises the “temporariness” of a dual structure that does not correspond to the country’s basic education system in terms of both the quality and the contents of the education. The observation that Turkey’s arrangements regarding the education of the Syrian refugee children sets out from the current situation and is evolving through short- and medium-term initiatives to permanent, comprehensive and sustainable long-term policies supports the opinion that the TECs will not be supported by Turkey in the long run. As indicated by MoNE Deputy Undersecretary Ercan Demirci in his announcement of 2 September 2016, it is understood that efforts are being made to render the infrastructure of the education system functional for the Syrians, targeting to include the Syrian children into the Turkish education system within five years (MEB, 2016b).

In this process, the second step was demonstrated as solving the problems experienced in public schools. In addition to the solutions to be planned in the long run, such as increasing student numbers, eliminating the language barrier and cultural differences, there are also topics in which a rapid progress to be seen in the short/medium term, such as providing information on the legislation, providing the student with academic support, and scholarships.

The fact that Turkey has continued this process mostly relying on its own sources must also be taken into consideration. Supporting refugee education considering its contribution to social peace, welfare and harmony in addition to the individual dimension concerning the refugees’ self reliance and well being is important for the solution of global immigration and refugee crises becoming more apparent. Different from countries hosting an incomparably small number of refugees and/or most of whose refugees live in camps, Turkey constitutes an original example for other countries trying to cope with refugee crises in the international literature, due both the large number of refugees, and the fact that the refugees are mostly settled in cities. The positive results of the search for regulating and providing the education of almost one million
children and youths mostly living in cities is the common sensitivity not only of Turkey, but also of a much wider geography, and it is obligatory that all parties, who may have a share in young generations with a future, should work together.

**Bibliography**


CULTURAL INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS

Introduction

No country in the world has a monocultural structure any longer. Communication and transportation technologies that have developed along with globalization have made almost every part of the world accessible. People and cultures have become closer to each other than ever before. The ease of traveling and immigration has accelerated international migration, transformed the structure of countries and cities, and made many religious, ethnic and cultural communities cohabitants.

Since the very early periods of the world, the unequal distribution of values such as economy, security, and welfare between people and countries has led to the continuation of individual and mass migration movements. According to the United Nations Migration Report of 2015, the number of international migrants reached 244 million by 2015.1 Of the international immigrants in the world, 76 million live in Europe, 75 million in Asia and 54 million in North America. The number of displaced people in the world reached in 2014 the highest level since the Second World War. These migrations will continue so long as there is no equitable sharing on a local, national or international scale, in areas related to human life such as peace, democracy, human rights, freedom of thought, income distribution, wages etc. And on the agenda of world countries there will always be threats and opportunities because of immigration, and politicians and academics will keep focusing on these issues.

International migrations have important consequences for both immigrant-sending and immigrant-accepting communities. Migration process can be dealt with in terms of its economic, legal and international dimensions. But for both source societies and immigrant-accepting societies, the most difficult and comprehensive dimension is the social one. This

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dimension has a broad framework that encompasses the arrangement of relations with the individuals and institutions of the new society in which immigrants start to live, and the imagination of the construction of a common future. Different social groups getting in contact affect each other, and this interaction can lead to a reaction to the other as it is evaluated as ‘deterioration of cultures’ from time to time.

In countries where dense populations of immigrants can be seen, the requirement that immigrants and host communities that make up society co-exist in peace and tranquility poses an important problem that must be solved by the modern world. As Frisch’s words “we wanted workers, but people came,” clearly reveal about immigrant workers in Germany, immigrants are not a tool in the new social structure, but an important actor of it.

Global migration movements deeply affect social institutions and force the countries that receive immigrants to develop policies towards co-existing with the others. These policies can vary from multiculturalism to assimilation. In this section, while we consider cultural adaptations of immigrants, we will primarily discuss the changes that the immigration process causes with time in both source communities and immigrant-accepting communities, and we will also deal with the new life styles of immigrants and the ghetto as well as the main cultural modes of integration such as integration, assimilation and multiculturalism in immigrant-accepting societies. We will try to reveal the social structure of Europe, which was the main destination of irregular migration especially in 2015, and the factors affecting immigrants and the adjustment of immigrant groups as a vital component of this structure.

**New Life of Immigrants**

Whether migration takes place in or out of the country, it creates significant economic, social and psychological changes in the lives of those involved. While leaving the place where the immigrant feels he belongs, hidden in his suitcase are all life experiences, lifestyles and dreams rather than a few personal belongings. Not only the immigrant’s body but also all the spiritual cultural values that they have had till the migration date
are involved in migration. Migration is not just a geographical change, but also an intercultural phenomenon that surrounds the whole life of immigrants, rearranges the spatial and human relations and (with the reproduction of the culture of immigration) continues to influence the generations. Even if there is no other cause, being an immigrant (having immigrant origins) can cause alienation, loneliness, deficiency and melancholy feelings, although they decrease their intensity as one gets far from the first generation of immigration. Whether it is a forced migration to escape from war or conflict, or voluntary migration for “a more prosperous life”, as a break from places where people are born and raised, immigration gives rise to a feeling of homesickness that will be felt in all the rest of their lives or even carried to future generations. This feeling, which is directly related to “leaving-emigrating,” will only disappear when subsequent generations begin to feel that they fully belong to the community to which they emigrated.

Immigration is a social phenomenon that encompasses all areas of life and requires the reestablishment of human and spatial relations, and whose social and cultural aspects are more important than its economic and legal aspects. Immigrants who are physically thousands of miles away from their country can continue to feel mentally as if they were in their own country. Their wish to live their new life according to old rules and habits inevitably leads to a number of conflicts and incompatibilities. Whether the direction of migration is towards developed, developing, or underdeveloped countries, breaking from the original culture damages the sense of belonging, and it gives rise to the feeling of being ‘neither there, nor here’ in the first generations.

From the moment people come to the world, they learn how to behave in the society they belong to through their families, friends, educational institutions and the media, and they further learn the roles and expectations that the society imposes on them by living in a natural process, that is by socializing. Immigration interrupts immigrants’ the process of natural socialization. Everything that immigrants know according to old social norms loses its validity. Like a newborn baby in the world, immigrants have to re-learn by experience all the information they need to
participate in life. Immigrants’ attempts to apply in the new community the original codes of behavior of the original society in which they were born and raised can cause cultural and even physical conflicts.

Integration, which we can somewhat refer to as a process of ‘re-socialization’, is one of the chief problems that migrants have to deal with. Integration refers to the integration of immigrants with the society to which they are alien and their beginning to live in harmony with that society. An immigrant who has completed cultural integration has reached a common sense of how to behave in society. He / she automatically behaves in accordance with social norms. An immigrant who has reached adult age is like a child who lacks adult human behavior and does not know how to behave in the face of a society whose language and culture he/she is alien to. Life experience and reference milieu will not work in the new social environment. Everything that he/she knows in his/her own language and culture must be replaced with re-learnings; that is, he/she has to socialize again in order to adjust to the community that he/she has joined.

As in the case of the intermediary institutions of the socialization process, migrants also need intermediary institutions to facilitate the process of cultural adjustment during resocialization. The cultural integration process is not limited to the efforts of politicians and public institutions. All social institutions and people that immigrants face should also develop an appropriate attitude to the integration strategy. Immigrant-accepting states should be aware that while developing their adaptation policies, they need to develop a broad range of policies to encompass all the social sections, educational institutions, the media, non-governmental organizations, and even families and individuals.

The link between the immigrant’s past and the future breaks off. The acculturation process in a different environment than the original culture is filled with obstacles and difficulties for the individual equipped with his / her own culture’s emotion, behavior, mindset, values, language, religion and all other patterns. The cultural difference between immigrant-sending (source) and immigrant-receiving countries is one of the main factors determining the acculturation process. If cultural differences between the source country and immigrant-accepting country are small, it will
be easier to develop new acceptable behaviors in a new society, to learn again, to learn about new culture instead of their culture-specific socially accepted conducts. If the difference between the two cultures is great, the individual has to develop new strategies for acculturation.

The form of immigration is also an important element in the immigrant’s construction of a new life. Those who migrate using the experiences of an acquaintance and joining the chain of immigration make easier both the journey of migration and the integration with the community newly joined. The stress of acculturation is less experienced in groups with such social support who migrate to places where acquaintances and relatives live (Kümbetoğlu, 1996: 274). Immigrants want to reduce the stress created by re-socialization in a different society, using relationships of citizenship and kinship. In places where they have just emigrated, they even prefer to live in neighborhoods where their own countrymen primarily live. Thus, neighborhoods where immigrants live intensively, that is, ghettos, are emerging.

Ghettos

Immigrants living in prosperous communities live in locations where there is a dense population of ethnically-defined ghettos. The ghetto, which is a type of locational ethnic segregation and which is most emphasized by urban and immigration studies, refers to a residential place, living together, sharing everyday life and a special ‘housing environment’ (Erder, 2006, p.8). Ghettos are considered as one of the biggest obstacles to the cultural integration of immigrants. As a matter of fact, the concept of ghetto, which expresses segregation and dissociation with the main social structure, is defined as an area or region thickly inhabited by individuals who cannot integrate with the rest of the society due to racial, religious or cultural (ethnic) characteristics (Erkal, 1997, p.121).

The immigration process creates an atmosphere of great insecurity for the first generation of migrants, devastating their values and behaviour. For immigrants it is impossible to solve the problems with known traditional ways. Ghettos are transforming itself into an important spatial power for immigrants, in addressing the problems arising from both themselves
and the host nation’s social and political structure. Ghetto, also viewed as ethnic colonies, emerges as “an institutional response to the needs of immigrants which result from their being immigrants and minorities, and as a way to ‘transport’ and maintain social relations existing in their own homeland” (Tılıç, 1996, p.566). Ghettos offer immigrants the opportunity to speak their own tongues, and to retain customs, customs and traditions in a foreign country far from their homeland. In such milieus, especially the first generation immigrants can sustain their existence by protecting their identities and cultures within their ethnic group of solidarity without undergoing a process of cultural interaction.

The studies conducted on ethnic migrant groupings in ghettos indicate that the phenomenon defined as ‘spatial ethnic concentration or ethnic segregation’ has both positive and the negative aspects (Erman, 2002, p.1). Viewed positively, it can be said that it provides opportunities for multiculturalism, prevents alienation and marginalization, and enables immigrants to revitalise their identities. What is criticized is that it strengthens immigrants’ integration with the dominant culture, prevents them from learning and internalizing new behaviour patterns, and furthermore, such spatial ethnic intensities lead to the labelling of those who live in that space, which leads to violent reactions (Erman, 2002, p.2).

While the ghetto can be taken as homogeneity in some way, it is mainly a result of not being socially and economically advantageous. For instance, the Turks living in Germany think that there is somewhat a “relationship of inequality” between themselves and the Germans. To overcome this inequality, they seek refuge in ‘diasporic subjects, countercultures, imaginary communities, and symbolic belongings they have created’. In a sense, they experience a different process of socialization, undergoing a process of individualization and identity formation free from the pressure of the dominant culture (Kaya, 2000, p.12).

It is not true to say that immigrants’ concentration in ghettos is entirely their own choice. For the Turkish immigrants, as in the case of Germany, the immigrants’ spatial and social lives apart from the Germans are explained by the external influences such as housing market exclusion and xenophobia as well as the need for security and belonging (Tılıç, 1996,
p.566). Immigrants find themselves unable to find homes in some German-dominated neighbourhoods and therefore have to live in lower-class places whose infrastructure and environment are of a lower status compared to other parts of the country.

**Global Migrations and New Social Structure of Europe**

Globalization, in Giddens’ terms, has brought the ‘density of social relations around the world’ to a much higher level than in previous periods. Castles and Miller, in his book *The Age of Migration* (2008), addresses the international migration movements in the modern world and how these migratory movements have been experienced in terms of different aspects of migration, putting ‘globalization’ in the first place of the new trends that attract attention in international migration.

Work life, forms of organization, business technologies, communication methods and transportation networks, which globalization has transformed as a result of capitalism, have made it easier to override barriers between countries. However, while capitalist countries advocate free circulation of information, capital and goods all over the world, they take a rather conservative stance on human mobilization and the free movement of labour. Topçuoğlu states that this corroborates Bauman’s thesis of ‘hierarchical globalization’ (2012, p.509). Politics categorizing and ostracising immigrants on the basis of their birthplaces, which are criticized by post-Marxists and liberal philosophers, are labelled as hierarchical globalization by Bauman and are summarised as ‘while the citizens of certain nations can act as they wish, the actions of others are pushed out of the boundaries of the law’.

Whether regular or irregular, global migrations are deeply affecting the demographic structure of all countries of the world. While developed countries receiving immigrants host the vast majority of immigrant stocks in the world, the majority of irregular migrants, that is,

---

the refugees are in the underdeveloped and developing countries.\textsuperscript{3} With 47 million immigrants, the United States has the most immigrants in the world, while Turkey is the country with the most refugees.

\textbf{Table-1: Countries with the Most Migrants (2015)}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Number & Country & Number of Migrants (thousand) \\
\hline
1 & United States of America & 46.627 \\
2 & Germany & 12.006 \\
3 & Russia & 11.643 \\
4 & Saudi Arabia & 10.186 \\
5 & England & 8.543 \\
6 & United Arab Emirates & 8.095 \\
7 & Canada & 7.836 \\
8 & France & 7.784 \\
9 & Australia & 6.764 \\
10 & Spain & 5.853 \\
19 & Turkey & 2.965 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}


The United States (USA) is the country with the most immigrants of the world with 46 million 627 thousand immigrants according to 2015 data. The USA is followed by Germany with 12 million immigrants, followed by Saudi Arabia with 10 million. The countries with the most immigrants after Germany are the United Kingdom, France and Spain.

There are some countries where immigrant populations are above the country’s population, even though they do not rank in the top rankings

\textsuperscript{3} According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2014, the number of displaced people in the world has reached 59.5 million. This number represents the highest number since the Second World War. Of these, 19.5 million are refugees, 1.8 million are asylum seekers and 38.2 million are internally displaced persons. Turkey, which welcomed 3 million refugees (temporarily protected people and temporary refugees), including 2.7 million Syrians in 2016, has become the most refugee-hosting country in the world. Turkey is followed by Pakistan, Lebanon and Iran. More than half of the world’s refugees (53 percent) are from Syria, Afghanistan and Somali.
of the world’s most immigrant-populated countries. For instance, 83.7 percent of the population of the United Arab Emirates (BAE) are immigrants, while the rate is 73.8 in Qatar, 60.2 in Kuwait and 54.7 in Bahrain.⁴

Table-2: Ratio of Migrants to Total Population in European Countries (2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population (.000)</th>
<th>Population of Migrants (.000)</th>
<th>Percentage of Migrants %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>43,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>8.078</td>
<td>2.335</td>
<td>28,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweeden</td>
<td>9.571</td>
<td>1.520</td>
<td>15,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>4.627</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>15,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>8.495</td>
<td>1.334</td>
<td>15,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>46.927</td>
<td>6.467</td>
<td>13,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>5.043</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>13,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>63.136</td>
<td>7.824</td>
<td>12,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>82.727</td>
<td>9.845</td>
<td>11,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>16.759</td>
<td>1.965</td>
<td>11,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>64.291</td>
<td>7.439</td>
<td>11,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>11.104</td>
<td>1.160</td>
<td>10,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5.619</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>9,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>60.990</td>
<td>5.721</td>
<td>9,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>11.128</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>8,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>10.608</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>8,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>5.426</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>5,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>74.933</td>
<td>1.865</td>
<td>2,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>489.992</td>
<td>51.877</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is seen that the mainstream of migrations in the world is in the direction of the north and west. Excluding North America, the most important destination of regular and irregular migrants targeting welfare states is the

⁴[http://www.migrationpolicy.org](http://www.migrationpolicy.org)
European continent. More than 10 percent of the European population are now immigrants. As for the proportion of immigrants in some European states, it is seen that Luxemburg has (43.3 percent), Switzerland (28.9 percent), Sweden (15.9 percent) and Netherlands (15.9 percent). In three countries hosting more than half of the migrant population in Europe, the ratio of immigrants to the total population is about 12 per cent (12.4 percent in the UK, 11.9 percent in Germany and 11.6 percent in France).

As a geography where immigration movements have always been intense due to wars, colonialism and global commercial relations throughout history, Europe has become particularly important in terms of global migration movements since the Second World War. After the immigrant countries Australia, USA and Canada, Europe, having become a central attraction for individual and mass migrations, has turned into a multicultural structure with very diverse ethnic, religious and cultural elements.

After the devastation experienced in the Second World War, European countries entered a process of reconstruction and industrialization and began to import foreigners. As it was realized that the guest workers, who were initially considered to be temporary, were permanent, the adaptation of strangers, ethnic origins, social problems and lifestyles have, from the 1980s onwards, become a problem that European states are now seeking to solve. It was accepted that immigrants, predominantly male workers seen as temporary/guest workers (guestworker / gastarbeiter) thought to return to their home country were in fact to be permanent and would be a part of European society. European countries first applied return incentives to reduce the number of immigrants, and for those who prefer not to return to their countries, they wanted to develop policies aimed at facilitating integration.

According to the studies, it cannot be said that the public perception about the immigrants is very positive in the countries densely inhabited by immigrants. Research shows that the public opinion advocates a reduction in the number of immigrants in their country.

Studies on the public perceptions of immigrants have begun to be conducted since the early 1960s. According to the report on immigration policies in the Western countries, prepared by the Hochschild and Mollenkopf for the Transatlantic Migration Council in 2008, the public opin-
ion tends to be increasingly negative for immigrants (Hochschild and Mollenkopf, 2008). According to a survey on perception of immigrants, just in Europe and North America in 2003, those who want to reduce the rate of immigration in Canada and Switzerland remain at only 50 per cent. The highest public opinion favoring a reduction in the rate of immigrants is in England (78%), Germany (73%), Netherlands (70) and Norway (70%) (Hochschild and Mollenkopf. 2008, p.5)

Tablo-3: Views on Desirable Trajectories for Immigration in Selected Western Nations, 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Foreignborn population share in 2003 (percent)</th>
<th>Increase levels of immigration “a lot”+ “a little” (percent)</th>
<th>Keep levels of immigration the same (percent)</th>
<th>Reduce levels of immigration “a lot” + “a little” (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>5.3 (2001)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For some countries, these results include noncitizen respondents, so the table probably overestimates voters’ support for more immigration.


Models of Acculturation

Relations of immigrants and the host society and policies applied by the countries can be handled in a wide range - from assimilation to multiculturalism. In this section we will examine the social structures related to the process of acculturation in countries densely populated by immigrants and the policies that we can consider as political reflections of this process.

When the issue of acculturation comes into question in the new social structure of Europe, two extreme theoretical approaches of assimilation and integration come to the forefront. In countries like the USA, Canada and Australia, which define themselves “countries of immigrants”, multiculturalism and the model of melting pot are solutions mentioned as different from these two approaches in Europe.

In the new social structure of Europe, an intense cultural process has been witnessed in the last half century. In terms of immigration policies, the fact that Europe differs from countries adopting a policy of multi-culturalism results from different migration experiences. The United States, Canada, and Australia are countries which readily accept that they are countries of immigrants, which keep receiving immigrants and in fact they are countries founded by immigrants. European countries, on the other hand, were not immigrant-receiving but immigrant-sending countries until the Second World War. In fact, countries like the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand can even be said to have been set up by migrants from Europe. After World War II, European countries became receptive of immigrants, not immigrant-sending and began to get groups of immigrants who are culturally very diverse. Those who ruled Europe, subjected to a new process of acculturation, aimed to produce policies to integrate immigrants in a way that would give ‘the slightest harm’ to their own social and cultural structures.

Acculturation (cultural encounter) refers to the cultural changes that both sides experience as a result of culturally diverse societies encountering each other in common social environments and situations. This encounter can be in different forms such as colonization, military occupation, migration and temporary residence (tourism and education).
Early studies about acculturation focus on how immigrants who have begun to live in host communities change willingly or unwillingly. Recent research has focused on how individuals interact with ethnocultural groups and what kind of changes they undergo in plural societies (Berry, 2013, p.276).

Acculturation includes both changes in the behavioral patterns of individuals and changes in the institutions of the social structure (Sirkeci et al., 2015, p.4). During the process of acculturation in communities facing immigrants, both immigrant communities and the host community can develop different strategies for acculturation. In the new cultural milieu that has emerged, both sides reach a point of social reconciliation to live together soon or later, whether in an easy or conflicting way.

Adoption by the native community, getting jobs and establishing satisfying social relations are vital needs for immigrants. This is sometimes a difficult and lengthy process that takes place after a few generations. While new generations want to embrace the values and norms of the original culture of their parents, they also take into account to what extent the new dominant culture surrounds them. As a result, they can experience tensions and conflicts (Kümbetoğlu, 1996, p.274).

Acculturation leads to an interaction between the community of immigrants and the native community, and changes in the sociocultural structures of both. Following the migration, material cultural items do not take long to change, while the change of spiritual cultural items (economic adaptation, cultural integration, satisfaction with life, depending on the native community’s recognition and acceptance of the immigrants) takes much longer. This difference brings about a ‘cultural vacuum’ or a ‘cultural lag’, which leads to social problems in Ogborn’s terms.

Intercultural strategies refer to manners of interrelationships between ethnic communities in culturally plural societies. This type of relationship concerns whether minority groups in a society can live with their own cultures, or whether they will become fully assimilated and become indistinguishable from the dominant society.
Berry states that the contact of acculturating peoples reveals four basic strategies, namely integration-assimilation and multiculturalism-melting pot, and demonstrates the relations between these strategies with the following diagram (2013, p. 1128).

Figure 1: Varieties of Intercultural Strategies in Ethnocultural Groups and in the Larger Society (Berry, 2013, p. 1128)

Issue 1: Maintenance of Heritage Culture and Identity
Issue 2: Relationships Sought Among Groups

Berry states that as a result of the contact of two different social groups, four different cultural strategies emerge intertwined, two positive and two negative. It is expected that these cultural strategies will have four different consequences such as separation, marginalization, segregation and exclusion. According to Berry, the integration policy of the host community may lead to separation, and assimilation policies may lead to marginalization. Similarly, the policy of multiculturalism can lead to segregation and the policies of the melting pot can lead to exclusion (Berry, 2013, p. 1128). As can be understood from the figure above, the policy of acculturation is a process that needs to be built on a very delicate balance and needs to be managed very carefully.
Integration

As a result of acculturation, communities from two different cultural groups living in the same country have an intercultural feature. Both community groups want to live together and protect their own culture at the same time. This can only be achieved through social and cultural integration (Şahin, 2010, p.105). While the concept of ‘adaptation’ which means ‘adapting the immigrants to the community in which they live’ was used in previous studies about the integration of the immigrants with the community they live in, the concept being used today is “integration” which involves integrating immigrants with the host society as well as protecting the immigrants’ own ethnic cultures.

According to Esser (2000, pp. 56-61) who conducts studies on social integration of immigrants living in Germany and introduces the theory of social integration in this respect, with each new generation, the level of adoption of German culture increases and the level of maintaining Turkish culture declines and assimilation is imminent (Şahin, 2010, p.105). While the first generations of migrants are more sensitive to their ethnic cultures, the younger generations born and raised in the new country can more easily adopt the cultures of the host community and complete the process of social integration.

Esser’s approach, which deals with integration as system integration and social integration, can be sociologically interpreted as material (system) and spiritual (social) cultural change. According to Esser, if immigrants work and pay taxes, contribute to economy and act in accordance with the laws, their integration into the new system has been done. However, social integration involves immigrants’ integration with the new community not only in terms of economic or legal responsibilities but also in terms of four different dimensions of acculturation, socio-economic-political position, interaction and identity (Essen, 2000, pp. 58-61, 2010, pp. 106-107). In this sense, we can interpret social integration as a way of ensuring cultural change and integration, unlike the system integration that gives priority to material aspects.
Assimilation

Assimilation, which the dictionary defines as becoming similar, means changing someone to become like you. Sociologically, assimilation can be defined as the immigrant’s becoming similar to the dominant community, losing their cultural heritage and original identity as a result of the relations with the dominant society which are developed by the individual immigrant or ethnic group living outside the society in which they were born and grew up.

The existence of different cultural societies together in harmony or the desire of one to completely eradicate the other is a natural result of cultural encounters. Immigrants and host social groups getting in contact for the first time in the acculturation process resist becoming similar. However, since those who decide on and implement policies are the rulers of the host society, they can apply policies to repress the immigrant cultures and melt them away over time. Host societies that advocate keeping the homogeneity of their cultural structure as a reaction and do not want it to “deteriorate” can regard it as a right to expect immigrants to be like themselves.

First generation immigrants want to solve social problems that they meet with their own social codes and their cultural values. So their assimilation is very difficult. However, if the individual is born and raised outside the country where he / she feels he / she belongs, the cultural codes from his / her family are insufficient to cope with the problems. In this case, new generations resort to different ways. Immigrants have to either reinterpret their cultural values and make them compatible with those of the community they live in or adopt the cultural values of the host community. While the first generation immigrants may be reluctant and reactive to adopt host cultural values, with the systematic immigration policies of the host country over time, especially after the second generation, the cultural values of immigrants can be completely melted away in the dominant culture’s values, meaning that the process of assimilation can be completed.

The assimilationist approaches assume that the identities of the immigrant community and the host community, separated from each other by sharp lines in their first encounter, will attain complete harmony over
time under the common identity of ‘nation state’. Immigrant individuals, subject to the same legal rules, who live within the structure of the nation state and have equal opportunity in the structure of the secular state will in time melt in that nation state’s melting pot, lose their old identity and gradually become new identities as a part of the common identity of the nation state. Assimilationist viewers argue that the United States of America (USA) is an example of the success of this approach and that the United States, a country of immigrants, steadily gets immigrants and melts different ethnic origins in one pot and implements a successful policy of integration. Outweighing ethnic or group identity, individuality, which is a central element in American culture, facilitates immigrants’ adaptation after a period of adaptation (Kaya, 2008, p.157).

**Multiculturalism**

The ideology of globalization, which arose in the early 1980s and has been influential since the early 1990s, offers multiculturalism, democracy, prevention of discrimination, protection of minorities and ethnocentric human rights as values rising all over the world starting from the West. Especially since 1990s, these issues have become central to international and domestic politics, and have also been used as instruments of various political aims.

Multiculturalism, presented as an ideal form of ‘cohabitation’, means that every ethnic, religious, cultural group that constitutes a society can exist in harmony in that society by protecting its own values. ‘Multiculturalism, which suggests ‘unity in diversities’, both involves treating cultures equally, not creating a hierarchy between cultures, and aims to allow for a considerable existence for pluralism (Çötok ve Taşdelen, 2013, p.8). Philosophically, multiculturalism involves issues ranging from racist ideas to cultural views, sociologically from being foreign or immigrant to native, and culturally depends on the theory of the failure of European monocultures (Sözen, 2004, p.89).

When it comes to multiculturalism, countries that first come to mind are the United States Canada and Australia. Even though it is difficult to say that all ethnic groups in these countries are living in perfect harmony,
fact that some groups ‘want to integrate by protecting group identity’ has made it necessary to consider different alternatives called multiculturalism or mosaic model. The best example for this model is the Quebec French living in Canada with group identities. The mosaic model based on the thesis that integration can exist without assimilation suggests a harmony that allows the difference of group identity to be maintained rather than a meltdown or assimilation (Kaya, 2008, p.157-158).

Kymlica states that multiculturalism is still valid and an ideal model of integration and coexistence for Western democracies but that there are 5 basic factors that will prevent (or facilitate) this process (2012, p.298-299):

1. *Decuritization of Ethnic Relations (Decreasing Security Measures):* If the state perceives immigrants as a security threat, support for multiculturalism (such as Muslims after 9/11) will drop and the space for minorities to even voice multicultural claims will diminish.

2. **Human Rights:** Multicultural support is based on the assumption that there is a common commitment to human rights across ethnic and religious lines. Much of the backlash against multiculturalism stems from anxieties about Muslim immigrants in particular and perception of them as reluctant to embrace liberal-democratic norms.

3. **Border Control:** Multiculturalism becomes even more controversial in countries where citizens fear they lack control over their borders, for example, when countries are faced with a large number (or unexpected surges) of unauthorised immigrants or asylum seekers.

4. **Diversity of Immigrant Groups:** Multiculturalism works best when immigrants come from many source countries, not overwhelmingly from just one.

5. **Economic Contributions:** Support for multiculturalism depends on the perception that immigrants are holding up their end of the bargain and that they are making good-faith efforts to contribute to the society – particularly economically.
Table-2: Multiculturalism Policy Scores for Some Countries (1980-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>7,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>5,5</td>
<td>5,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The USA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>2,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall Average</td>
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<td>2,71</td>
<td>3,48</td>
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Source: Kymlicka, 2012, s.327

According to the table, along with Australia, Canada and New Zealand; of European countries, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, and the United Kingdom seem to have scored over 4. With the average score being 3.1 out of 8, it is difficult to say that in Europe, where immigrants make up more than 10% of the population, there is a relatively large increase in multicultural policies from 1980 to 2010.
According to Kymlicka, from the 1970s to the mid-1990s while there was a tendency to implement a multicultural policy aimed at promoting minority rights across European states, endorsed both by some states and international organizations, since the mid-1990s, there has been a backlash and a return to ideas of nation state, single nation, unitary citizenship, even assimilation politics (2012, p.300). As far as multiculturalism is concerned, the main reason for this retreat is that the members of the host society fear that multiculturalism threatens their way of life. Immigrants, who were formerly considered as the source of socio-economic problems, have begun to be associated with problems such as crime and terror over time. The September 11 attacks have made the anti-immigrant policies of European countries more visible. Since this attack, especially in the media, a link between Muslims and terrorism, then between immigration and crime, has been established, and discriminatory and racist discourses which associate Muslim immigrants with terrorist events have become widespread.

Negative approaches to immigrants are not entirely economical. The concept of ‘security’ was redefined in Europe after the Cold War. According to this new approach, a ‘new’ understanding of security that is human-centred has emerged that incorporates many aspects such as environment, poverty and population movements, and in fact links immigration indissolubly with the security system. Particularly irregular migrations have been seen by European states as a challenge to nation-state boundaries, government system, citizenship and social welfare regimes. First, immigrants are presented as ‘foreigners’ to native citizens, and then immigrants are subcategorised as legal, illegal, irregular, undocumented, etc. and alienated (Öner, 2012, p. 14). Irregular migrants are viewed as potential criminals due to the escalation of global terrorist incidents, and especially Muslim immigrants become the main objects of the European process of securitization. This leads to the rise of anti-immigrant movements and urges politicians to adopt more assimilationist politics rather than multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism can be viewed as the nation state’s policy of identity against the ethnic communities. Ethnic politics cannot develop beyond the authority of the dominant politics of the host society. The official language, calendar, holiday days in a country are determined by the rulers of host community; issues other than these such as the ethnic language
and important days can only be handled unofficially (Sözen, 2004: 132). According to Sözen, ideologies of ethnic groups that do not make sense in daily life have no chance of succeeding. If a country really claims to apply multicultural politics, it should undertake to transfer the daily life elements of ethnic cultures through education and mass media (Sözen, 2004: 136). Otherwise, the cultural values of immigrants will melt away within the host culture, that is, assimilation in the long run will be inevitable.

Conclusion

Immigration means that everything that has been experienced so far suddenly vanishes out of the immigrant’s life. In particular, external migration refers to facing a new environment, new people, new social relations, a new culture, a new language, and sometimes a new religion for the immigrant individual. A variety of causes, such as the disruption of one’s usual lifestyle, the difficulty of meeting the needs for nutrition and housing, dangerous and infectious diseases, the loss of a family member on the challenging migration route, can lead to major emotional breakdowns and traumas in migrating children and adolescents. If immigration takes place illegally and one has an unlawful residence in the country they migrated to, the constant fear of apprehension and deportation keeps the psychological pressure ever-disturbing and causes the mental discomfort to continue (James, 1997, p.98)

Integrating with the society to which they are alien as part of the process of becoming a part of that society, that is integration, is the greatest of the problems that immigrants must solve. It is important that all socialization instruments (family, peer, educational institutions, media) contribute to the transition process and do not contradict each other so that the process of integration can be easily experienced both for immigrants and for the host society. The new way of life that starts after the immigration process forces all the individuals that immigrated to re-socialize like a little child who has just begun to know about life. In this process, integration into the system is achieved in a very short time, while cultural integration takes longer.
Immigrants, the host society and the source country managers each have distinct responsibilities for cultural integration of immigrants. It is necessary for immigrants to make efforts for integration, especially by respecting the laws and cultural values of the country they have joined, and countries accepting immigrants are expected to adopt non-discriminatory, fair, tolerant, transparent and reassuring policies that respect different identities and cultural values.

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CULTURAL INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS

lere Kongresi, Sayfa: 1-17. Ankara: İmaj Yayıncılık


SYRIAN REFUGEE WOMEN: MIGRATION TRAUMA AND INTEGRATION

Summary

The main objective of this article is to identify the current problems of the Syrian women taking refuge in Turkey and placed under protection under the legal temporary protection status, and to compile the work carried out and required especially with regard to their social integration processes. Another purpose of this article is to identify the basic needs of the Syrian women in the social and economic field following immigration. With a social gender approach the study reads the problems and needs of the immigrating Syrian women over the obstacles brought about by being a woman, presenting an assessment regarding social adaptation processes.

Keywords: Syrian War, Syrian Woman Asylum Seekers, Immigration, Immigration and Women, Temporary Protection Status, Refugee.

1. General Introduction

Defined as an individual or mass act of translocation, “immigration” is as old has history itself, and has been one of the most important factors affecting the social, economic, cultural and spatial development process. (Şahin, 2001, p.59) Changing the lifestyle brings with it a change in the social order and policies, starting with the individual. Forced immigration, where asylum is sought in another country with mass immigration movements in humanitarian crises, accompanies the effort to become included in a different social structure without an adaptation process under extraordinary circumstances forcing people to flee violence and to abandon their lifestyles. (Castles and Miller, 2008 p.12) While the migration process is traumatic for all individuals, when the social and psychological prob-
lems arising from social gender injustice are added in the case of women, it leaves deeper scars and makes women's lives even more difficult. (Berger, 2004). Women's invisibility in the subject of immigration, and the fact that their sufferings are greater compared to men, is very important for considering social gender equality and justice during this process.

Far beyond being a process related to the immigrant, the phenomenon of social inclusion is connected to specialised support programs addressing immigrants due to the receiving country’s social approach, current policies and especially victimisation due to war. However, women’s gender-based roles within the community, their experiences and the perception of their identity within the cultural structure affect the inclusion process. (Parrado and Flippen, 2005). For this reason, during the immigration process women must be delivered of their position of “being dependent on men”, their experience must be considered within its specific dynamics, and the policies to be developed must be implemented based on this approach.

As a result of the war that started in Syria after 15 March 2011 millions of Syrians left their countries, giving rise to the greatest humanitarian crisis experienced during the last century. In the changing world order, the responsibility for the victimisation caused by this humanitarian crisis and for the millions of people forced to abandon their country must be shouldered not only by neighbouring countries but also all developed countries. However, the events of the recent years indicated that especially EU members states and the USA failed to handle the issue on a human rights basis, rather following a domination and interest policy regarding the region. As a result of the mass migration movements caused by the increasing size of the Syrian crisis, Turkey, which shares a 911 km border with Syria, opened its doors to the Syrian victims of the war, admitting around 3 million refugees into our country. According to UN data of 2014, with the Syrian crisis the total number of people around the world under asylum-seeker and refugee status reached 46.3 million. The number of Syrians immigrating to, and seeking asylum in, other countries as a result of the Syrian crisis constitutes the largest refugee population within the jurisdiction of the United Nations (UN). (UNHCR, 2014, p. 3). According to data from the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees, with its “Open Door Policy” Turkey became the country that admitted the largest number of Syrian asylum-seekers among Syria’s neighbours. As the foremost country to shoulder the responsibility in one of the world’s greatest humanitarian crises of the last century, Turkey became, and will continue to be, the hope of millions of suffering Syrians with its approach of defending human values and basic human rights. (UNHCR, 2015).

The Syrians taking refuge in Turkey as a result of the “Open Door Policy” initially tried to live in 22 camps established in 10 border provinces. The number of Syrian refugees living in the camp areas is 272,820. (AFAD, 2014) With the continuation of the Syrian crisis and the capacity of the camps being filled, the Syrians made efforts to maintain their living in areas outside the camps in provinces close to the border.

Most of the over 3 million Syrian refugees taking shelter in our country consists of women and children. A general observation of the profile reveals that 77% consists of women and children under 18, while %23 are men over 18 (UNHCR, 2015).

Nearly 50% of the women living in and outside the camps are in the 19-54 age range. Although this age range corresponds to a very large women population that could be productive and take place in active work life, the fact that the education level of most of the women asylum seekers is low, constitutes an important obstacle before participation in the active labour. (AFAD, 2014)

With the extension of the war, the number of Syrian asylum seekers arriving in our country with the mass influx increased along with the problems and responsibilities entailed. The assessments and research conducted establishes that it is very difficult for the war-weary asylum-seekers to return to their country before the current crisis is altogether over. The assumption is that the war in Syria would completely end in 3-5 years from an optimistic point of view, and in 8-10 years from a pessimistic point of view, after which the country will start to become a livable and safe place. Data indicates that Turkey is the country with the largest number of Syrian asylum seekers.
Since 2011, when the war started, in order to meet the basic needs of the asylum seekers, Turkey spent an invoiced amount of 10 billion Dollars on its own, and 20 billion Dollars together with local governments and NGOs, while international aid remained at only 455 million Dollars in spite of all attempts and promises. (KADEM, 2015)

In spite of all efforts made by Turkey in the international arena to address the refugees, the USA and the EU, in particular, remained indifferent to this humanitarian crisis. This situation caused Turkey to become the country that suffered the most from the political, social and economic effects of the Syrian refugee crisis. The fact that Syrian asylum seekers having to leave their country because of the war chose Turkey made it necessary to reassess many phenomena from legal processes, foreign policy processes and social policies to an integral integration policy in our country. That most of the Syrian asylum seekers are women also brought the necessity to evaluate the crisis from a social, economic and cultural point of view, taking gender-based needs and factors into consideration.

In Turkey, many efforts are made to develop integrated policies addressing the asylum seekers and solving the existing problems in a planned manner in order to prevent Turkey from experiencing a refugee crisis within its own social and political internal dynamics. The management of the refugee crisis in a planned manner requires the identification of women and children as a priority target audience, and specialising the policies and programmes accordingly.

2. The Legal Statuses and Legal Rights of Syrian Women in Our Country

“Each individual has the right to seek asylum in other countries and benefit from asylum opportunities in the face of persecution.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14, Paragraph 1.

The first issue to be handled when discussing what could be done for the Syrian women in connection with the ongoing humanitarian crisis would be to assess the rights and opportunities they have on the legal basis in our country.
Within this scope, the legal statuses and legal rights of women asylum seekers must be identified. The main one among the agreements that form the basis of the policies Turkey has developed towards refugees is the Geneva Convention of 1951. Our country’s international obligations regarding immigrants were identified within the framework of the “Geneva Convention” and the “Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees” signed in 1967.

Due to the “geographical restriction” included in the Geneva Convention, Turkey only accepts arrivals from Europe as “refugees”. According to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, a refugee is an individual who

“As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”

According to the Convention, those from outside European countries are considered “asylum-seekers”. Due to the geographical restriction in question and the restriction containing the remark “due to events occurring in Europe” brought to our national legislation, the Syrians in Turkey are not granted a “refugee” status. Within the framework of the situation in Turkey, the definition of refugee included in the Geneva Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees was reassessed in 2014 in the light of the EU Acquis processes, and was regulated through “Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection”.2 The Law introduced the definitions of refugee, conditional refugee, secondary protection and temporary protection.

Since assessing, for approval, the “conditional refugee” status of over 3 million Syrians over individual application processes creates a significant obstacle, the “Temporary Protection Regulation” was published in 2014.

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A different kind of protection was defined under the “temporary protection” status for the Syrians registered in Turkey. The grant of this status is conditional upon the people being forced to leave their countries, being unable to return to their country of departure, arriving at, or entering through, the Turkish border in mass in order to seek urgent and temporary protection. (Article 91) Through this status the Syrians were provided with facilities with respect to non-refoulement, and protection at the point of refoulement, health, travel, business establishment, residence permit and acquiring housing. However, they are not granted work, social security and citizenship rights.

According to the same law, women suffering from torture, sexual violence or other psychological and physical violence may be admitted to shelters for women. Refugees and asylum-seekers admitted to shelters have the same rights as those enjoyed by the other women at these centres. (KADEM, 2016)

3. The Problems of Syrian Women under the Temporary Protection Status within the Social Structure, and What is Required During the Social Integration Process

In this chapter the problems encountered by Syrian women under temporary protection status during and after immigration have been examined in the context of “language barrier” in particular, and psychological problems and abuse, education, economic problems and employment, social services. In order that the social integration process may be handled effectively, the problems encountered by women and existing efforts within this context must be clearly identified.

As the women’s problems arising from social gender roles are examined under main headings, deepening the research on three basic axes might prove effective. The first basic axis concerns the problems arising from the differentiation of identity between the identity of a woman in the social structure of Syria and that of a refugee woman in the social structure of Turkey. The roles acquired by women within the family structure and the community’s expectations change due to many factors under the “refugee
woman” identity. The second main axis concerns the problems women encounter in connection with immigration. The physical and moral abuse they experience during and after immigration causes a change in their lifestyle as well as bringing along a wide array of psychological traumas.

The fact that women do not speak about the abuse they suffer or consider this a natural outcome of war are among the fundamental aspects that deepens this problem. The third main axis concerns poverty and the problems they encounter while trying to participate in the economic life in order to cope with poverty. With a decrease in the level of welfare, women refugees have to start working and at this point, having a low education level, are exploited as cheap labour and are forced to work in short-term jobs. While these three main axes are interconnected, problems experienced in many different fields contribute to the disadvantaged condition of refugee women.

3.1. Language Barrier

The fact that the Syrian women suffer from a language barrier, and the difference in lifestyles due to the fact that the woman identity is perceived differently in Syria and in Turkey, bring along many problems for the Syrian women arriving in our country due to forced immigration. AFAD (2014, p. 24); AFAD (2013, pp. 25-26).

It is a well-known fact that the fundamental point in the adaptation of Syrian women to the social life in Turkey is related to the sense of belonging. The sense of belonging of a people forced to migrate to another country under war conditions would take years/generations to develop. While the sense of belonging is a very important factor in ensuring integration, its development requires the intermingling of the local people and the Syrians. At this point, important observations were made on the sense of belonging in the conclusions of the “Social Adaptation Research on Asylum Seeking Women and their Families in Gaziantep” conducted by the Women and Democracy Association targeting the refugees residing in Gaziantep. An effective communication between the Syrians under temporary protection and the local people is the foremost factor to
allow their integration with the social structure and the development of their sense of belonging. According to the research, the language barrier is an obstacle before the integration of Syrian women under temporary protection status with education and social and economic life. 38.3% of the women emphasised that the most important factor preventing integration with the local people was language.

(KADEM, 2015) The Turkish - Arabic, Arabic - Turkish language education to be provided the Syrian women and children along with the local people in order to remove the language barrier, which forms an obstacle in intercultural communication and access to services, will accelerate social integration. Also, priority must be given to education and educationalists and education materials must be developed in order to increase the efficiency and effect of language education.

### 3.2 Psychological Problems and Abuse

In addition to the psychological destruction caused by the war, approximately 35% of the Syrian women under temporary protection status, who were forced to immigrate to Turkey, lost at least 1 member of their families to the war. (AFAD, 2014) In general, in cases of forced immigration, it is always women and children who feel the psychology of war, the poverty and discrimination most acutely. (KADEM, 2015) The impassesses and difficulties suffered by women, having to seek asylum in another country, with no professional skills and amid financial difficulties and desperation in an environment of loss and pain, should not be considered to be over with their arrival in Turkey.

Women having to leave their countries do not only escape the cannons and guns of the war, but also social sexual discrimination, sexual abuse, sexual violence, domestic violence, and social and cultural prejudices related to traditions due to being women. Millions of women who lost their families, husbands and relatives to the war, escaping the physical and sexual pressure and persecution in their country to protect their children and themselves, fall victim to physical and sexual abuse during and after their escape. (KADEM, 2016) For this reason, especially refugee women and children need special protection and support as distinct from men.
The UN Higher Commissioner for Refugees report classifies the threats faced by refugee women in general. The threats faced by women before, during and after immigration have been defined as physical and sexual assault and abuse. Struggling for existence in the shadow of war, these women try to cope with hardships such as witnessing the death of their children, falling apart from their children due to bombardments or human traffickers, lack of identity, failing to make themselves understood due to their lack of foreign languages, prostitution, falling prey to the organ mafia, forced marriage, trying to live unaccompanied and alone, violence, racism, Islamophobia etc. Women escaping war face a serious of hazards in the countries in which they seek shelter. Hundreds of thousand Syrian women with a low education and income level, who need support to survive, and who have lost their families, husbands and social support mechanisms face physical, sexual and psychological abuse. Syrian women and girls are unwilling to speak about the physical and sexual harassment they experienced during the war, on their way to immigrate and after, and these traumatic experiences continue to bleed in their psychological worlds as unseen wounds, which in turn weakens these people psycho-socially vulnerable and open to new abuse. One of the most important reasons why women are not cured of their traumatic experiences is the language barrier. The traumatic psychological condition of the Syrian asylum seeker women, their cultural codes, education levels (64% are primary school or under, while 21% are illiterate) and submissive personalities render them open to abuse.

The Syrian women who lost their families, husbands and relatives to the war are those who are most subjected to abuse, harassment, and physical and sexual violence due to the sexist point of view even in their country of arrival. For this reason, many families and women consider early marriage or becoming second or third wives a solution to this problem. Unaware of their legal rights in Turkey, many of the asylum seeker women seek salvation in marriage. At this point, the increased number of divorces, polygamy, and child marriages seen in the regions where the Syrians live in large numbers also affect the traditional family life of the local people. In addition to all these, the asylum seeker women also suffer domestic violence in the hands of their husbands and family members who
were not able to overcome their war trauma and who are trying to cope with difficult living conditions. The problems experienced by the asylum seeker women and the social problems caused by them indicate that the refugee problem is not a one-sided problem, and that it is important to develop policies that would apply to both communities.

Compared to men, trying to survive in the country of refuge alone is much more difficult for women who, have lost their husbands or relatives during the war and who have inadequate education.

(UNCHR, 2014) The abuse suffered on the immigration route by women who are forced to immigrate to another country under the trauma of war causes the traumas to deepen and leads them to see violence based on gender as a commonplace. Trying to keep pace with life in another country and trying to return to their routine in fear of death after having lost the people they value, their lifestyles and their routines, unfortunately they also have to cope with surviving in a system foreign to them and to struggle against abuse due to economic difficulties and legal rights.

Strengthening Syrian woman refugees, enabling them to stand on their own feet, and developing psycho-social support mechanisms to provide women and children with psychological support along with all educational and humanitarian aid is very important.

3.3 Education

Among the greatest difficulties encountered by women in the country in which they take refuge is their inability to provide for their daily lives, which can also be ascribed to the language barrier. For women asylum seekers who try to normalise their daily lives, the skill to struggle against social judgment and problems is also directly related to the level of education. We see the importance of education in the effort of women trying to normalise their daily lives after fleeing a traumatic environment to adapt to the social integration process.

Examining the educational level of the Syrian women under temporary protection status, it is seen that 17.5% of the women living in camps
are illiterate, while 38.5% are primary school graduates. Of the women who live outside the camp and struggle against economic difficulties, 24.5% are illiterate while 31.5% are primary school graduates. Outside the camps, the ratio of qualified and university graduate women is 7.3% (AFAD, 2014, p. 24). These ratios indicate that the primary need of these women is professional education and education to strengthen their living skills, especially basic education.

Literacy and all kinds of educational support to help Syrian women improve themselves are very important to accelerate their social integration while preventing the abuse they suffer due only to being women. On the other hand, this will create great added value to enable Syrian women, who have to support their children and families, to continue their lives without requiring support.

3.4. Economic Problems and Employment

It is seen that the socio-economic difficulties experienced in the country of arrival start altering the roles in the families. The failure of men to find employment causes women and children to work. 29.4% of the Syrian women under temporary protection status earn a monthly income less than 100 Dollars. 35.8%, however, has an income between 100-200 Dollars. (AFAD, 2014, p.30) Considering that most of the Syrian women do not have a job that brings income, it becomes apparent that the women have no security to help them continue their lives apart from aid.

Obviously, asylum seekers escaping war would have many vital needs while trying to live in a new country. First of these is the need for accommodation. Accommodations such as houses and shanties that would not be considered worthy of rent, or would fetch only a small amount of rent, in many provinces under normal circumstances, are let out to asylum seekers at twice or thrice the normal rent. This causes a number of asylum seeker families to live together and the family members, including children, to work as cheap labour.

In order to prevent unregistered employment and abuse, Syrian asylum seekers were granted the right to work through the Law on Foreigners
and International Protection of 2013 and the “Regulation on Work Permits for Foreigners Granted Temporary Protection” published in January 2016. However, since the preconditions required by the law for a work permit are difficult to meet in practice, they did not bring the expected benefit.

According to the law, in order to be able to work, an asylum seeker must first obtain a Temporary Protection Status, must have been residing in the country for at least 6 months, and must have found employment. The work permit application cannot be made individually by the asylum seeker, but by the employer accepting to hire. However, the most important point here is that the employer may only employ a number up to 10% of their current workers or must document that a Turkish citizen to fill in the vacancy is not available. Since, with registered employment, employers must pay at least the minimum wage to their employees and as control is inadequate, many employers hire unregistered Syrian refugees as cheap labour. Syrian women under temporary protection status have difficulty in accessing the labour market and looking for jobs because of their low education level and their lack of professional skills, thus having to endure the labour exploitation they face.

In order to integrate the asylum seekers into economic life and to prevent abuse, asylum seekers were granted the right to registered work through the “Regulation on the Work Permits of Foreigners Granted Temporary Protection” published in January 2016. Also, all job seeking and placement services provide to Turkish citizens at İŞKURs under the Ministry of Labour and Social Security are provided to all asylum seekers under Temporary Protection Status. Nevertheless, the benefitting rate is very low due to not being aware of these services.

3.5. Social Services

Although the Syrian asylum seekers in Turkey are granted the right to benefit from education, health and social services under the Temporary Protection status granted them, it is known that they are not able to

\(^{3}\)http://www.calismaizni.gov.tr/media/1035/gkkuygulama.pdf
fully take advantage of these services due to not being aware of their rights. Especially, the level of awareness of Syrian women regarding their rights is lower compared to men. Women living in camps have more knowledge about their rights compared to women living outside camps. (AFAD, 2014)

According to research conducted by AFAD in 2014, 93.8% of the woman asylum seekers living in the camps take advantage of health services, while this ratio is only 57.9% for those living outside the camps. The health services provided to women also includes birth services. 96.2% of the women living in the camps and 97.1% of the women living outside camps give birth at hospitals.

Many refugee women living in our country were unable to get over their post-war trauma, and are in despair for not knowing what to do to survive and look after their children. Also, young women face many risk factors such as violence, failure to benefit from education opportunities, and early marriage and pregnancy.

New arrangements regarding legislation must be carried out by the concerned authorities on immigration policies. It is necessary to produce long-term policies regarding asylum-seekers, and to ensure sustainability. It is mandatory to focus on long-term solutions rather than short-term solutions. State mechanisms and the international community must be mobilised in order to provide funding on this subject. The issue of ending the war, however, obviously remains within a political process.

Current issues that may be solved from a humanitarian point of view may be solved through strengthening women. For the solution of the problems arising from the persecution they suffered and the disadvantaged condition they were subject to, women must be provided with psychological and social treatment and support in order to enable them to relax and participate in social life. On this matter, non-governmental organisations led by women must develop a point of view based on human rights and women’s human rights, and must take up a position that would provide help in adapting to the present and mitigating the scars of the past and would give hope to asylum seeker families, especially with regard to the strengthening of women.
Conclusion

As the war in Syria continues, so does the immigration movement. This situation indicates that the Syrians will be staying in Turkey for a long time yet, and most of them will built their lives here and will not return. It is necessary that many sociological, political and demographic studies specific to women must be conducted in Turkey, and legislation and policies must be developed.

The immigration experience fundamentally alters women’s roles and responsibilities in the context of social gender. It also causes an increase in women’s roles within the social structure. In addition to their identities as wives, mothers and housewives, they also have to struggle to exist in work life. They also need many social support programmes and support for strengthening due to their trauma brought by war psychology and existing in a society with which they are not familiar as well as their psychological problems. Compared to men, this situation requires greater effort from women in terms of social adaptation. The fact that the problems encountered by women are more numerous compared to those of men increases the disadvantages brought by the identity of “refugee” in the receiving community.

It is seen that the Syrian woman profile in turkey has needs with a multitude of layers, such as education, employment, and social and psychological support. At this point it is very important that social behaviour patterns and judgments are overcome. Examining the cultural and historic similarities between Turkey and Syria in detail, it is seen that there are great differences in the cultural structure. This situation gives rise to the necessity that the social integration process must not only include the Syrians, particularly Syrian women under temporary protection status, but also the community itself. Diversity must be perceived as wealth in the construction of a stronger future within our country’s multicultural structure, and long-term policies and legal arrangements must be made.

The lives of Syrian women inside and outside the camps must be specifically examined. Conducting research in this field in depth would light the path to an effective solution for the protection of women and in meeting their needs.
Explaining the rights and legal statuses granted, and opportunities provided, to the women upon their entry into Turkey taking the language barrier into consideration is very important for the solution of problems such as ostracisation, cultural sensitivity, discrimination and abuse. Setting off from this point, cooperation between the state and the civilian society must be strengthened at local level, and the number of functional programmes must be increased in humanitarian aid processes. It is also important that state officials are educated in order to enable the Syrian women who are not informed on Turkey’s legal and social basis to benefit from public services, particularly social services. Their awareness must be raised in order that they may provide services without discrimination against the Syrian women and taking social gender justice into consideration. To this end, civil servants with a knowledge of the necessary language, who has reached a certain level of awareness with regard to women’s rights must be appointed to regions where there are large numbers of Syrian women. One of the most important points is that the awareness of Syrian women, as well as of civil servants, must be raised within the scope of Law No. 6284 on the Protection of the Family and Prevention of Violence Against Women.

Strengthening the abilities and knowledge of the Syrian women during their social integration may contribute a significant added value to Turkey’s development process. Within this scope, policy-makers and implementers must consider the topic of women’s migration and its effects, and the needs of women following migration as a priority area.

**Bibliography**


In Response to the Syria Crisis.


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ARE SYRIAN REFUGEES A MATTER OF SECURITY?¹

This article explores whether Syrian refugees present a security threat to Turkey. It delineates activities that could challenge Turkey’s security through an overview of other countries’ experiences. In an effort to explain how Turkey has ended up hosting more than 3 million of refugees it focuses on the developments regarding Turkish-Syrian relations just before the civil strife in Syria has begun and highlights the identity politics as the most important factor shaping Ankara’s initiatives. It argues that national security approach does not contradict with improvement of human security. On the contrary the article suggests that human security and national security issues complement each other therefore should be evaluated together. After examining the security challenges that Turkey has already confronted and may confront in the future, together with the steps taken so far to protect her security, the article concludes by highlighting the long-term strategies to tackle with the uncertainties related to the future of Syria.

Refugees as Involuntary Migrants

Before identifying the security challenges refugees might pose one needs to distinguish between voluntary migration and involuntary migration. While voluntary migration includes individuals leaving their homes of their own country to pursue economic opportunities, personal enrichment, or to be reunited with their families, forced migration can stem from a variety of causes, including war, internal strife and human slavery, ethnic cleansing, and deportation.²

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²Forced Migration is “a general term that refers to the movements of refugees and internally displaced people (those displaced by conflicts within their country of origin) as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects.” See, “Forced Migration Learning Modul”, The Harriet and Robert Heilbrunn Department of Population and Family Health, Columbia University, Mailman School of Public Health, at http://www.columbia.edu/itc/hs/pubhealth/modules/forcedMigration/definitions.html, (last visited 28 June 2017).
Generally speaking, refugees are not expected to engage in violent crime or terrorism since they are not perpetrators; on the contrary, they are victims of oppression and violence. Besides, as stated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, of the 18 million refugees in the world today, more than half are children. Among the adults, the vast majority are civilians who have never engaged in combat. Hence, they are mostly incapable of - or psychologically averse to - fighting. A survey of Darfuri-an refugees conducted in Chad in 2008 indicated that those who had personally experienced violence during the civil war expressed less interest in retribution and had a greater desire for peace than those who had not.

As opposed to voluntary migrants, refugees are not selected for their skills, may have suffered from war-trauma making employment difficult, and may have lost their assets prior to flight. In light of these realities refugee problem often evaluated as a matter of providing humanitarian assistance and public services by their receiving countries. Yet this approach should neither obscure identity concerns of hosting states nor security problems that could emanate by the influx of refugees.

Besides we tend to think that most refugees want and ultimately need to return home since they have an emotional attachment to their country that is not easily reproduced on another territory. In this vein repatriation often presented as the optimal solution to refugee problems. However conditions at home often do not allow this solution. Moreover after a long stay in another country repatriation may be seen as yet another form of migration rather than a return to normality that necessitates alternative solutions.3

**Borders as Delimitations of Identities**

As argued by several scholars borders are delimitations of identities. Territories do not only create boundaries that divide space and resources they also become homes to be commonly defended because the territorial definition of the group membership provides physical substance

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and symbolic meaning to notions of `us' and `them'. In other words, borders fulfill the national states’ need to maintain identities as distinct from each other by creating a clear psychological border between them.⁴

Hence crossing borders either means a redefinition of identity to integrate into receiving country/region or challenge the existing ones in case large numbers of refugees are obliged to stay for an undetermined period. Refugees may be seen as unwelcome foreigners by native population and a perception of identity “threat” to the receiving country or region may appear on the grounds that they could reverse the composition of a country’s or a region’s population. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that this type of tension and the resulting reactions are not necessarily felt in all segments of the society in the same manner. Besides, there might be differences between the approaches of the government and the rest of the society.

Many states have historically incorporated their national, ethnic, or racial criteria into their migration policies in order to build and preserve certain identities. United States, for instance, applied racial restrictions on immigrants during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Similarly, Germany’s post-World War II immigration policy favored ethnic Germans (or Aussiedler). Likewise, Australian migration policies were shaped by the “White Australia” criteria for much of the twentieth century. Another example is the automatic right to immigrate to Israel which is granted to Jews in the 1950 Law of Return.⁵

Samuel Huntington, in his book entitled “Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity” argues that waves of immigration to the


United States threaten to undermine its core identity, allegedly based on an “Anglo-Protestant” heritage.  

In the same vein, concerned with the goal of changing the demographic structure of certain areas in favor of the Muslim-Turkish population, the Turkish Parliament had issued a number of official decrees, directives and laws for regulating the immigration-settlement policies since the promulgation of the Republic in 1923. As Kirisci argues, Turkish immigration and refugee policies have been biased in favour of “Turkish descent and culture” and then only as long as such persons were of Sunni-Hanefi background. With the Turkish Settlement Law 2510 issued on June 14, 1934 it became possible for non-Turkish-speaking Muslims to immigrate to Turkey.  

Security Challenges Posed by the Flow of Refugees

Security challenges usually develop indirectly. Humanitarian assistance actually plays an essential role in mitigating potential security threats posed by the crisis. Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are mainly concerned about food, shelter, health care, and education. Thus, in the short term, meeting these basic needs will dilute the influence of militant groups and pacify anxious host states.

Refugees Overwhelming State Capacity

In the long run however large-scale refugee flows, can overwhelm a state’s capacity to provide public services and conflicts over resources especially when international aid may not be available and continuous. This may lead to precarious financial situation for refugees who would subsequently

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8 “İskan Kanunu”, no: 2510, 14/06/1934, Düstur, Tertip: 3, Cilt.15, pp. 1156-1175.
be forced to compete with native population for jobs and scarce resources; thereby, bringing them into conflict with domestic actors. When savings run out, refugees may turn in desperation to crime, prostitution, and child labor. If poor conditions continue, increasing numbers of refugees will become slum dwellers living on the fringes of society. In desperate circumstances, the refugees and IDPs have become susceptible to political manipulation by extremists. Tensions between local residents and refugees could erupt in violence, threatening political order. It is generally accepted that individual refugees and IDPs do not inherently pose a security threat, but that under such conditions, their “loyalties can be bought.”

States differ in their capacity to tackle with refugee crisis. Let alone long-term ones, short-term challenges threaten weak or failing states. Today some of the world’s poorest nations are often subjected to the problem of porous borders and bear much of the cost of maintaining refugees. Refugees across borders produce additional stress on already weak state institutions, heighten competition over scarce resources, and exacerbate ethnic and sectarian tensions.¹⁰

Influxes of refugees may either produce or deteriorate environmental and health problems too. They can place considerable stresses on natural resources assimilative, they can stretch capacity of environments by the additional wastes produced, and this can lead to an accelerated conversion of forests to agricultural land, collection of firewood, extraction of surface and ground waters, fishing and hunting into an area, leading to both environmental and social impacts can exacerbate threats to human health.¹¹ In Pakistan the Afghan refugees were accompanied by more than 3 million heads of livestock whose indiscriminate and uncontrolled grazing ruined the sparse grazing grounds and caused extensive damage to the ecology of the surrounding areas.¹²

Security Implications

For a long time the relationship between refugee crisis and national security, understudied by specialists in international relations and security studies. However today there is a growing understanding that refugees are not simply the unfortunate by products of war, but may serve as catalysts for the occurrence of conflicts, including those being between states.\(^{13}\)

One main ground for caution in welcoming refugees from conflict-torn regions that is instinctive and widely shared is that people seeking refuge across international borders threaten to destabilize the countries that take them in. Broadly speaking, refugees’ impact on security could be discussed in three sets of arguments. First set of arguments claim that refugees increase the likelihood of the receiving state to mobilize forces against the sender. It should be noted that possibility of conflict between the refugees and the receiving state is high at the onset especially if the receiving state views the refugees as a security threat. Military endeavours could precede mass refugee flows. A frequently given example of this is the case of U.S. invasion of Haiti. It has been claimed that a major reason for the U.S. invasion of Haiti that ousted the military junta and reinstated President Aristide in 1994 was to prevent further refugee migration.\(^{14}\)

In the same vein it is often maintained that NATO military operations in Kosovo was to prevent further mass migration out of the Balkans.\(^{15}\)


Secondly it is assumed that the large flows of refugees increase the likelihood that sending states will initiate disputes against the host. This usually happens when refugee sending countries launch military attacks on neighboring territories in pursuit of refugees and rebels among them. Especially porous borders in weak states can allow politically organized non-state actors’ access to territory and population groups that can be used for political mobilization, which in turn can lead to the emergence of “refugee-warrior communities.” The militarization of a refugee population occurs when combatants in the refugees’ camp form a de facto state-in-exile. In this vein refugee camps offer available environments who would like to launch an attack across the border. Refugees may be truly support the militants or they may be coerced into doing so. In this regard, the mobilization activities of the Palestine Liberation Organization in refugee camps in Lebanon in the 1970s, the role played by refugee camps in Pakistan as sites of mobilization for Taliban-related groups in the 1980s, and the emergence of the Rwandan Patriotic Front in Ugandan refugee camps in the 1990s are well known examples.

In such cases, the militarization of refugees can lead to international war and regional destabilization. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the 1990 attack against Rwanda led by Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Uganda, the 1996 Rwandan invasion of Zaire to eradicate the security threat posed by the Rwandan Hutu militants who had taken shelter among the refugees, and the influx of 10 million refugees into India, which prompted the Indian invasion of East Pakistan in 1971 are the most cited cases of refugee sending countries acting by the desire to clear refugee camps that harbored militant factions.16

Secondly militants can expand rebel networks to encompass the host state when they establish bases on external territory and form social ties with domestic opposition groups of a similar ethnicity or political orientation. As Brown argues, “If refugees flee to neigbouring countries where large numbers of their ethnic brethren live, their plight can lead their compatriots to become more radicalized. Political instability can follow”.

Therefore, at the extreme, refugee inflows may lead to violent turmoil on the host country’s territory. For instance, Jordan was involved in a bloody armed conflict in 1970 when it moved to expel Palestine Liberation Organization fighters operating within refugee camps on its soil.\textsuperscript{17}

Thirdly, ethnic or factional violence that erupts among refugees can also spread conflict to the receiving state. This often occurs when refugee groups include members of different ethnic groups or competing political parties. Such violence threatens the stability of the receiving state, which may already have only a tenuous hold on political order.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{Ankara’s Approach to Syrian Refugee Crisis}

Turkey was the first country to receive and embrace refugees when Syria’s civil war broke out. As the table 1 shows, more than three millions Syrian refugees have moved into Turkey since 2011. Yet, these numbers clearly outscore the Turkish government’s estimation thinking that the regime in Syria would fall soon in a similar manner that did happen in Libya.

In fact, the anticipated duration of stay for Syrians was ranging from one to three weeks. Today, as noted above, the number is over three millions of people.


As it has already been mentioned the possibility of conflict between the receiving state and refugees is high on the onset if the receiving state views the refugees as a security threat. In the Turkish case however there was no such perception. On the contrary, similar to Pakistan’s experience, there was a willingness to host refugees in Turkey through “open door policy” formulated from the outset of the Syrian crisis.

The adaptation of such a policy was also a product of AKP’s identity perception which has rested on the idea of a Muslim World and viewed the Muslim nations in Turkey’s neighborhood a part of the “self”. It was not all new but rather a continuation of an approach that had created an “era of honeymoon” in Turkish-Syrian relations. In order to understand the peculiarities of this approach one needs to go back to the era when the two countries relations were in a honeymoon just before the internal clashes started in Syria.

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Table 1: Number of Syrians Under Temporary Protection per Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Syrians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>14,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>224,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1,519,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2,503,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2,834,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017*</td>
<td>3,049,879</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*As of 15.06.207

The Era of Honeymoon in Turkish-Syrian Relations

Syria has long been a concern for Turkey due to its territorial claims and its support given to PKK. Nevertheless a new chapter opened in Turkish-Syrian relations after the signing of Adana Agreement on October 20, 1998 as a result of Ankara’s coercive diplomacy urging Syrian leadership to end its support to the terrorist organization and deliver its leader Abdullah Ocalan. The agreement did not only establish cooperation against the terrorist organization PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) it also laid the ground for crisis management and cooperation in multiple areas between the two countries.

However what flourished Turkish-Syrian relations was the adoption of a new vision in Turkey’s relations with the Middle East by the AKP government. In this new vision, it is believed that all Muslim nations share the same fate and the same future since “they come from the very same civilization” and “they had fought wars against the same enemies”. While it encompasses all Muslim nations it put particular emphasis on Turks and Arabs “who were obliged to get separated” because of the external actors’ interferences. Erdogan’s words express how Arabs viewed as an extension of “self”: “A Turk cannot live without an Arab. An Arab is the Turk’s left eye, his right eye.”

This vision more than in any other field manifested itself in trade and economic relations between the two countries that are perceived as the best way to obtain win-win situations and expected to pave the way to the resolution of the problems between the two countries. In 2004 Turkey and Syria signed a free trade agreement and agreed to put their differences behind them during a visit by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Most strikingly an agreement was made to open four border trade centers in Turkey, one of which will be situated in Cilvegozu,

Hatay. According to Turkish government’s interpretation Syria indirectly recognized Turkish sovereignty over the area since it had agreed to the establishment of a center there. Turkish-Syrian Regional Cooperation Program became operational in 2006, aimed at developing technical, economic, cultural and scientific cooperation. Its target was to facilitate regional development by financing projects that will create employment as a priority.

President al-Assad’s visit to Istanbul in September 16, 2009 also was a pivotal point for taking cooperation between the two countries to the strategic level, through the establishing of the Syrian-Turkish High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council which resulted in signing 51 agreements. The relations between the two countries also turned to a new phase with the decision to lift the visa requirements during the same meeting.

In the years ahead Turkish-Syrian cooperative spirit on water issue continued to evolve. On January 2010 Turkey and Syria signed a memorandum of understanding outlining their plan to construct a ‘friendship dam’ on the Orontes River which has long been planned but never been realized because of Hatay question. The dam that planned to be used by both countries in a 50-50 model expected to protect farm fields and settlements in the two countries from floods and droughts irrigating some 10,000 hectares of farms and generating nearly 16 million kilowatt-hours of energy per year.

On June 10, 2010 the foreign ministers of Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon decided to set up ‘High-Level Quartet Cooperation Council’ to strengthen the existing cooperation, develop long-term strategic partnership and solidarity, and further improve the economic integration.

The trade turnover between Turkey and Syria has grown from 730 million US dollars in 2000 to 2.5 billion US dollars in 2010. Turkey’s annual exports to Syria from 2001 to 2010 rose from 281 million US dollars to 1 billion 845 million US dollars. Turkish investments in Syria in 2010 reached 1 billion US dollars. In 2009 Turkey and Syria signed a memorandum on uniting the gas transmission systems of the two countries, allowing Syria in the future to receive natural gas from Iran or Iraq through Turkey in the amount of 0.5–1 billion cubic meters for five years, starting in 2011. Turkish-Syrian ties were strengthened at the level of ordinary citizens. Thus, in 2010, 750 thousand Syrians visited Turkey and 1 million 350 thousand Turks visited Syria. Oleksiy Volovych, “Erdogan-Assad: From friendship to Emnity”, Borysfen Intel, 7 February 2017 at http://bintel.com.ua/en/article/02-06-turkey-syria/, (last visited 28 June 2017).
in this framework the establishment of a free trade zone and a visa-free travel regime across the four countries for their nationals was also decided.23

There were a couple of major steps showing that the security threat between Turkey and Syria is no longer an issue. First one was the decision to clear of mines in the border area. The Turkish-Syrian border was first drawn in 1921, altered in 1938, and finally demarcated once again in 1956. The mines between the two countries were planted as early as 1952 as a result of the Cold War environment. They constituted a dangerous barrier between the people, especially those in the province of Hatay and its surroundings who were related to each other either by blood or family and continue to marry with each other across the borders. Though people on both sides of the border were always complaining about these mines and demanded their removal the PKK’s attacks against Turkey from across the Syrian borders justified their presence.

As a matter of fact, the idea of mine clearance was not welcomed until the security agreements between the two countries signed. Though the Turkish parliament ratified the Ottawa Agreement24 on 12th March, 2003 the decision on this issue had to wait until the 1st March 2008.25

The second step was the decision to jointly operate border gate facilities in accordance with the protocol of cooperation on procedures on the movement of passengers and goods signed in Lattakia in October 2010 during the 2nd Ministerial Meeting of the Syrian-Turkish High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council. The shared border process first started in Nusaybin a district in the province of Mardin bordering Syria which was one of the border areas that were once riddled with land mines.

All of these efforts were lost due to emergence of violent clashes between

24 On 1st March, 1999 146 countries signed the agreement in Ottowa, Canada to remove and prevent the use, storage, production and transport of anti-personnel landmines. According to it “...every country to be responsible for removing every single anti-personnel landmine planted within its territory or jurisdiction within a period not more than 10 years from the date of it signing the agreement”
25 The law for removal of these mines created heated parliamentary debates but after incorporating certain amendments of the draft it was ratified by majority vote on 4th June, 2009.
Assad government and the opposition forces. Ankara initially sought to convince Syrian regime to carry out reforms and refrain from violence against protestors. After futile mediation initiatives, Ankara began to provide safe haven to the Syrian rebels, and open its doors to civilian refugees. Since April 2011, within the framework of “temporary protection”, Turkey has admitted refugees who escaped from the bloody suppression of the protests opposing the Syrian regime and the subsequent outbreak of civil war. Ankara’s end goal was to create a safety zone in northern Syria and eventually place a large number of refugees in this area but that has not been achieved so far in spite of high expectations.26

Registration Problem

Turkey caught unprepared in several issues. First of all in order to manage this crisis in every sense, Ankara needed to know identities of these people. Most importantly since the beginning of November around 500,000 Syrians have remained unregistered, and those who have been registered is about 68%. Proper registration seen as “unnecessary” due to the expectation that “Syrians would return before long” and later it became harder to control due to the continued refugee influx, as well as an avoidance of people to be registered. However by December registration of the 90% of the refugees completed as a result of the vigorous efforts of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the technical assistance given by the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). As of 12/02/2016, 2,778,878 Syrians have been biometrically recorded and Temporary Protection Identity Documents have been issued. Among these foreigners, the number of people in 10 provinces of 26 temporary accommodation centers that are established by the Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Authority is 256,971, and there are 2,521,907 Syrian foreigners out of these accommodation centers.27

According to the official data given in table 2, among the total of Syrians (3,049,879), the number of children is 1,395,445 and the number of woman is 751,631.

Table 2: The Distribution of Age and Gender of Registered Syrians Under Temporary Protection As of 15.06.2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Man</th>
<th>Woman</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,631,626</td>
<td>1,418,253</td>
<td>3,049,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>194,196</td>
<td>180,651</td>
<td>374,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>223,514</td>
<td>210,502</td>
<td>434,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>169,884</td>
<td>156,569</td>
<td>326,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-18</td>
<td>141,229</td>
<td>118,900</td>
<td>260,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-24</td>
<td>255,298</td>
<td>195,080</td>
<td>450,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>165,855</td>
<td>129,273</td>
<td>295,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>139,492</td>
<td>109,314</td>
<td>248,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>98,619</td>
<td>81,606</td>
<td>180,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>69,268</td>
<td>64,775</td>
<td>134,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>53,508</td>
<td>49,252</td>
<td>102,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>42,809</td>
<td>41,049</td>
<td>83,858</td>
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<td>55-59</td>
<td>28,900</td>
<td>28,732</td>
<td>57,632</td>
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<td>60-64</td>
<td>20,054</td>
<td>20,487</td>
<td>40,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-69</td>
<td>13,316</td>
<td>13,704</td>
<td>27,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-74</td>
<td>7,108</td>
<td>7,878</td>
<td>14,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-79</td>
<td>4,421</td>
<td>5,277</td>
<td>9,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-84</td>
<td>2,311</td>
<td>2,920</td>
<td>5,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-89</td>
<td>1,257</td>
<td>1,550</td>
<td>2,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90+</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>1,321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Out of the registered Syrian refugees in the country, some 260,000 people are hosted in 26 camps run by the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey (AFAD), where refugees have access to
shelter, health, education food and social activities. Despite these efforts from the government, local authorities and the generosity from host communities, as shown in table 3, 90% of Syrian refugees (over 2.5 million persons), as well as many refugees from other nationalities, live outside the camps under very challenging circumstances with depleted resources. Registered refugees have, in principle, access to public services, including education and healthcare.

Table 3: Syrians Under Temporary Protection Staying in and Outside of Accommodation Centers


Social, Economic and Environmental Costs

Turkey bears the enormously high costs of Syrian refugees. Economic costs are known, social costs and security challenges would be felt if certain measures are not taken.
Similar to Pakistan’s experience Turkish government has defined Syrian refugees as Turkish people’s brothers since they are Muslims. However as Erdogan’s research revealed this attitude is not so common in Turkish society. On the contrary, the number of people underlining the cultural gap, marginalizing the Syrians or describing Syrian presence as “trouble” is extremely high. Syrians are often described as “People who escaped from tyranny/brutality” “People under hard conditions”, yet they are remarkably not perceived as “one of us”. It is often repeated that Syrians are “guests” and they are under the obligation to “conform”. Yet it is also true that local people sympathize with Syrians who are closer to their own ethnic or religious properties while excluding the others. While Arabs think highly of Arabs, Kurds of Kurds, and Turks of Turkmen, each group marginalizes every other one.28

In addition to that not all parts of Turkey influenced by the mass flow of Syrians and, even if it is so, their impact is not equally felt. Significant differences are observed among the provinces. Border cities are directly affected by rapidly changing demographics. The rapid change and constant flow of people tends to cause feelings of insecurity among the local community. As ORSAM/TESEV Report reveals, this sentiment might not be so prominent in every city, but citizens living in cities such as Kilis, Hatay, Sanlıurfa and Gaziantep suffer from a feeling of insecurity in a tangible manner. According to this report, Kilis, whose population was once mainly consisted of Turkmens, is one of the cities where this issue is quite apparent. After it had accepted a large number of refugees who are mostly Arab, the local community has got the sense that they now became the minority in their hometown.29 Hatay is where the highest level of tension is observed. The main reason is that Hatay’s population is mainly composed of the Alawites who perceives the government’s Syria policy as means of “Sunnification of the region” and consequently tend to stress the negative impacts of the flow of the Syrians. Feelings of lack of security among the Arab Alewite population created a fertile ground for provocations and conflict between the two communities.30

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28 Erdogan, op.cit., p.62
30 Ibid., p.63.
When we come to the economic cost of hosting Syrian refugees we see that Turkey is now spending in the vicinity of $590 million per month. Foreign support in meeting those costs is quite limited. The total humanitarian funding provided by the EU to Turkey since the beginning of the crisis amounts to over €664 million. Undoubtedly expenditures for Syrians are not just limited to their basic needs.

Another problem is related with the young and cheap labor coming from Syria that is preferred by small- and medium-sized Turkish enterprises that is adversely affecting the unemployment rate in Turkey, which was hovering at 12.1 per cent in November 2016. Registered unemployed in Turkey is now 3.7 million, with youth unemployment reaching a worrying 23%.

The use of Syrian workers in the industry, agriculture and small business sectors as illegal, cheap labor causes reactions. Local people especially in the border area are concerned by the possibility of “losing their jobs” or “competition induced by an increased labor supply, resulting in income decrease”. According to the survey findings of the report investigating the economic effects of Syrians on Turkey, 40% to 100% of the people who lost their jobs in border cities believe that it happened because of the Syrians. In several cases however a large part of those people became unemployed due to economic developments that are not related to Syrians.

The native population residing in the said cities also complain about the massive increase in rents and the disruptions in receiving public services, mainly healthcare. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, unlike the case in Pakistan, no environmental degradation occurred because of hosting massive amount of Syrian refugees in Turkey.

**Criminal and Terrorist Activities**

It seems impossible to claim that refugees will never commit an act of violence against their host communities, politically motivated or not. Any

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32 Orhan and Gundogar, op.cit.
33 Erdogan, op.cit., p.61.
large group of people—whether refugees or locals—will include a wide range of personalities, some more willing than others to behave violently. At the local level, Syrians are commonly identified with theft, prostitution, seizure, property damage, etc. In contrast, all of the studies indicated that crime rates are lower among Syrians than among locals. Recently the statement of Turkey’s Interior Ministry revealed that “The crime rate among Syrians was 1.32 percent between 2014 and 2017 - and the majority of those cases were mostly mutual disputes among Syrians. According to that statement despite the rising refugee population, their involvement in crime in Turkey decreased by 5 percent in the first half of 2017”.

Perhaps the most obvious link between refugees and organized crime is the human smuggling and trafficking that emerged to meet the demands of individuals seeking to cross national borders. Smuggling in the border cities had already existed; however, with the advent of the Syrian crisis, it has increased considerably and gained a human smuggling dimension. According to official resources, the average number of irregular migrants who were seized between 2005 and 2014 is about 50 thousand annually. This number reached to 146 thousand 485 in 2015 and reached to 174 thousand 466 in 2016. As Turkish Interior Minister Suleyman stated, as of 7 February, the number of illegal migrants seized in 2017 has been 10 thousand 695 while the number of migrant smugglers who have been arrested as of 2010 is 4 thousand 856.

Though they may not be quite visible today massive influx Syrian refugees within Turkey increased the country’s vulnerabilities in multiple dimensions. One of major problems faced by Turkey within this mass movement in the Middle East is the passage of foreign terrorists. In this context, 52 thousand 75 persons from 145 countries were banned from entry into Turkey, and 4 thousand and 369 persons from 99 countries were deported from the country.

36 Ibid.
ISIS Threat

The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Syria (ISIS) has become one of the factors that push Syrians to cross the border. Therefore it would be fair to view them as victims of ISIS terror rather than being agents of it. Besides initially ISIS was opposed to the flight of refugees from territories that it controls seeing it as a “major challenge to the legitimacy of its caliphate.” As a matter of fact, it has regularly call Syrian refugees to return, asserting that they will be abused and forced to convert in the host nations of the “infidels.” Apart from that ISIS seeks to create “a blacklash” against Syrian refugees in Europe or in the United States which would intensify discrimination against them that would give militant organizations more opportunities to recruit them from within the ranks of disaffected refugee populations.

Like in other situations treating refugees with hostility or to discriminate against them could easily become a “self-fulfilling prophecy” since equating refugees with terrorists is exactly what the Islamic State wants. If they perceive discrimination, radical ideologies may find a receptive audience, particularly among second- and third-generation children of refugees.37

Yet the general picture hardly guarantees the possibility of “sleeper agents” among the Syrian refugees. There is a potential for terrorist organisations to infiltrate into camps or ghettos where large number of Syrians live in quite poor conditions. Therefore Syrian refugees needed to be treated not only as a short-term humanitarian problem but as a long-term integration challenge. Radicals could coerce refugees to join their group or pay money to hire fighters to be used in their attacks. Besides they could also recruit new members if educational, and social and economic support for the refugees is not given by other sources. Undeniably, the Syrian refugees need a comprehensive and long-term package as well as immediate humanitarian aid in order to minimize the possibility of them to involve in criminal and terrorist activities.38

It should also be noted that Turkey has been used as a transit route for volunteers passing creating the first threat to Turkey. Foreign terrorist fighters who decide to go to Syria to join ISIS forces there or leave the conflict zone to go back to their countries of origin might prefer to reside in Turkey since it is a Muslim-majority country where she/he can blend relatively easily in with local society, as well as among Syrian refugees residing in Turkey.\textsuperscript{39}

More importantly Turkey has also become one of the targets of ISIS after she agreed to take a more active role in the US-led campaign against ISIS in 2015, allowing US warplanes to strike ISIS targets from its base in Incirlik and moved to tighten security along its 900km (560 mile) border with Syria.

Moreover the war against ISIS encouraged PKK and its Syrian affiliate PYD (Democratic Unity Party: Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat: PYD) in a way to establish an autonomous body with its own military, security, administrative and economic institutions through imposing a fait accompli on the ground. The possibility for tactical collaboration between PKK and ISIS has urged the Turkish forces to fight on two grounds. Table 4 includes an overview of PKK and ISIS assaults on Turkey from June 2015 to January 2017.

**Table 4: PKK and ISIS Assaults on Turkey (5 June 2015 -5 January 2017)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 January 2017: Izmir</td>
<td>2 killed, 11 injured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attackers exploded a vehicle and opened fire at people near a courthouse in the Western city of Izmir. Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK) claimed the attack</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January 2017: Istanbul</td>
<td>39 killed, 69 injured.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People were shot dead inside the exclusive Reina nightclub on the Bosphorus.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 December 2016: Istanbul</td>
<td>44 killed, 60 injured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Twin bombings near the Besiktas football area. The attack claimed by TAK.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 4 November 2016:    | Diyarbakir       | 9 killed, over 100 injured
ISIS claimed responsibility |
| 6 October 2016:     | Hakkari          | 16 dead, 27 injured
A car bomb exploded near a military post in the eastern city of Hakkari. According to state sources the attack was carried out by PKK |
| 21 August 2016:     | Gaziantep        | 50 dead, at least 90 injured
A suspected suicide bomber detonated explosives at a wedding party in southeastern city of Gaziantep. Officials blame the PKK for the blast. |
| 18 August 2016:     | Elazig & Van     | 14 dead, 300 injured
Suspected Kurdish fighters have carried out a wave of deadly bombings in Turkish cities of Elazig and Van, targeting security forces. |
| 28 June 2016:       | Istanbul, Ataturk Airport | 41 dead, 239 injured
Attackers reportedly tried to penetrate the “control point” coming into the airport. Security personnel then opened fire to neutralize the attackers who then detonated their explosives. No immediate claim for the attack. |
| 13 June 2016:       | Ovacik, Tunceli  | 9 injured
The explosion happened near a housing block for civil servants. Left wing HBDH (Halkların Birleşik Devrim Hareketi: Peoples’ United Revolutionary Movement) claimed responsibility. |
| 8 June: Midyat, Mardin | 6 dead, 20 injured
A car bomb exploded near a police station in a region where government forces were battling Kurdish terrorists. PKK claimed responsibility. |
| 7 June 2016: Beyazit, Istanbul | 11 dead, 36 injured
Explosion happened near a metro station. TAK claimed responsibility |
| 27 April 2016:      | Bursa            | 13 injured
A female suicide bomber is believed to have targeted worshippers at the city’s Grand Mosque |
| 19 May 2016: Gaziantep | A suspected ISIS member blew himself up during a police raid |
| 10 May 2016: Baglar, Diyarbakir | 3 died, 45 injured
An armoured police van carrying inmates and policemen was struck in the center of the city. PKK claimed responsibility |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 May 2016: Gaziantep</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 dead, 22 injured</td>
<td>A vehicle blew up near the city’s main police station. Assailants also fired automatic weapons. No claim of responsibility. Blamed on ISIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 March 2016: Ankara</td>
<td></td>
<td>37 dead, 70 injured</td>
<td>The second explosion in the capital within a week set several cars on fire, created a shower of debris and heard miles away. TAK claimed responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March 2016: Istiklal Street, Istanbul</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 dead, 6 injured</td>
<td>Suicide bomber hit a shopping district where a lot of pedestrians were milling around. No claim of responsibility. Blamed on ISIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March 2016: Diyarbakir</td>
<td></td>
<td>7 dead, 27 injured</td>
<td>The explosion hit a police vehicle near a busy bus terminal. PKK claimed responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 February 2016: Ankara</td>
<td></td>
<td>28 dead, 60 injured</td>
<td>A car bomb exploded during rush-hour traffic in the heart of the Turkish capital, close to parliament and the military headquarters. The vehicle exploded as military buses were passing by.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 January 2016: Diyarbakir</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 dead, 39 injured</td>
<td>A bomb was detonated at the entrance of the Çinar district police complex, with attackers then reportedly firing rockets at the police HQ. A baby was killed in the attack. No group claimed responsibility, but officials blamed the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 January 2016: Istanbul, Sultanahmet</td>
<td></td>
<td>12 dead, 14 injured</td>
<td>A suicide bomber strolled up to a group of foreign tourists in the historic Sultanahmet Square in broad daylight and blew himself up. The bomber was later identified as an Islamic State fighter, Nabil Fadli.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 December 2015: Istanbul, Sabiha Gökçen Airport</td>
<td></td>
<td>One dead, one injured</td>
<td>Two cleaning workers were injured – one fatally – in the blast in the early hours of the morning as the Turkish military continued its operations against militant group, the PKK. Kurdistan Freedom Falcons, an offshoot of the PKK, claimed responsibility for the attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 December 2015: Istanbul</td>
<td></td>
<td>Five injured</td>
<td>A pipe bomb exploded on an overpass near a metro station at the height of the evening rush hour. No one claimed responsibility for the attack.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10 October 2015: Ankara

102 dead, 400 injured
Twin explosions outside the city’s main train station ripped through a group of people who had gathered to protest against violence between the authorities and the PKK. One of the two bombers was identified as Yunus Emre Alagoz, whose brother had carried out the Suruc bombing. He is suspected of being a member of ISIS.

20 July 2015: Suruc

33 dead, 104 injured
A suicide bomber targeted a group of students who had gathered in Suruc to discuss rebuilding the Syrian border town of Kobani, which had been under siege by Isis. The attack was carried out by Seyh Abdulrahman Alagöz, recruited by Isis six months earlier.

5 June 2015: Diyarbakir

Four dead, 400 injured
Two bombs exploded at a pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic party rally as the chairman was about to deliver his speech. It is not known who was responsible for the attack.


ISIS threat to Turkey could be evaluated under three headings: 1) ISIS the suicide bombings against selected targets in Turkish territory, 2) the rocket attacks on Turkish soil as a response to Turkey’s artillery fire conducted as part of the anti-ISIS coalition attacks in Syria, 3) the attacks against the Bashiqa Camp, where the Turkish military trains local forces against ISIS in Iraq.\(^\text{40}\)

The attacks carried out by ISIS in Turkey indicate that its threat to Turkey is transforming from a sole criminal issue to a long-term strategic concern. However only in one instance (Sultanahmet bombing on 12 January 2016) the ethnic origin of the suspect was the Syrian. According to security sources, the suicide bomber 28-year-old Nabil Fadli who

\(^{40}\)Ibid., p.36.
killed 10 tourists by blowing himself up in Istanbul’s touristic Sultanahmet Square. Fadli was identified as a Syrian citizen born in Saudi Arabia and applied for asylum at the Zeytinburnu Migration Management Directorate in the Istanbul district on Jan. 5. Fadli was provided a biometric identity after his fingerprints and photo were taken by the migration center. In his interview, he told migration officials that he fled the war in Syria and wanted to enter Europe. Fadli said he would stay in an apartment in the Zeytinburnu district of Istanbul, but he later moved to a hotel in Kadirga. The man arrived at the center alongside four other men and remained at his declared address for a few days. The office gave identity cards to the four other men as well. Fadli was among the Syrians migrants who were given “temporary protection” during their stay in Turkey. Though this episode shows us the possibility of Syrian refugees to be recruited by ISIS, it should also alert us about the potential of provocations that would lead to the securitization of Syrian refugees.

Measures Taken to Cope with the Security Challenges

The measures taken by the Turkish government at the domestic level mainly comprises four different phases. First, in order to prevent foreign terrorist fighters’ passage through Turkey, the country established a no-entry list of potential people at the beginning of 2014 that was accelerated by the UNSCR. The second instrument is the Risk Analysis Groups that have been established by Turkish security units to identify potential foreign terrorist fighters at borders, ports, and airports. As of

42 Copenhagen School theorists argue that “in international relations something becomes a security issue when it is presented as posing an existential threat to some object – a threat that needs to be dealt with immediately and with extraordinary measures.” Refugee securitization links refugees to the idea of a threat. See: Ann Hammerstadt, “The Securitization of Forced Migration” in Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long, and Nando Sigona eds., The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) pp. 265-277.
February 2016, they had interviewed 5,734 individuals and described 1,748 of them as inadmissible.\textsuperscript{44}

Thirdly, Turkey has been implementing strict enforcement measures since March 2015 to seal off its border with Syria and stop smuggling, illegal migration and terrorist attacks. Above all these measures, Turkey also decided to fortify the border through constructing a wall. On 13 August 2015, Turkey began building a three-metre-high wall, reinforced with four-metre ditches, to physically secure its 900-kilometre border with Syria. Additionally, on 8 January 2016, Turkey started implementing visa restrictions for Syrians entering the country by air or by sea that is a dramatic shift in Turkey’s previous open-door policy. Entering Turkey illegally has been the only way for the majority of Syrians crossing over since 9 March 2015, when Turkish authorities closed the last two border crossings with Syria. Although these border gates were allegedly shut temporarily as a security precaution, in reality they remained so making it impossible for Syrians to cross legally. Notwithstanding all the challenges and risks to enter Turkey illegally, especially residents of northern Syria have continued to come through smuggling routes.\textsuperscript{45}

Despite these measures, it was difficult to stop terrorist attacks on Turkey’s soil. ISIS has been able to carry out multiple suicide attacks in different Turkish cities. Some of those attacks targeted Turkish citizens such as the attack on a wedding celebration in Turkey’s southeastern province of Gaziantep, a major city lying only 60km north of the Syrian border near the Syria border, which killed at least 54 people. Gaziantep was believed to become a hub for Syrians fleeing the civil war in their country. As well as hosting refugees and opposition activists, there have long been fears that the city would become home to a significant presence of sympathizers of the ISIS. While some of the attacks targeted Turkish citizens other attacks targeted Syrian activists and opposition figures living in Turkey.

\textsuperscript{44} "Turkiye’nin Yabanci Savascilarla Mucadelesi”, a public announcement by the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 2016, at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye泯in-yabanci-terorist-savascilarla-mucadelesi.tr.mfa (last visited on 28 June 2017).
At first sight Syrian refugees’ involvement to terrorist attacks highlighted the need for a risk management approach to national security. However a risk management approach to national security that seeks to minimize terrorist atrocities is not sufficient unless certain precautions are taken to solve more complex problems that could be faced in the long run.

**Repatriation versus Citizenship**

Repatriation is often considered to be the most durable solution to refugee problems. Yet it is applicable if the situation improves in the home country. Normally refugees return as soon as circumstances permit, for example when a conflict has ended or at least a degree of stability has been restored and basic infrastructure has been built. As in the case of Afghan refugees in Pakistan when the issue prolonged, a permanent return is not always easy. However, the changing nature of the problem may put pressure on the receiving country.

The repatriation of Afghan refugees gathered momentum after the fall of the Taliban in 2001. While many returned voluntarily, repatriation slowed considerably since 2007, as the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan has prompted many refugees to reconsider their plans to return home. During the 1980’s, refugee camps in Pakistan provided significant support for the struggle against the forces of the Soviet Union and the Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan. From the early days of the Soviet invasion, the ethnic composition of the refugee population overwhelmingly Pashtun and its concentration in the areas where their ethnic affiliates live carried the risk of a possible renewal of Pashtun nationalism within Pakistan itself. Even so Pakistan sought to weaken the position of Pashtun “nationalist” groups within the Afghan resistance by supporting radical religious groups. Nonetheless when the Taliban was denied the victory that was expected in Afghanistan, Pakistan has faced with the revival of Pashunistan issue in a different form.46

Anti-Afghan sentiment increased in Pakistan following an attack on an army-run school in Peshawar by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which is believed to operate from bases in Afghanistan, in December 2014.

The government launched a crackdown on refugees, constricting the rules for their continued stay in Pakistan. Afghan refugees’ homes were raided and they were denied jobs and homes. In December 2015, the government issued an ultimatum forcing, over half a million Afghan refugees during the period between July and mid-December 2016 to leave Pakistan for Afghanistan where the conflict and economic crisis have left the government struggling to maintain basic living standards.\(^\text{47}\)

In the similar vein, the long-term solution to Syrian refugee problem requires the restoration of peace and political stability in the country that would eventually facilitate a peaceful return home. However until today the situation has not improved and large-scale return does not seem to be a likely option in the near future. Though there are no clear signs of emergence of serious violent encounters between Syrian refugees and Turkish society even in case such threats emerge, repatriation would be very complicated issue.

Above all, the future of Syria still remains unknown and rise of new political entities would not be an unanticipated development. Thus in order to reply the question of “how do they return?” one needs to know “where do they go?” and “where now they belong?” The answer may not be an easy one since the territory that they used to live may have occupied by another group of people aspiring to maintain its sovereignty in that area.

There is ongoing military struggle between various parties in Syria as of July 2017. It should be noted that while PYD seems to take over 38 thousand square kilometers of Syrian territory it controls % 65 of Turkish-Syrian border as of April 2017.

It is obvious that any discussion related to future of Syria should also take into consideration how Syrian refugees’ would be affected by new

political realities on the ground that has a lot to do with the ongoing struggle to redefine boundaries.

While repatriation of Syrian refugees does not seem to be a possible solution granting full citizenship to Syrians could improve their living conditions and legal rights hence reduce their level of frustration and delimit the potential of security threats. In January Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has announced that some Syrian and Iraqi refugees who pass a screening process will be granted Turkish citizenship. After security checks carried out to determine who among the millions could be eligible for citizenship, it was decided that Turkish citizenship will be granted to a total of 7,000 Syrians. The initial number of Syrians who would become Turkish citizens was determined to be 10,000 and the total number would gradually reach 30,000. In the last seven years some 12,000 Syrians were granted citizenship and the number is 409 for the first six months of this year.48

It should also be noted that the issue is still highly controversial among Turkish citizens and political parties. In order to ensure Syrian refugees’ peaceful integration to Turkish society efforts to build a common vision that is largely shared by all parties and different segments of the population is urgently needed.

**Concluding Remarks**

Domestic strife and civil wars often generate mass refugee flows to neighboring countries. Most of the researches conducted on international migration seem to adapt a human security approach to address the problems and find out their possible solutions. These studies that urge for more attention to sustainable development as the functional strategy to ensure human security often underrate national security concerns. Despite clear humanitarian dimensions, refugee crises are not merely humanitarian disasters but have real security implications for states.

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In Turkish case there was no reaction from Ankara to the flow of Syrian refugees since they have considered as the brothers of Turkish people. On the other hand no matter how Ankara sympathizes with the forces of opposition fighting against Assad administration Damascus was not in a position to disturb Turkey and/or harm Turkish interests and until today possibility of direct conflict between Syria and Turkey remains a distant possibility. It should also be underlined that in spite of the fact that things got complicated with the unexpected amount of people coming, Turkish state until now seems to be capable of managing the crisis and trying to fulfill the needs of refugees and tackle problems faced.

Still it is difficult to assume that things will remain as they are. Though small number of events could not change the general picture they illustrate vulnerabilities. To conclude Turkey’s Syrian refugee crisis demonstrates that there is a need to reconcile human security approach with national security interests in order to reach efficient solutions for the long-term solution of the problem. Refugees are not a matter of security per se but they can be a part of security problems under certain conditions.

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SCHOOL SOCIAL WORK TOWARD SYRIAN REFUGEE CHILDREN

Introduction

The refugees migrating to Turkey due to the civil war in Syria have experienced many changes since the beginning of this challenging process, and have tried to adapt to these changing circumstances. However, migration to another country has brought along many needs and problems for the Syrian refugees. The migrants have encountered various needs and problems during the migration process, both individually and as family. In this context, children as members of families, experience problems in adapting to the country of migration, as much as adults.

Arriving in a new country after the difficult conditions in Syria and their traumatic experiences therein brings with it a considerably difficult period, especially for children of school age. Children of school age make a huge effort to adapt to both the social life and the new education system of the country in which they arrive. It is very important that Syrian refugee children get through this difficult process in a healthy way and adapt to the new social life and schools in Turkey. Therefore, school social work addressing Syrian refugee children is very important in supporting them psycho-socially and economically. This section dwells on work that may be carried out under the scope of school social work to address the needs and problems of Syrian refugee children.

Syrian Refugees in Turkey and Their Children

Asylum seekers have started to enter Turkey in April 2011. In June 2011, they were placed in camps established in the border provinces of Hatay, Gaziantep, Kilis and Şanlıurfa under the “temporary protection” status.

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With an increase in the number of asylum seekers, tent- and container-cities were formed in the provinces of Kahramanmaraş, Adıyaman, Osmaniye, Adana, Mardin and Malatya. Part of the asylum seekers were thus placed in these areas (SİGSİP, 2013: 6).

The Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) was identified as the body responsible for the coordination of asylum seekers from Syria. Under AFAD’s coordination, the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Health, National Education, Agriculture and Rural Affairs, Transport and Finance, the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the Governorate of Hatay, the Office of Religious Affairs, the Undersecretariat of Customs and the Turkish Red Crescent carry out joint efforts. Also, the Prime Ministry appointed a governor responsible for coordination on 21 September 2012 (SİGSİP, 2013: 6)

Considering the age group characteristics and ratios of the population arriving from Syria in Turkey, it will be seen that the ratio of the young population is high.

“The most noteworthy demographic characteristic of the Syrians in Turkey is the fact that they consist of a young population. The ratio of Syrians under 18 is around 55%, which corresponds to 1.5 million youths and children. According to UN data, within this extraordinary number, the ratio of the age group of 0-4 years of age is 20%. In other words, 550 thousands of the Syrians in Turkey are under 4 years of age. Considering the fact that the average stay of the Syrians in Turkey within the last five years has been 3 years, it can be said that at least 200 thousand out of 549 thousand children were born in Turkey. Among these children, the ratio of those arriving with their families is high. Children, women, elderly and handicapped migrants form the section that require special social protection.” (Esen, 2016: 13-14).

According to UNICEF data of 3 November 2015, 1,182,261 of the Syrians migrating to Turkey are children. In other words, Around 54% of the Syrians in Turkey are between the ages 0-18. Among these, the number of children of school age is 746 thousand. This data shows that there are hundreds of thousands of Syrian children who have left their education
incomplete in their own country and who need to continue their education (UNICEF, 2015, quoted by Emin, 2016: 9).

As understood from these data, children within the age group of 0-18 years constitute the largest group among all of the Syrians in Turkey. According to UNICEF’s 2015 data, 746,000 of the Syrian children are of school age. This, in turn, clearly indicates that children, especially children of school age, must be considered carefully in the context of policies and services developed in connection with the Syrians in Turkey.

Needs and Problems of Syrian Refugee Children

Like adults, refugee children from Syria come from an environment of war, having suffered the resulting difficult conditions. After the traumatic experiences brought about by the war conditions, the children come across many new circumstances in the countries to which they migrate, or in Turkey, which is one of these countries. They struggle to adapt to circumstances that are very different from their pre-war routine lives in their own country, as well as a new physical, social and cultural environment.

Due to the war in Syria, the children are forced to come across many extraordinary experiences. Living in an environment of war, the consequent migration process, life in the country of migration, and this rapid change experienced by the children, to which they need to adapt, is not at all easy.

The extraordinary experiences encountered by the children during and after the war may be gathered under 3 headings:

1. Extraordinary experiences encountered by children in an environment of war,
2. Extraordinary experiences encountered by children during the process of migration due to war,
3. Extraordinary experiences encountered by children after the war, in the countries to which they migrate,

“In an environment of war, during migration and in the country of migration, refugee children come across many experiences that are different
from what their peers would usually experience. The children’s lives and experiences during and after the war may be listed as follows:

1. **Witnessing/Experiencing Extraordinary Conditions:**

Children living in such an environment, whether they were born before or during the war, are forced to witness an extraordinary life, which is much different from that of children living in a country where there is no war, who live a normal daily life.

2. **Living Under Adverse Physical Conditions:**

They are forced to live under adverse physical conditions as a result of their houses or their surroundings being bombarded, their houses being destroyed after bombardment and such as having no access to amenities such as water, electricity and heating for long stretches of time, losing their homes, living in the streets, and having no access to food and water.

3. **Losing Parents or Siblings / Relatives:**

The loss of both or one of the parents is always a traumatic, unforgettable experience in a child’s life. Losing his/her parents, with whom the child develops an emotional bond from the day she/he is born, is a traumatic experience in its own right. Facing the loss of a parent under harsh circumstances such as war is not easy at all for a child. Added to this, it is clear that the death of a parent in a traumatic manner such as due to heavy injury, rape or bombing during a war would affect the child’s life severely for the rest of his/her life. Children’s losing their parent(s) in war is an emotionally charged situation, which is also accompanied by a large amount of uncertainty regarding by whom the child will be cared for. The presence of the parents provides children with a sense of security in overcoming challenges during their lives, especially under war conditions. Being together with their parents allows children to experience a sense of security. Parents are the greatest source of support in protecting them even under the direst circumstances and preventing any adverse oc-
currences that they may suffer. Therefore, when losing parents, children experience a significant emotional void and trauma as they would lose their parents’ love, attention and support, and would not be able to be together with them.

It is also possible that, during wars, children may lose older or younger siblings in addition to their parents. The loss of a sibling is another experience the child would have difficulty in dealing with. Also, the loss of a close relative is also an important traumatic loss a child may experience due to war.

4. Becoming Orphaned:

Losing siblings and relatives in addition to parents causes children to become orphaned. The number of unaccompanied refugee children is estimated to be quite high. Losing their parents and siblings, and thereby being orphaned, children are forced to take shelter with acquaintances, or are taken into state custody. Sometimes the child is adopted by a neighbour, or another family or person with whom they are acquainted. In such case, the child starts living with a family or person, under conditions that are different from those in which they were born. Under conditions of war, even this may not always be possible. The child may have to live in a nursery, together with many other children.

As a result of these experiences, the child encounters many stresses such as the sorrow of losing a parent, sibling or relatives, being orphaned, anxiety towards the future, and living together with others in a new environment.

5. Being Subjected to Child Exploitation:

Sometimes, the lack of an acquaintance to protect and care for the child, and the fact that the child is orphaned, may be seized as an opportunity by ill-intentioned people. Such people may attempt to exploit these orphaned children for various ill-intentioned purposes such as using them as live bombs, in child trafficking, child slavery, child labour, as child soldiers, for child abuse, child pornography, and organ mafia.
Especially if they fall into the hands of ill-intentioned people, they may come across much harsher physical and psycho-social conditions that threaten their lives.

6. Injury and Disability as a Result of Attacks:

As a result of risks such as the large number of bombs used in the war, armed clashes etc., innocent adults and children may also become targets besides soldiers. As a consequence, they may suffer physical injuries that bring important negative changes to their lives, such as injury, loss of limb, and disability.

7. Witnessing/Experiencing Traumatic Experiences:

Under war conditions, children experience many adverse incidents such as the bombing of the homes of many children or adults with whom they are acquainted or not, suffering serious injury, loss of limb, violence or torture, or their death. Different from their peers, children in an environment of war witness many extraordinary adverse situations or sights. This, in turn, causes the child to be subjected to multiple traumatic experiences as a result of war.

8. Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)

Multiple traumatic experiences suffered by children or their loved ones, such as their homes being bombed, serious injuries, loss of limb, suffering violence or torture, and death, cause children to suffer from Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms such as fear, anxiety, and eating, sleeping and behavioural disorders. Such circumstances may have a negative effect on a child’s family, school and social relations.

9. Failure to Attend School / Receive Education:

One of the most important changes war causes in children’s lives is the failure of schools to provide education as a result of being damaged by
bombs. This causes short- or long-term discontinuation in children’s schooling. In a country where there is no war, going to school is an important routine of a child’s daily life.

However, war prevents children from going to school. Children experience severe anxiety because they cannot go to school and they do not know when they will be able to do so again. The destruction of the school building, and the injury, disability or loss of friends and teachers are negative experiences that affect children deeply and cause them to suffer from fear, anxiety, and eating and sleeping disorders.

Also, the loss of parents and relatives, depriving children of adults to take care of them, is a factor that prevents children from continuing with their education. Both the war environment in their own country and the struggle to live in the country to which they migrate may deny the child the opportunity to continue with their education.

10. Language Problems:

The refugees from Syria and their children experience difficulty in Turkey since their native language is Arabic. To these difficult conditions suffered by children in war are added the language barrier along with other problems due to migration. Although translation etc. services are provided in camps for those living in camps, and civil birth registries, healthcare institutions and Social Solidarity and Aid Foundations (SDYV), they come across many problems related to language at many places such as banks, schools and public offices. Children may experience difficulty in understanding the lessons and being successful at school due to the language barrier. In order to solve this problem, schools teaching in the children’s native language have been opened at the refugee camps. At these schools, mostly Syrian teachers provide children with education in their native language. Although this practice offers a solution to the language problem, both the families and the children have to learn Turkish in order not to experience difficulty in Turkey due to the language barrier. Therefore, it is important to provide bilingual education to Syrian children at school, both in Turkish and Arabic languages. Also, compulsory
Turkish language preparatory classes may be another arrangement to help children overcome the language barrier.

11. Socio-cultural Differences

Although bordering each other, Syria and Turkey have many cultural differences. These differences are prominent in spite of the fact that the majority of the population of both countries are Muslims. There are many differences in terms of social life, traditions and customs, cultural structure, values etc. between the two countries. The ratio of the Syrian refugees in the general population compared to other Refugees is very high. This situation brings along a multicultural life. However, negative experiences such as forced migration, violence, loss, disability or death as a result of the war make it difficult for the refugees to adapt to a new country. Also, the socio-cultural differences with the country of migration and the general social perception and attitude concerning the Syrian migrants can cause difficulties in ensuring a multicultural life and mutual tolerance. These difficulties may cause cultural conflict or violence. This may give rise to problems between adults, neighbours and families in social life as well as a grouping and conflicts among children/youths at school.

12. Social Exclusion and Discrimination:

Syrian refugees may come across difficulties regarding social acceptance. It is possible that Syrians occasionally face problems due to living in a country with a different language, traditions and culture. Syrians may come across social exclusion in various environments such as schools, hospitals or public areas. Such discriminative situations may be seen among children too.

13. Accommodation Problems:

Refugees face accommodation problems due to the fact that their homes were bombed before the migration. Accommodation problems also continue in the country of migration. Those living in refugee camps are
accommodated in tents or prefabricated houses provided at the camps. As good as these conditions may be, the camp environment has certain problems and disadvantages. Those living outside refugee camps quite often rent a house for a number of families to live in together to keep the costs at a minimum. Problems arising from such as finding a suitable home, heating, living expenses etc. are experienced. Many problems are caused by more than one family living together. Children also have difficulty to do their homework or study in crowded houses.

14. Health Problems:

One of the main problems for refugees is health. Health problems may be caused by the war in Syria as well as dehydration, hunger, fatigue suffered during migration in long journeys. Being injured or getting sick during the war or the process of migration while not having access to medicine and treatment may cause various chronic health problems. Having greater difficulty in enduring these negative conditions, children are under a greater risk of sickness. If interventions addressing this problem are overlooked during other processes in the countries of migration, the problem can grow and become chronic.

15. Economic Problems:

People migrating from Syria to Turkey may encounter different social and economic problems in their new lives. Syrian refugees experience many economic stresses including finding accommodation, paying their rents, finding employment, earning a regular income, and meeting their families’ needs. These conditions, like all members of families, adversely affect access by children to accommodation, food, healthcare and education.

The war in Syria causes children to come across multi-faceted traumatic experiences such as witnessing many negative incidents such as losing their relatives and remaining orphaned and without protection. Before overcoming the impact of such traumatic experiences, families and children experience another challenging experience such as migration. In countries in which they take shelter as refugees and where a different
language is spoken, they are forced to live in a setting with which they are unfamiliar, under different traditions, customs and culture.

These difficulties and traumas they experience cause children to have difficulty especially in going to school, succeeding in school, concentrating on their courses, developing harmonious relations with their teachers and friends etc. This, in turn, has an effect on the child’s adaptation and attendance to school.

**International and National Arrangements the Child’s Right to Education**

One of the fundamental problems experienced by children of families arriving in Turkey due to the civil war in Syria is the fact that they are forced to experience an interruption in their education. It is very important that refugee children are provided with the opportunity to continue their education in Turkey from where they left before migration. There are various international and national arrangements to ensure that migrants and asylum-seekers and their children receive education in the country of migration. The education of migrants and asylum-seekers in the countries of migration are secured under such legal arrangements. Based on these arrangements, practices addressing the education of refugees and their children in different countries are evaluated and reported on. Changes required in countries of migration are explained, and recommendations on these are made. Care must be taken to prevent refugees and children from being subjected to discrimination especially while enjoying their right to education. These arrangements may be summarised as follows (Tüzün, 2009: 24-29):

1. The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) draws attention to the fact that women who are members of minorities face multiple discrimination based on their ethnic origins and genders with respect to the right to education. It expresses that states must take legal and administrative measures and provide social assistance in order to overcome this problem.
2. The committee has indicated that non-citizens may enjoy their right
to education “regardless of their legal statuses.” This is very important especially in enabling those entering a country illegally (such as asylum-seekers, unregistered migrants, stateless individuals) to enjoy their right to education.

3. Drawing attention to the fact that discrimination based on race and ethnicity may manifest in the form of violence, emphasis was placed on the possibility of such violence to be seen in an educational setting. It is indicated that another important element preventing access to education at schools is the possibility of violence based on race and ethnicity. Therefore, it is important that states fulfil their obligation of eliminating discrimination in accessing education. It is emphasised that states must combat violence based on race and ethnicity in order to prevent such discrimination.

4. The committee has also drawn attention to the fact that harassment and discrimination that may be experienced at school may also originate from the children’s classmates and their families. States are requested to consider this situation and take precautions.

5. It is indicated that the language problem may constitute an important barrier for foreigners in education. Emphasis has been placed on the importance of providing education in two languages or in the native language in order to ensure the integration of children, whose native languages are different from the country’s official language, into the education system in the country of migration.

6. The committee overseeing the implementation of the treaty recommends Party States to remove the obstacles before the access of non-citizens to education, under the heading of “Discrimination Towards Non-citizens.” Recommendations were also made to ensure the access of “children of non-citizens and unregistered migrants” to public schools.

As a result of migration waves taking place in various times in Turkey, it is seen that various arrangements have been made in Turkey to allow asylum-seekers and refugees to enjoy their right to education. On the subject, the Ministry of National Education (MEB) published the circular no. 2003/3 in February 2003. Accordingly, “Foreigners whose asylum
and refuge requests are being examined and who have obtained residence permit under refugee status may enrol their children of schooling age, without an education visa being required, provided that they can document their statuses (Tüzün, 2009: 68).

The first comprehensive legal arrangement addressing foreigners, refugees and asylum-seekers living in Turkey was prepared in 2014, when the number of the Syrian population in Turkey had neared two million. With these two circulars published by MEB on 26 April 2013 and 26 September 2013, the risk of unforeseeable problems connected with Syrian families’ children, who are kept away from education for a long period, was started to be acknowledged. With these circulars, MEB made efforts to create solutions to the Syrians’ educational problems through various activities (Seydi, 2014, quoted by Emin, 2016).

The circular entitled “Precautions Addressing Syrian Citizens Accommodated Outside Camps in Our Country” is the first official document prepared by MEB on the subject. However, this Circular was prepared in order to identify and allocate venues that provide, or may provide, education to Syrian children living outside camps rather than as a policy identifying a solution for their education (Emin, 2016: 13).

On 26 September 2013, MEB published a second and more comprehensive circular entitled “Educational Services Addressing Syrian Citizens under Temporary Protection in Our Country.” This second circular contained the following arrangements regarding the education of children (Emin, 2016: 13):

- Providing an education opportunity to Syrian children within camps, whose education was interrupted, which will prevent them from losing years,
- The educational services to be carried out should be coordinated by MEB,
- Commissioning, by MEB, of teachers above the norm in that province in order to meet the need for teachers, while commissioning persons with a knowledge of the Arabic language and who meet the requirements, in exchange for course fees, in order to close the gap in teaching staff,
• In the same manner, commissioning, on a voluntary basis, of teachers from among the Syrian citizens or those considered qualified to teach by MEB, who wish to educate children,
• The education curriculum should be prepared by the Syrian National Coalition Higher Education Commission under MEB’s control,
• Syrians of Turkish origin should be allowed to receive education under the Turkish curriculum upon their request,
• Turkish language and vocational training courses should be opened for Syrians wishing to learn Turkish,
• Those of the Syrians outside the camps, who hold a residence permit, should be enrolled to schools under circular no. 2011/48 of 16 August 2010 entitled “Foreign National Students.”

As seen, the second circular dated 26 September 2013 brings a larger scope of arrangements for the education of refugees and their children.

Following this, Law No. 6458 on “Foreigners and International Protection (YUKK)” was enacted in April 2014. Thanks to the “Temporary Protection Regulation” taking effect in October 2014, the Syrians obtained the right to “access to healthcare, education and social aid services.” Consequently, the educational services to be provided to the Syrian children were brought under a certain standard and ensured under Circular No. 2014/21 of 23 September 2014, entitled “Educational Services Addressing Foreigners.” In its Strategic Plan of 2015-2019, for the first time MEB included planning addressed to the education of refugees (Emin, 2016: 16).

Also, work was carried out to facilitate the adaptation of Syrian children to Turkish society and the Turkish Education System. In this scope, preschool and primary school first year students were transferred to public schools. Private schools were also opened by Syrians. Syrians are also able to provide education according to the Syrian curriculum in buildings assigned to them by the Turkish government or which they contacted through their own means. For instance, private schools were opened for Syrian children in Istanbul, Bahçelievler. Such schools are also seen in the provinces of Istanbul, Şanlıurfa and Gaziantep, where there is a
large Syrian population. Such practices may be shown as examples to Turkey’s policies towards solution for Syrian asylum seekers’ education problems (Emin, 2016: 16).

International rules, and national arrangements made in Turkey with regard to the education of asylum-seekers and refugees and their children, are important in that they ensure the children’s right to education as well as allowing them access to education without encountering discrimination. It is believed that the education opportunities for Syrian refugees and their children in Turkey will improve in time, and that the required regulations will be carried out.

**Needs and Problems Experienced by Refugees and Their Children in Turkey Regarding Education**

A large part of asylum-seekers and refugees do not speak Turkish. Due to the language barrier, they are not able to communicate, and do not know where to turn to with respect to their problems. They come across various problems that differ according to the provinces, districts and settlements in which they live. The shared problems of the asylum-seekers are lack of adequate accommodation, healthcare and food, cultural incompatibility, children’s failure to continue with their education, and being subjected to social exclusion (SİGSİP, 2013: 11).

According to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), receiving education is a fundamental right, and all states are obliged to provide all children with free compulsory basic education (CRC, Articles 28, 29). Also, education has been defined as an effective and important method of protection for displaced children. School is considered a more protected environment against “conscription, abuse and exploitation” for displaced children. Participating in education and recreational activities such as sports at school can help the child overcome the trauma caused by the violence and conflict environment in the war as well as displacement.

According to Article 42 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, no individual may be deprived of their right to education. However, Article 27 of the above-mentioned regulation provides that education oppor-
opportunities for individuals residing in Turkey under refugee and guest status are conditional (SİGSİP, 2013: 17)

However, it is understood from the SİGSİP (Platform for Monitoring Asylum-Seekers from Syria in Istanbul, 2013) Report that none of the children of compulsory schooling age were able to continue with their education during the first years of migration from Syria to Turkey. The report indicates that, since no arrangement has been made with regard to Syrian children of schooling age despite September, which is the beginning of the new academic term, having passed, Turkey has violated the treaties to which it is a party while also obstructing the children’s right to education. It is indicated that the President of the Association for Solidarity with Syrian Refugees living in İzmir applied to the Provincial Directorate of National Education, requesting three schools to be assigned to Syrian students between certain hours of the day, and that this request was denied. The same report also states that the request was denied in spite of the fact that the President of the Association for Solidarity with Syrian Refugees indicated to the MEB Provincial Directorate of National Education that they only request venues for classes and that they would supply the books and teachers themselves. It is stated that consequently, they were not able to respond to the children’s families on the issue of jobs and the education of the children.

It is indicated that the Governor of İzmir said, on the subject, that 1,600 classrooms are being built as the demand cannot be met, and that no education could be provided by just assigning 5 teachers to one building and putting the children in this building. Also stating that doing this straight away would not be easy in the first instance, the Governor indicated that humanitarian contributions as much as possible were made, but the centre of attraction was not there, but the border zone. The Governor's Office stated that tent cities already provide education, but such requests by those applying without identity cards or passports in metropolises could not be met due to security reasons (SİGSİP, 2013: 18).

In connection with the above, the issue of opening schools of a different curriculum for Syrian Asylum Seekers reveals the contradiction in this matter; the provision of education by a school bearing the Free Syri-
an Army (FSA) flag at central Reyhanlı was brought to attention, and Hatay MP Mevlüt Dudu brought the issue to Parliament. This was followed by a written statement made by the Governorate of Hatay on the subject, which specified that

“... The venue indicated to be a school is a place where counselling services are provided to Syrians and children who have arrived legally in our country with passports and who hold residence permits; it is in the status of a counselling centre where rehabilitation services are provided to the Syrian children who have escaped the war in Syria and who have taken shelter in our country...”

During interviews held in Istanbul, it was found out that a school providing education in Arabic was opened in Zeytinburnu for Syrian Arabs, but the information was not confirmed. Comments on the above situations point out to unequal practices and even discrimination caused by differences in practice in different provinces. The SİGSİP report indicates that this situation is the most obvious example of the fact that no arrangement has been made concerning the education of the refugee children (SİGSİP, 2013: 18-19).

It is believed that such practices should be considered natural while arrangements regarding the refugee children’s education are still under-way during the first phases when Syrian refugees entered Turkey.

Other Administrative and Legal Arrangements Regarding Children

The field of migration is a dynamic and multi-dimensional subject that requires cooperation and coordination at national and international level and that deeply concerns Turkey’s economic, socio-cultural and demographic structure, its public policy and security. In spite of this, before the migration influx to Turkey from Syria, there was no public body specialised in migration, which could be considered an authority. A competent corporate structure was required for the effective management of migration issues. To this end, the Directorate-General of Migration Management was formed under the Ministry of the Interior. The
forming of this Directorate-General, which is similar to other examples in the world and which develops and implements strategy and up-to-date policies regarding the issue of migration in Turkey, is focused on human rights and is equipped with qualified personnel and a strong financial infrastructure, is important for the coordination of services addressing refugees of all ages (GİGM, 2017).

Along with this administrative structuring addressed to the production of policies and services for the solution of the needs and problems of refugees and refugee children in Turkey, there are also legal arrangements at international and national level. One of these legal arrangements is Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection (YUKK). YUKK became effective after having been published in Official Journal Issue 28615 of 11.04.2013 (GİGM, 2017). All these efforts are very important steps in terms of securing all rights and the right to education of accompanied or unaccompanied refugee children.

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) adopted in 1989 and brought into force in 1990, is an international convention. This convention includes certain arrangements regarding all children including refugee children. This convention, which was brought into force in Turkey in 1995, ensures that all children under the age of 18 within the boundaries of Turkey would be under the state’s protection and that the provisions of the convention would be implemented (SİGSİP, 2013:19-20).

The CRC draws attention to the provision of children’s fundamental human rights such as health, accommodation and education. Also, a special emphasis is placed on the unity of family and the reuniting of families. Along with fundamental humanitarian services addressing children, the CRC also contains provisions ensuring children to enjoy all of their rights, particularly the rights to stay with their families, their education, and protection against violence and abuse. Since the provisions of the CRC ensure protection of all children within the jurisdiction of a certain country, children who are citizens, as well as refugee children are also protected (CRC, 1989, Articles 8, 10, 20).

According to Provisions 41/III and IV entitled “Protection of the Famili-

“Every child is entitled to enjoy protection and care, and to be in, and maintain, a personal and direct relation with their parents unless this is against their best interests.” (Additional paragraph: 12/9/2010-- art. 5982/4).


According to these provisions of the Constitution, every child within the boundaries of the Republic of Turkey is entitled to protection and care. The Turkish State has undertaken to take protective measures in protecting all children within the country against all kinds of abuse and violence. The Law on the Protection of Children, too, brings the necessary arrangements to ensure that children living within the Republic of Turkey enjoy protection and rights.

The duties and responsibilities of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies have been defined in the following articles of the law as follows (SİGSİP, 2013: 20):;

“In order to ensure the healthy development of children by protecting them against all kinds of negligence and abuse, coordinating national policies and strategies, conducting social services and aid activities towards children, and ensuring cooperation and coordination between concerned public institutions and voluntary corporations in this area.” (Article. 2 Sub-Paragraph c)

“Monitoring international developments and activities in the field of social services and aid, supporting these and assessing them in order to make use of them in the activities to be conducted, and ensuring the nation-wide implementation of international treaties and conventions in this field to which we are party.” (Article 2 Sub-paragraph j)

In other worlds, according to both the CRC and the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, the Syrian children in Turkey are entitled to protection, care and protection from all kinds of violence regardless of their
legal status, by virtue of the mere fact that they are children. At local level, Mukhtar’s Offices, Municipalities, District Governors and Governors, Provincial Directorates of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, Provincial Directorates of Health, Provincial Directorates of National Education, and Provincial Directorates of Security Forces are responsible for carrying out this duty.

There are certain problems experienced in practice in spite of all international and national legal arrangements. A large part of refugee children fail to receive education services. They are also unable to receive psycho-social support services to ensure the rehabilitation of the trauma they experienced.

Refugees, particularly children, are unable to receive adequate nutrition.

In order to meet their families’ needs, many refugee children work without social security, under very bad conditions. Part of these children begs on the streets. These children are unprotected on the streets against any risk of abuse.

Very low wages are paid to adult or children refugees and asylum-seekers who have to work without being insured in daily jobs. In some cases they receive unfair treatment by not being paid. In spite of this, they cannot seek their rights as they do not know where to apply to. It is seen that refugees and asylum-seekers that are employed without being insured face unfair treatment. Both adults as well as their children are affected negatively by these circumstances (SİGSİP, 2013).

Also, asylum-seekers living in various places of Turkey, outside camps, are unable to take advantage of the healthcare, food, education and accommodation facilities provided to the Syrians living in camps (SİGSİP, 2013: 31). For this reason, both adult and child refugees from Syria who have migrated to Turkey live in different conditions. While the Syrian refugees living in the camps are better positioned to benefit from the facilities and services, those living outside camps are disadvantaged in this respect.

In other words, neither the CRC, nor the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, the Law on the Protection of Children nor
any other legal arrangements place legal obstacles for refugee children in Turkey to enjoy their rights. According to these arrangements, the Syrian children in Turkey are entitled to protection, care and protection from all kinds of violence regardless of their legal status, by virtue of the mere fact that they are children. At local level, Mukhtar’s Offices, Municipalities, District Governors and Governors, Provincial Directorates of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, Provincial Directorates of Health, Provincial Directorates of National Education, and Provincial Directorates of Security Forces are responsible for carrying out this duty.

Some uncertainty was experienced during the first phase of the migration movement. However, necessary arrangements on this subject were made to find a solution to such problems. Although arrangements were also made to ensure that right to education of the Syrian refugee children is not interrupted, certain families and children, especially those living outside the camps, had difficulty in receiving services. To address such problems, work shall be carried out urgently with cooperation between Ministries such as the Ministry of the Interior, Directorate-General of Migration Management, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of National Education and the Ministry of Labour, and Non-Governmental Organisations.

School Social Work That May be Carried Out to Address Syrian Refugee Children At Schools

It is important to carry out psycho-social work under school social work in order to monitor the refugee children to the end of preventing them from staying away from education, and to ensure their integration with school life.

Ensuring that the children continue their education without being subjected to any social exclusion at school by teachers, classmates and their parents should be considered among the primary goals. This requires various arrangements to ensure an atmosphere of tolerance and sensitivity at school, which are requirements of a multi-cultural life.
In Turkey, especially child refugees have an important place among the Syrian migrants. Conducting school social work addressing children in order to minimise the risk they face during and after migration, and to enable them to cope with their trauma and to adapt to normal life will be useful for ensuring their adaptation to Turkey. The circumstances suffered by both accompanied and unaccompanied refugee children during the migration are very challenging experiences. To summarise these:

- The environment of war they experienced in Syria,
- The loss of parents and other family members in the war,
- The violence they suffered and witnessed during the war,
- The challenging migration process that followed,
- The difficulties caused by living in a new country with a different language and different customs,
- The difficulties caused by living in a new country with a different language, culture and education system,
- The early marriage age of especially unaccompanied children (child brides),
- The capture of especially unaccompanied children by illegal organisations, and their facing dangerous situations such as organ trafficking, sex trafficking, child pornography and child trafficking,
- Physical, emotional, sexual and economic negligence and abuse suffered especially by unaccompanied children in the hands of their relatives with whom they are staying, or people that they do not know, etc.

The solution of such problems suffered by refugee children, protecting them against the risks, dangerous circumstances etc. they face, and their being raised in a safe environment, which is their right like all other children, are very important. For this purpose, the Syrian children must first be schooled, and all interventions required within the scope of school social work must be conducted. The work to be carried out under this scope can be listed as:
1. Refugee children may be associated with a “Child Protection System” as soon as they are admitted into Turkey. To this end, situations that pose a risk concerning children entering the country (the status of being accompanied, being subjected to trauma, having been forced to early marriage, facing a hazardous situation etc.) must be communicated to the Directorate-General of Child Services of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies (ASPB), and the ASPB Provincial Directorates of Social Services.

2. The examination, intervention and monitoring work regarding the children communicated to the ASPB Provincial Directorates of Social Services must be carried out by a case manager social worker to be commissioned by the Provincial Directorates of Social Services.

3. Such case manager must make the necessary arrangements to ensure that the refugee child is protected against risks, lives in a safe environment and continues their education from where they left, and intervention and monitoring must be carried out against their traumatic experiences.

4. It is necessary to provide the child with psychological support during this process, ensure support through approaches such as play therapy etc., allow them to continue their education, and provide language etc. services in order to help them adapt to life in Turkey.

5. Establishing the child’s connection with school, allowing them to attend school as part of normal life like their peers, and preventing them from staying away from school is especially important. Continuing with school and normal life is very important in helping the child to overcome the trauma experienced during migration.

6. The ASPB case manager and the MEB school social worker may cooperate to play an important role in overcoming many problems and increasing the child’s adaptation and success in school.

7. The school and the school social worker have important roles and duties in continuing the child’s connection with education, their monitoring at school, finding immediate solutions to their prob-
lems and ensuring their linguistic development.

8. The school social worker monitors the child’s progress in cooperation with the case manager working at the ASPB Provincial Directorate of Social Services. In this way, they may immediately notify the case manager on any difficulties the child encounters at school. This cooperation allows quick intervention for the solution of the child’s problems at school.

9. Children face problems related to the language barrier especially at school. In order to solve this problem, education is provided in the children’s native language at the refugee camps. However, although this may offer a solution to the language problem at school, the children also have to learn Turkish to pursue their lives in Turkey. For this reason, providing bilingual education is important.

10. Social exclusion can cause grouping, social isolation or clashes between the students at school. Carrying out work to ensure that the Syrians, especially the Syrian refugee children are accepted at schools may yield useful results. To this end, projects addressing the public, aiming to increase social sensitivity may be conducted. Conducting such activities both at the public level as well as for children at schools would prevent potential clashes.

11. Work needs to be conducted to ensure an atmosphere of mutual tolerance in the society and to allow multi-cultural life.

School social work will be the greatest supporter of the child and their family in allowing the children to enjoy their right to education, ensuring their social integration, and solving the psychosocial and economic problems they encounter.

The school social worker carry out their professional intervention focused on an ecosystem approach and a holistic approach covering the “child, family, school and society.” While conducting such intervention, they carry out team work with the teachers, school staff and school prin-
ciper within the school, and with professionals in institutions such as hospitals under the Ministry of Health (SB), the Social Mental Health Centre, ASPB, the Ministry of Justice (AB), the Governor’s Offices, and the District Governor’s Offices outside the school. The following may be given as examples for certain work that may be carried out with other institutions: MEB, ASPB and SB may conduct joint work for an unaccompanied refugee child requiring protection.

MEB may work with AB for a refugee child forced to partake in crime. SB may cooperate with the Mental Health Centre for a refugee child and their family, who have suffered trauma. SB may work with AMATEM (Alcohol and Substance Addiction Treatment Centre) for a refugee child with substance addiction.

While carrying out this work, the School Social Worker takes as basis the three intervention levels of the social services profession:

- Working with the individual and the family, “micro level social work intervention”
- Working with groups, “mezzo level social work intervention”
- Working with the public, social work management and organisation, “macro level social work intervention”

The following may be given as examples for the professional interventions of the social work profession for refugee children:

- Working with the individual and the family, “micro level social work intervention:” Organising house visits to refugee children who do not attend school, preparing a psychosocial examination and evaluation report on why they cannot attend school, to communicate the condition of the child to ASPB, and to ensure cooperation etc.
- Working with groups, “mezzo level social work intervention:” Employing group work methods and techniques on unaccompanied children who start school, in order to conduct supportive work to help them cope with the trauma they experienced, etc.
- Working with the public, social work management and organisation, “macro level social work intervention”
At tent cities where a larger number of refugee children are staying, conducting project work targeting the adaptation of children to school, overcoming the language barrier and coping with traumatic experiences. While conducting such work, making use of the public resources to organise the provision of trainers for artistic activities from public education centres, ensuring that children receive services from the hospital according to their trauma experience, cooperating with families, conducting family training, and conducting awareness-raising work with school staff concerning their approach to the children etc.

**Conclusion**

Since all such work may be realised by employing a school social worker at school, social workers must be employed by schools in Turkey under MEB and at Counselling and Research Centres (RAM) in order that such services may be provided to refugee children. It is a very important priority that the “school social work” function, which has been employed at schools across the world for over a hundred years in the USA, in European countries and even in Far Eastern countries, the services of which are offered not only to refugee children, but all children at the school, finds the place it deserves in Turkey within the MEB system without further delay.

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CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE IMPACT OF ASYLUM CRISIS ON MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION: THE CASE OF TURKEY

Starting with the self-immolation of the twenty-six year-old Tunisian Muhammed Buazizi on 17 December 2010 the Arab Spring involved public demonstrations with the demand of a governing system serving for a fair and transparent society in place of the anti-democratic government. Approximately one month after the demonstrations started, Zeynel Abidin Bin Ali was forced to leave Tunisia. This was regarded as a development giving credibility to the idea that the anti-democratic governments across the countries of North Africa and Arabian Peninsula would be replaced with democratic government in a near future. The following chain of events, however, has been in total contradiction with this optimistic expectation. The Tunisian case turned into an exceptional one in which an anti-democratic government was successfully toppled. In Algeria, for instance, public demonstrations could not challenge dominant position of the President Abdulaziz Buteflika who managed to be elected for the fourth term by winning the 88 percent of the votes. In Egypt and Libya, the Mubarek and Kaddafi regimes have been toppled; yet democratic governments have not been established so far. The public demonstrations in Bahrain, Yemen and Syria were violently crushed. Nevertheless, the Syria differs from Bahrain and Yemen for suffering from a long-term civil war between anti-regime and pro-regime groups. The civil war prompted the unprecedented forced immigration of the post-Second World War period. An overwhelming majority of the Syrian immigrants have been hosted by Turkey. As indicated by Murat Erdogan, in his article titled “The Outline of Living Together with Syri-

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an Refugees in Turkey,” Syria has turned into a terrain of power struggle including the global and the regional powers.

According to the data collected by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) more than five millions of Syrians had to flee their country from April 2011 to September 2016. This unavoidably caused significant changes in the demographic structure of neighboring countries including Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan. For sharing the longest border with Syria, being one of the G-20 countries and locating along the route towards European countries - the final destination for most Syrians - Turkey has been the most affected country by the forced immigration. The data obtained by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, more than three millions of registered Syrian refugees reside in Turkey.4

The flow of the Syrian people into Turkey since 2014 was so intense that Turkey became the country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world. Broadly speaking, the forced immigration has both positive and negative effect on the country’s legislation and economic and social structure. While it is important to grasp the positive and negative consequences, making policy suggestions concerning the legal regulations and the welfare system are also needed. This study titled ‘Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey: Findings and Suggestions’ consists of articles aiming to address this gap. In doing so, the project combines the studies detecting economic and social impact of forced immigration and those seeking to formulate policies for economic and social problems.

In the articles included in this study, the three views on the policies concerning the Syrian refugees have been highlighted. The first view is that Turkey’s open-door policy towards the Syrian refugees conforms to the established norms of the 14th Article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the obligations arising from the country’s international commitments and the close bond between Turks and Syrians forged by the

4 Of the recorded migrants, 53.2% are male and 46.8% are female. As the 0-17 age group comprises a 44.7 rate of the total Syrian migrant population, this is an attention-grabbing concern calling for an immediate search for a solution in terms of the social and economic problems of the immigrants. Please see the following for Syrian refugee numbers in Turkey and a detailed information on the settlement of refugees by various criteria. http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224 (11 July 2017).
common culture. Yet, because only a small portion of the promised external financial aids have been given to Turkey, it has been emphasized that Turkey has resorted to using its own financial resources in dealing with issues.

The second view is that, a paradigm defining the problem as a “permanent one” rather than a “temporary one” must be adopted. In this context, as indicated by Özer and et al. in the article titled “The Transformation of Turkey’s Education Policies for Migrants and Refugees,” Turkey has begun to deem the issue “permanent one” since 2013; yet this paradigm shift needs to be further reinforced. The article discussing the attendance of Syrian children and youths to education programs emphasizes that, as a positive consequence of this paradigm shift, the Regulation of the Ministry of National Education dated September 2014 lifted some of the bureaucratic obstacles to formal schooling of the Syrians, though the system still has its shortcomings. A similar conclusion has been drawn from a comparative analysis on the content of the “the Law on Foreigners and International Protection No 6458” came into effect in April 2013. This comparative analysis conducted in Sağiroğlu’s article titled “Central Migration Management in Turkey” suggests that there has been an improvement in legal regulations concerning the management of migration crisis. As stated in Murat Erdoğan’s article, because there is a very low possibility for Syrian migrants to return their country, Turkey should embrace “permanent-problem approach.” Third, assuming that the public policies ensuring the social integration of the Syrian people into society are formulated, Turkey will further strengthen its economic and cultural relations with the Middle East and North African countries in future. Likewise, the implementation of such policies will allow Turkey to take its place in the process of Syria’s economic and social re-structuring in the post-Syrian crisis period.

The three interrelated essential conditions for the success of public policies have been emphasized in the project. These conditions are par-

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particularly important for ensuring ‘the state capacity’, which has been discussed in detail in Kıvanç Ulusoy’s article titled “Syrian Refugees in Turkey: A Test for the State’s Capacity.” An effective state capacity - a sine qua non for the smooth implementation of public policies - an approach excluding people from the decision-making process and turning blind eye on people’s demands must be avoided. The first condition is that the scope of cooperation between international, national and local entities should be clearly determined without allowing any ambiguity. This will prevent conflicts of authority in the implementation of public policies. Thus, not only public policies will be enforced effectively but also any factors increasing the costs of the crisis management plans, such as recurrence humanitarian aid to the same refugee by different actors, will be eliminated. This will help to keep the costs at an optimum level. Effective coordination between international and national institutions will help the protection of social integrity; in other words, ensuring the harmony between the native people and the immigrants. Regarding the importance of social integrity, Murat Erdogan suggests the following: “without the improvement of local harmonization processes, it is impossible for central regulations to be enforced in Ankara to reach their objectives.” In Ahmet Koyuncu’s article titled “A Blessing? A Burden? An Annotation on Turkey’s Syrian Asylum Seekers and Migration Economy,” it is suggested that social integrity will play an important role in two ways. First, it will decrease the tension between the native people and the immigrants, which is likely to be stemmed from the conflicting economic interests. Second, the Syrians will contribute to national economy if they take place in the work-force of the country. This suggestion is significant for conflicting with the discourse presented by radical right-wing parties, which are also labeled as ‘anti-immigrant parties,’ in West European countries. It should be noted that these parties have been supported by a non-negligible number of voters since the mid-1980s.

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Yusuf Adigüzél’s article titled “The Cultural Integration of Migrants”-carrying out a comparative analysis on harmonization policies (integration vs. assimilation) of the various countries concludes that the social harmony can be best ensured through the integration-oriented policies that will foster a multi-cultural society rather than the assimilation-oriented policies which may lead to marginalization of the immigrant population. This article also highlights the necessity of establishing positive relations between the local people and immigrants as a precondition for successful integration policies. Towards this end, effective language teaching policies are required. The fulfilment of this requirement will foster social capital between Turkish and Syrian people; thereby, averting social unrest that can be deliberately triggered on the grounds of the lack of social cohesion. This view complies with the findings of academic studies on the profile of electorate voting for anti-immigrant parties in West European countries. Accordingly, voters positively interacting with immigrant population are very less likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties. Likewise, Sare Aydin Yilmaz’s article titled “Syrian Refugee Women: Migration Trauma and Integration” concludes that learning the language is a necessary condition for the development of the feeling of belonging to a society. In fact, language learning will help the Syrians to interact with the local people and subsequently increase the extent of social capital between the two groups. Ahmet Koyuncu stresses that the Syrian workers who cannot communicate with their employers are unable to express their needs and complaints properly; furthermore, the workers who have been forced to work under minimum wages cannot voice their complaints to relevant authorities. Learning the language will effectively eliminate these problems. The achievement of these inter-related three conditions will make the effective coordination between institutions possible and that is vitally important to prevent the emergence of security-related issues. In that regard, Gülden Ayman’s article titled “Are Syrian Refugees a Matter of Security?” examines the internal and external safety issues that can be emanated from the forced immigration and emphasizes the importance of coordination.

between national and international institutions for recognizing the people who have engaged in terrorist organizations and came to Turkey through porous borders between Syria and Turkey in the previous years.

As indicated in Adem Esen’s article titled “Irregular International Migration and Local Governments,” due to insufficiency of settlement policy, Syrian refugees have scattered particularly throughout city centers including Istanbul. As a corollary of this, 91 percent of the Syrian refugees live in city centers rather than in refugee camps. This has unavoidably brought the migration-related problems to city centers. In addressing the problems occurring in city centers, municipalities, what Murat Erdoğan calls ‘invisible heroes’ are crucial actors for two reasons. The first reason is that, unlike central and international actors, municipalities have the capacity for establishing a closer connection with the immigrants. The second reason is that municipalities are closely subjected to the negative effects of the sudden flow of immigrants into the city centers. In fact, the rise in a city population has considerably increased the workload of the municipalities. Adem Esen classifies the services that have already been provided to immigrant population by municipalities under the following subheadings: “housing (shelter)”, “water and sewage services”, “public transport”, “social assistance”, “education”, and “funeral services.” A detailed discussion on each service is also made in the article with a particular emphasis on municipalities in the Southeastern Anatolian Region. The increase in the budget expenditures of the Gaziantep municipality due to increase in workload is remarkable. According to the report dated April 2016, the municipality’s expenditures for the provision of social service to Syrian immigrants reached 845,628,832TL. This figure is equal to 20 percent of the total budget of the municipality for the period between 2011 and 15.10 It is should be noted that although certain municipalities have displayed a relative success in providing services, the insufficiency of the legal regulations on the calculation of the money that is to be allocated to a specific municipality from the central government imposes a heavy financial burden on municipal administrations. Here, the example of Kilis is striking, which is also mentioned in

Murat Erdogan’s article. Before the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, the population of Kilis was about 90,000; yet this number reached over 200,000 in the aftermath of the Syrian civil war. Nevertheless, the amount of money allocated to the Kilis municipality by the central government has been calculated through ignoring the immigrant population. This is the result of the existing regulation that takes the population of the Turkish citizens residing in the municipality into account in the calculation of the budget to be allocated. Adem Esen emphasizes the necessity for amending the existing regulation in such a way that the money could be calculated through considering the total population of the city including both native and immigrant population.

The articles included in this study emphasize three features related to the demographic structure of Syrian refugees in Turkey. The first feature is that those under 18 years old and the young population compose 55 percent of the refugees. The second feature is that women and children refugees needing a special protection constitute approximately 75 percent of the total refugee population. The third feature is that ninety-five refugees (out of one-hundred) are unskilled workers. This data clearly shows the necessity of effective schooling and education policies that will support the integration of the Syrian refugees. Otherwise, especially the children and youth population are likely to become the “risk group” in the coming years. This risk group may cause the rise in the number of individuals participating into incidents that may deteriorate the social harmony and the public order. It should be noted that studies on radical right parties in West European countries have widely concluded that the increase in crime rates bolsters the electoral support given to anti-immigrant parties.11 In that regard, Ozer, and et al. emphasize the need for determining long-term and comprehensive education and schooling policies for the Syrian children and youths. Rather than unqualified temporary education centers, which have already suffered from limited finance and can offer short-term solutions at most, the educational institutions that will offer long-term solutions should be established and supported under the

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supervision of the Ministry of National Education. In Nurdan Duman’s article, titled “School Social Work Toward Syrian Refugee Children” and examining the factors causing psychological and economic problems for Syrian refugee children, the necessity of provision of psychological support to the children and the importance of educational institutions in removing this necessity are highlighted. Besides Syrian children and youth migrants, Syrian women refugees are members of the group who are in need of special protection. As indicated in the reports of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Syrian refugee women have widely been exposed to physical assault and sexual harassment.

Emphasizing that there is a direct relationship between the integration of Syrian refugee women into the society they live in and the education level, Sare Aydin Yılmaz also underlines the need to formulate public policies in the field of education encompassing women as well. This will work for the elimination of the psychological traumas of the war felt by the Syrian women at most. The expansion of shelters for women under the strict control of the government will bring a solution to the problem of forced marriage, a problem widely faced by the Syrian refugee women.¹²

This study includes articles making discussions revolving around the contribution of the Syrian refugees to workforce in Turkey as well as the potential contribution to the Syrian economy after the end of the crisis. Ahmet Koyuncu throws doubt on the suggestion that the Syrian refugees have only imposed negative effects on the nation’s economy. Koyuncu emphasizes the importance of the Syrian refugees in meeting the demands for workforce in seasonal sectors and manufacturing industry. Thus, Koyuncu argues that the further inclusion of the Syrian refugees into the workforce will ensure a positive contribution to the nation’s economy.

In addition, personal connections of skilled Syrian refugees can increase the trade volume between Turkey and countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Çağrı Levent Uslu and Gökçe Bayındır Goularas examine the contribution of the Syrian refugees to the Turkish economy from a different perspective in their article titled “The Contribution by Mi-

grants and Refugees to Their Countries of Origin: The Syria Example.” Emphasizing the fact that the Turkish and Polish immigrants working abroad contributed to the economy of their country of origin through transferring their earnings to their homeland, the article suggests that the Syrian workers can also play an important role in restructuring of the Syrian economy after the end of crisis. This will facilitate the improvement of strong mutual economic and cultural relations between Turkey and Syria in the future.

References:


13 For an a detailed discussion on the contribution of Turkish immigrants working in Germany to the Turkish economy, please see the following: Gottfried E. Völker (1976). Turkish Labor Migration to Germany: Impact on Both Economies.’ Middle Eastern Studies 12 / 1, pp. 45 - 72.


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